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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies how the interactions between different levels of government
influence the distribution of transfers to local governments and local taxation focusing in
particular on the role of strategic policy makers.
Chapter 1 examines the distribution of intergovernmental grants and shows that dis-
tributing federal funds to local governments through states may increase politically-driven
misallocation of funds. I adapt a probabilistic voting model to study the political incen-
tives facing politicians in a setting with three levels of government and compare federal
transfers distributed directly to localities versus those passed through states. Using data on
federal awards and subawards from the United States, I show that expected higher voter
turnout and lower ideological polarization are associated with higher federal and state
intergovernmental grants. Applying the empirical estimates to the model yields a measure
of politics-driven resource misallocation equal to 1.9-5.9% of the value of targetable pass-
through intergovernmental grants. This shows that intermediated distribution of federal
grants increases opportunities for politically motivated misallocation.
Chapter 2, joint with Thomas Brosy, analyzes the effect of falling home prices associated
with the Great Recession on local property tax revenues. In order to assess the magnitude
of the crisis’ effect on the finances of local governments, we collected data on historical
local property tax revenues and assessed values and tax rates for 44 states in the U.S. We
leverage this novel dataset to study the two channels through which falling home prices
affected property tax revenues: a mechanical channel through which home values affected
assessed values, and a policy channel through which policymakers responded to changes
in the tax base. We find that the mechanical correlation between home-price changes and
assessed values after 2007 was smaller than before the crisis. From the policy side, our
analysis shows that negative shocks to the tax base were offset by as much as 80-85% on
average in the long run by increases in the tax rate. In addition, rate limits played a role
in reducing the ability of policymakers to offset negative shocks to the tax base and lead to
a bigger decline in revenues. Overall, we find that the effect of the recession on property
x
tax revenues was smaller than assumed but negative and lasting.
Chapter 3 investigates the responses of local governments to a change in threshold
for the Single Audit. The U.S. Single Audit is a comprehensive audit undergone by non-
federal entities spending more than $750,000 of federal funds in a fiscal year. Using data
on audited entities from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse as well as detailed expenditures
data from the Census of Local Governments, I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis
exploiting the change in threshold for audit exemption in fiscal year 2015. The estimates
suggest that complying with the audit requirements on average increases expenditures
directly related to financial administration.
xi
CHAPTER I
Political Incentives in Fiscal Federalism
Abstract
Intergovernmental grants commonly pass through multiple intermediate levels of govern-
ment. As they do, political incentives affect the distribution of these funds to local gov-
ernments. Evidence from the United States indicates that higher expected voter turnout
and lower ideological polarization are associated with higher federal and state intergov-
ernmental grants. Applying this estimate to a probabilistic voting model with three levels
of government yields a measure of politics-driven resource misallocation equal to 1.9-5.9%
of the value of targetable pass-through intergovernmental grants. This shows that inter-
mediated distribution of federal grants increases opportunities for politically motivated
misallocation.
JEL Codes: D72 , H73 , H77
Keywords:Fiscal Federalism, Intergovernmental Grants
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1.1 Introduction
According to the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments, local governments obtained around
36% of their general revenues from intergovernmental transfers. Of this, only a small per-
centage (11%) was received directly from the federal government, with the larger share
being transferred from state governments. However, 36% of the funds received from
state governments is constituted by funds which are raised by the federal government
and passed through states to be redistributed to localities. The use of pass-through trans-
fers is usually justified on the grounds of increased flexibility and accountability for local
spending. In the case of federal transfers, state pass-through allows funds to be spent
by leveraging the states’ infrastructure and knowledge of the local communities. In ad-
dition, federal pass-through grants may be set up for categories of spending that reflect
federal priorities and for which local governments would lack incentives or resources. On
the other hand, the involvement of multiple layers of government and strategic decision-
makers could lead to politically self-motivated spending by officials at multiple levels of
government. Misallocation from politically self-motivated spending could arise if politi-
cians strategically decide how to allocate transfers in order to maximize their chances of
reelection.
My paper focuses on the role of political incentives in the distribution of federal trans-
fers, comparing the cases of direct and pass-through distribution. The results show that
transferring funds through intermediate levels of government leads to inefficiency in the
allocation of resources due to politically strategic spending. If politicians at each govern-
ment level involved in transfer allocation decisions are strategic, then the final allocation
will be a result of the interaction of all of the politicians’ incentives. I frame politicians’
incentives in the case of direct distribution and intermediated distribution of transfers us-
ing a probabilistic voting model. The main predictions from the model are that, in both
cases, localities which are considered more politically important will receive more trans-
fers. I empirically test the model’s predictions using U.S. transfer data and find that the
evidence is consistent with the model’s predictions. Finally, I apply the estimated param-
eters to the model and find that intermediated distribution increases politically motivated
misallocation.
The literature on the benefits and drawbacks of increased centralization is very well-
developed, however the specific case of pass-through funds where the federal government
delegates to states the task of transferring funds to local governments has not been ex-
tensively studied, with more focus given to the comparison between fully centralized and
decentralized taxation and provision of public goods. Dixit and Londregan (1998) takes
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intermediated spending into account on the theoretical side, developing a model in which
redistribution objectives differ between state and federal politicians. Gerber and Gibson
(2009) provides an empirical application for the case of Metropolitan Planning Organiza-
tions as pass-through entities. My paper contributes to this area of study by framing the
question within a probabilistic voting model as well as providing an empirical application
and calibration of the model.
I use a theoretical framework in which two parties competing for elections have to
propose a distribution of transfers across localities. In this probabilistic voting model,
citizens’ decisions to vote for one party or the other depend on the utility received from the
proposed policy transfers and on political preferences. The model adapts Genicot, Bouton
and Castanheira (2018) (GE2018 in the following) to a case in which an intermediate
layer of government is present and federal and state politicians face different electoral
systems and thus different political incentives. In particular, state politicians receive an
aggregate transfer from the federal government that they need to redistribute within their
state and are assumed to be interested in maximizing the share of votes (similar to what
would happen in a gubernatorial election). Federal politicians instead have to decide
the distribution of the total amount of transfers to all municipalities, and do so with the
objective of maximizing the share of states for which they receive more than 1/2 of total
votes (similar to what would happen in a presidential election). Localities may differ in
size and political characteristics such as average voter turnout and variance of political
preferences (also called “swingness” in the literature). States may also vary in the overall
contestability, intended as a measure of the probability that a state might flip.
In the intermediated distribution case, governors have an incentive to transfer more
funds to localities with high turnout and “swingness” or, in other words, to localities in
which the potential share of votes to be captured is more responsive to transfers. Since
potential votes depend on the number of eligible voters, turnout rate, and share of swing
voters, two localities in the same state with the same number of eligible voters will receive
different transfers if the turnout rate and share of swing voters differ. In the federal case,
politicians want to maximize the number of states won. In this case, transfers will be
higher in localities with a higher share of potential votes within their states and in more
contestable states.
From the theoretical framework’s predictions, I derive two testable equations to em-
pirically analyze whether political incentives have a role in determining transfers to local-
ities. One of the key issues for identification in this study design is that there could be
unobserved characteristics correlated with the turnout rate and variability in party at the
locality level that also have an effect on transfers. I include results using an alternative
3
definition of turnout share that relies on the share of voting age population and thus is less
likely to be influenced by past transfers in attempt to reduce endogeneity concerns. In the
intermediated case, a subsample analysis for transfers with different levels of targetability
allows me to get a clearer picture of the instruments politicians have for targeting. In
additional results, I exploit differences in the timing of elections at the gubernatorial and
federal senate level to isolate reelection-driven political incentives. Using U.S. county-level
data I find that characteristics such as voter turnout and share of swing voters are positively
associated with transfers received during election years.
This paper uses a collection of data sources covering U.S. federal and local elections,
intergovernmental transfers, and local outcomes. In particular, the empirical application
is tested with data from the Census of Governments, and data from UsaSpending.gov,
previously also known as the Federal Assistance Awards System (FAADS). While the Census
of Governments bundles pass-through transfers and state-originated transfers to localities
together and differentiates spending by broad functional categories, the FAADS data also
includes subtransfers for more recent years, and can be linked to the Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance (CFDA) to obtain information on the type of transfer (e.g. project
versus formula). Although some challenges to the overall reliability of this data remain, the
FAADS dataset provides important insights about the different types of transfers received
by localities not often used in the literature and on the share of state transfers to localities
represented by pass-through transfers.
The results at the state level imply that an increase in potential votes by 10% would
result in an additional increase in “targetable” pass-through transfers of 1.6%, or about
$51, 200 per county on average. The results at the federal level produce coefficients of
larger magnitude, implying that an increase in the political sensitivity factor by 10% (de-
termined in this case by the county’s turnout share and the state level of contestability)
would lead to a 5.4% increase in federal transfers, corresponding on average to $815, 400
per county. Using the parameters obtained from the empirical analysis along with data
on American counties and states to simulate the model, I show that state pass-through
of transfers generates increased politically-motivated misallocation of funds under the as-
sumptions of the theoretical framework. The amount of additional politically-motivated
misallocation can be computed with the Atkinson measure and corresponds to between
1.9% to 5.9% of the value of pass-through “targetable” intergovernmental grants, or be-
tween $152 and $472 million per year.
By focusing on the differences in electoral systems and political incentives faced by
politicians at multiple layers of government, my paper provides a novel analysis of the
consequences of using intermediate layers of government to distribute transfers and tests
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the model’s implications using both Census data and new FAADS data on sub-awards. My
paper shows that using intermediaries in transfer distribution increases politically moti-
vated misallocation. The framework, however, does not capture the efficiency gains that
might derive from politicians of intermediate layers of government having an advantage
in targeting the population’s needs. In order to consider the overall welfare effect of using
intermediaries in funds distribution, the misallocation effects shown in this paper need to
be weighed against the possible positive effects of intermediation.
My paper contributes to several strands of the literature, starting with fiscal federalism,
by comparing different ways of structuring transfer distributions across layers of govern-
ments. The merits of centralized versus decentralized distribution of public services have
been thoroughly discussed in the literature, starting with the seminal work by Tiebout
(1956), which introduced the concept of people “voting with their feet”. Another seminal
contribution in this area is Oates et al. (1972), which proposed a theorem providing con-
ditions such that decentralized provision of public goods is Pareto-superior to centralized
provision. Following Oates et al. (1972), many papers investigated the role of spillovers
and heterogenetity in public preferences in this debate, including Gordon (1983). In par-
ticular, my paper’s focus on the interaction between systems is most closely related to Dixit
and Londregan (1998), which shows that considering the political interactions between
different layers of governments can lead to very different results from models where only
one layer (or no layers) of strategic politicians are taken into account. Another exam-
ple of a paper highlighting the importance of taking political incentives into account is
Lockwood (2008), which shows that when the assumption that politicians are benevo-
lent is substituted by a setup in which there is majority voting, there can be instances in
which decentralization provides more welfare than centralization even with externalities
and uniform preferences.
My paper adapts a probabilistic voting model to a fiscal federalism context, by compar-
ing not electoral systems per se, but fiscal structures relying on different electoral systems.
The model used in this paper is based on Genicot, Bouton and Castanheira (2018), who
compare resource allocation in proportional and majoritarian systems, and built in line
with the work of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (1999). Stashko
(2020) provides an empirical application of a probabilistic voting model, focusing instead
on the impact of district and local governments mismatch on allocations. Naddeo (2021)
also applies a similar model to FEMA relief spending, and finds that politicians target funds
to counties that have higher relative turnout compared to other counties in their district.
Additionally, the model rests on the assumptions that state politicians are at least par-
tially motivated by reelection incentives, and that voters respond to spending in their
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county. These assumptions have been investigated in the literature, including literature
on political business cycles studying how political factors matter more or less in determin-
ing transfers depending on the election cycle. The concept of political business cycle was
first introduced by Nordhaus (1975) and early empirical tests of this idea include Alesina,
Cohen and Roubini (1992), while a more recent application is provided by Rose (2006)
which tests whether fiscal rules limit political fiscal cycles.
My paper shows that political factors have a role in determining transfers and that
intermediated distribution of transfers is likely to generate more political misallocation.
Political factors and their effects on intergovernmental transfers are likely to be especially
relevant in the current situation, where local governments are under new fiscal challenges
and the structure through which potential relief is to be distributed is particularly salient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional
background. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 derives the empirical
predictions. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy and data, and section 6 presents the
results. Section 7 presents the calibration and discusses the results. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Institutional background
1.2.1 Intergovernmental transfers
In the United States the federal government raised $3.3 trillion of revenue in 2017,
mainly from income taxes, corporate taxes, and contributions to government social insur-
ance programs. Local government raised $707 billion in tax revenues, and state govern-
ments raised $946 billion. Local governments received $602 billion in intergovernmental
transfers, or about 36% of their total general revenue. Of this, $534 billion or 89% was
received from states and 11% from the federal government directly. It is important to
note that the $534 billion received from states also included pass-through grants from the
federal government. Using data from USASpending.gov for 2017, I estimate this to be at
least $192 billion or 36% of state transfers. States therefore have an important role both
in directly funding localities and in redistributing federal grants to localities.
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Figure 1.1: Breakdown of sources of revenues for local governments
The influence that state level politicians can exercise on how to spend grants depends
on the type of transfers. Federal grants to state and local governments can be classified
in three main categories: categorical grants, block grants, and revenue sharing (although
this last category has not been broadly used recently). Categorical grants are specifically
targeted to certain programs and activities, whereas block grants can usually be applied
to a broader set of activities to meet the objectives of the programs they are being issued
for. The Catalog of Domestic Federal Assistance (CFDA) classifies categorical and block
grant programs as project grants and formula grants. Formula grants are allocated accord-
ing to specific rules and factors (for example population or share of population below a
certain level of income), whereas project grants can be allocated in a competitive manner.
Politicians thus may have more room to influence who receives transfers in the case of
project grants, as the determinants of formula grants are less likely to be easily manipu-
lated. Federal grants may also have matching requirements, meaning that recipient states
or localities are required to fund certain projects in a predetermined proportion.
Federal direct transfers to localities are mostly concentrated on community and re-
gional development (41%), transit and transport (12%), education (10%), and public wel-
fare (7.5%). State transfers to localities (which include federal transfers passed-through)
instead, are mostly targeted to education (68%), public welfare (9%), health (4%), high-
ways (3%), and other general support (11%).
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Federal pass-through grants are grants which are awarded to recipients (often state
governments or government agencies) with the requirement that the funds be passed on
to sub-recipients, usually local governments such as counties, municipalities, towns, and
school districts. Depending on the type of transfer, states have some flexibility in deter-
mining how to organize the distribution of sub-grants and the priorities for funding. This
type of structure is widespread, for a specific example, in the Department of Transporta-
tion grants for Rural areas and Tribal Transit Programs1 states receive the transfers and
are then in charge of administering them to eligible sub recipients. The application pro-
cedure2 states that eligible sub-recipients should submit their application for funds to the
State agency designated by the Governor to administer the program, which will then eval-
uate and select eligible applicants and submit a program of projects to the Federal Transit
Administration. Another more recent example of use of pass-through structure is provided
by the distribution of COVID relief funds. The American Rescue Program (ARP) and the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) act both aimed to deliver funds
to local governments, but used two different methods to do so. With the ARP, local gov-
ernments received their funding directly from the Treasury. Under the CARES Act instead,
the Treasury provided direct funding only to counties and municipalities with populations
greater than 500,000, and used states as intermediate actors to deliver funding to all other
local governments as deemed appropriate. These two spending programs provide a clear
example of the two methods of federal spending analyzed in the paper: direct from the
federal government to localities, and intermediated through state governments.
1.2.2 Political actors
Political actors may target the distribution of transfers at different points in the funds
delivery, depending on their roles and powers. The theoretical framework in this paper
focuses on the role of governors at the state level, and of the president at the federal level.
At the state level, the literature has studied both governors (see for example Strömberg
(2004) and legislators (e.g. Stashko (2020)). Both positions have influence on how trans-
fers are spent, and governors in particular have more or less power depending on state-
specific rules. In general, state budgets are initially put together by the governor’s budget
office. The process may entail hearings and consultations with the appropriate depart-
ments. After this has concluded, a budget proposal is usually sent to the state legislature.
It is usually first sent to a specific committee (appropriations committee), which will hold
hearings on the proposed budget and propose amends, then shares it with the whole cham-
1CFDA number: 20.509, part of the Fixing America’s surface transportation Act
2https://sam.gov/fal/28f1179b7bcd483d87e7717b3e3a5278/view
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ber. In the chamber potential amends are considered and then the budget is voted on. This
process usually happens in the lower house of the state first, and then in the senate. Once
the budgets approved by the two chambers are reconciled, legislators then send the bud-
get back to the governor. The governor’s options then may depend state by state, but in
the majority of states governors may sign the bill approving the whole budget, veto it com-
pletely, or veto only specific line-items. In presence of any gubernatorial vetoes, the budget
is returned to the legislature, which can then either accept the the governor’s suggestions,
or override them and enact the budget. The rules regulating when an override can take
place depend on the state and usually require a certain share of legislators to vote to over-
ride.
Overall, both the executive and legislative branches of government have a significant
power on the spending decisions within a state, and may thus exert some influence on
spending in a way that maximizes the share of votes won. In addition to the influence
exerted on the regular budgeting process, some categories of spending may also provide
more power to one or the other branch. For example, the oversight on the spending of
some funds from the CARES Act is completely managed by the executive branch in some
states (e.g. New Hampshire) while in other states it has been shared between executive
and legislative branch (e.g. Alaska). In the federal case, the budget approval process fol-
lows a roughly similar pattern, with the exception that the executive branch does not have
line-item veto power.
1.3 Theoretical framework
The model adapts GE2018 to the case at hand. I assume that the country under
analysis has a continuum of individuals with mass 1. The country is divided into states
s ∈ {1, 2, ...S}, themselves divided into localities l ∈ {1, 2, ...L}. Each locality has popula-
tion nl, and the rate of local turnout is tl. I consider two cases. In the first, the federal
government allocates a budget ys to state governors, who are then in charge of redis-
tributing a share ql to localities. In the second case, the federal government decides the
allocation of a total budget y to localities and establishes ql for each locality.
I model the political incentives for the state level politicians and federal level politicians on
those facing governors and the president in the U.S. The governors are elected by popular
majority, and therefore maximize the share of votes received in their states. The president
maximizes the share of states won. In both cases, I assume there are two candidates from
two parties A and B competing for the election. The candidates propose a policy (a set of
transfers q) and implement this policy if elected. Citizens’ preferences depend on the util-
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ity from the transfers directed to their locality ql, and on ideology, modeled in line with the
probabilistic voting literature. Therefore, localities differ in terms of population, turnout,
and distribution of voter preferences.
1.3.1 Optimal allocation












) if ε = 1
(1.1)
where ε > 0. For the empirical analysis, it is useful to define ε = 1
ρ
, where ρ is assumed to
be greater than zero and lower than 1 to guarantee that the utility function is increasing
concave. ρ affects the concavity of the utility function, and 1
ρ
can be interpreted as the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, or in this case following Atkinson et al. (1970) of
relative inequality aversion.
With this type of utility function, as seen in Atkinson et al. (1970), Stashko (2020) and
Strömberg (2004), the parameter al is assumed to be greater than 0 and to indicate the
characteristics of individuals residing in a county which may affect how they value federal
spending. α determines the type of public good: if α = 0 the transfer ql can be interpreted
as a public good, and if α = 1, the transfer ql can be interpreted as equivalent to a private
transfer. This functional form is useful to link the theory and empirics, however it imposes
strong assumptions. The constant relative inequality-aversion assumption, however, will
be useful in the interpretation of the inequality calculation in Section 6.
With a Benthamite welfare function, the maximization problem of the utilitarian social



















where ql is the locality-level transfer allocation, nl is the locality’s population, and λO is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (1.2).
10
1.3.2 Direct federal transfers
In this section, I model the political incentives of the federal politicians in the case
of direct federal transfers. Individuals vote according to the utility they expect to receive
from transfers to their locality and according to two ideological “shocks”. More specifically,
individuals are affected by an aggregate state-level shock δs and a shock vi,l, which instead
reflects an idiosyncratic individual shock. An individual will vote for a federal politician
from party A if
∆ul(q) ≥ vi,l + δs
where ∆ul(q) = ul(qA) − ul(qB), and δs represents a state-level ideology shock, or the
general popularity of party B (as in Persson and Tabellini (1999)). δs is assumed to be a
random variable with uniform distribution described below with density φs and expected
value zero. vi,l instead represents the individual ideological preferences: states will differ
in the average preference for party B βs and also in the ideological homogeneity or vari-
ance in the ideological preference which is captured by γs. The random variables δs and
vi,l are usually denominated as shocks since their value is assumed to be realized in the
time between the politicians’ policy announcements and the elections. This implies that
politicians decide their policy platforms under uncertainty regarding the election outcome.


















Given the distribution of δs and vi,l, before analyzing the politicians’ maximization problem
I set up the following assumptions:
Assumption 1







An individual will vote for a federal politician from party A if
∆ul(q) ≥ vi,l + δs
and be indifferent between the two candidates if
vi,l = ∆ul(q)− δs
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In order to avoid corner solutions, I assume throughout the following that the election
results are contestable in every state; meaning that the probability of winning the election
for each party is greater than zero and lower than 1.
Assumption 2
The probability of winning the election for each party in each state is strictly between 0 and
1:
ps(q) ∈ (0, 1), ∀s, q
Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that in equilibrium every locality receives positive transfers.



























where λF is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, φs represents the
state contestability, and tlnl∑
j∈s tjnj
is the turnout share of the locality within the state. In this
scenario, γ does not appear in the first order condition. When federal-level politicians are
in charge of deciding the distribution of transfers, localities in high-contestability states
(φs) and with a higher share of the votes in their state will receive more transfers.
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Proposition 1: When federal politicians distribute funds directly, localities will receive
more if φS and tlnl∑
j∈s tjnj
are higher. In other words, if two localities 1 and 2 in states s1 and






1.3.3 Intermediated federal transfers
In this scenario, states receive a share of the budget ys from the federal politician to
redistribute to localities. The federal politician determines the amount to distribute to each
state as the aggregate of the locality-level allocations that would be distributed in the case
of direct transfer. This assumption reflects the idea that federal level politicians would act
strategically in this case as well, by limiting the amount of funding per state to the amount





where qFl is obtained from (5).
Each state politician redistributes ys to localities. The state’s politician then sets transfers
ql to each locality to maximize the share of votes in his or her own state under the budget
constraint
∑
l ql = ys.
Individuals vote according to the utility they expect to receive from transfers to their local-
ity, and according to two ideological “shocks”. As in the previous case, individuals are af-
fected by a shock δ, representing the popularity of party B, and a shock vi, l, which instead


























Localities will differ in the average preference for party B, and also in the ideological
homogeneity, which is captured by γ. The shock is again not realized before the politician
makes a decision on the transfer distribution. However, the politician is aware of the dis-
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tribution of the two shocks.
An individual will vote for a state politician from party A if
∆ul(q) ≥ vi,l + δ
and be indifferent between the two candidates if
vi,l = ∆ul(q)− δ
The locality-level share of votes for party A encompasses all voters to the left of the indif-
ferent voter, and is equal to




Then, the state politician of party A will propose a policy of transfers qA with the objective







































where γS is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, pl = tlnlγl rep-
resents the political sensitivity of the locality, which is obtained by multiplying the turnout
rate by population and γl, which represents ideological homogeneity. In a uniform distri-
bution, this parameter is proportional to the share of swing voters, and therefore has been
called a “swingness” measure in the literature .
Proposition 2: In the case of intermediated distribution of federal transfers, counties
will receive more transfers if they are characterized by higher turnout and more swing
voters, all else equal: q1 > q2 if and only if p1 > p2.
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In Proposition 1, the “turnout” variable of interest t1n1∑
j∈s tjnj
represents the turnout share,
or the share of turnout represented by the county in the state. In Proposition 2 instead, the
“turnout” variable of interest is the county level turnout rate tl. The section below details
how the two compare in this theoretical framework.
1.3.4 Comparing the two distribution methods
In a situation as the one studied, where each locality only belongs to one state (as op-
posed to the case in which a locality could be split into multiple political districts) favoring
localities with the highest turnout share within the state is equivalent to favoring localities
with the highest turnout rate. As a matter of fact, once the state level characteristics are
removed, and if swingness is not taken into consideration, a locality which has the highest
share of turnout within a state t1n1∑
j∈s tjnj
would also be the locality with the highest turnout
in terms of voters (tlnl). Thus, the main differences between allocations in the two modes
of distribution are due to the role of swingness and state contestability in a scenario in
which localities are each allocated to a single political district.
1.3.5 Equilibrium
The maximization problem of a state politician of party B will result in symmetric first
order conditions in the two cases, implying that politicians of the two parties will propose
the same policy qA = qB. According to Theorem 3 in Banks and Duggan (2005), in a
theoretical framework of the type presented a unique electoral equilibrium exists if the
policy space is compact and convex, the expected plurality shares are jointly continuous in
the policy q, and each plurality share is strictly concave in the party’s policy. In the case
under study, the set of feasible allocations is compact and convex. The expected plurality
shares are PAl (q) = 2tlnlγs(∆ul(q)−E[δs])−nltl and PBl (q) = nltl−2tlnlγs(∆ul(q)−E[δs])
for the case of direct federal transfers and PAl (q) = 2tlnlγl(∆ul(q)−E[δ])−nltl and PBl (q) =
nltl − 2tlnlγl(∆ul(q) − E[δ]) for the case of intermediated transfers. In both cases, PAl (q)
and PBl (q) are jointly continuous in q, P
A
l (q) is strictly concave in q
A and PBl (q) is strictly
concave in qB.
1.4 Connecting theory and data
In order to investigate propositions 1 and 2 empirically, I substitute the derivative of the










+ α(1− ρ)ln(nl) + ρal − ρλF (1.9)
• Intermediated transfers:
ln(qSl ) = ρln(pl) + α(1− ρ)ln(nl) + ρal − ρλS (1.10)
The parameter al represents the characteristics that determine how individuals differ
in how they value federal spending in their locality. As in (1.8), pl = tlnlγl represents
political sensitivity in the intermediated distribution case. Following Stashko (2020) and
Strömberg (2004), I assume that ln(al) is a linear function of observable and unobservable
county-level characteristics, and
ln(al) = βaxl + εl
where x represents a vector of the observable characteristics, and ε is drawn from a distri-
bution with mean zero and variance σ2ε .









+ β2ln(nlsy) + β
′
axlsy + εlsy (1.11)
• Intermediated transfers:
ln(qSlsy) = κ1ln(plsy) + κ2ln(nlsy) + κ
′
axlsy + εlsy (1.12)
or equivalently
ln(qSlsy) = κ3ln(tlsyγlsy) + κ4ln(nlsy) + κ
′
axlsy + εlsy (1.13)
The assumptions in the theoretical framework on ρ and α and the predictions of proposi-
tions 1 and 2 imply that
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• β1 and κ1 = ρ ∈ (0, 1)
• β2 and κ2 = α(1− ρ) ∈ [0, 1)
• κ4 = α(1− ρ) + ρ ∈ (0, 2)
where ρ affects the concavity of the utility function, and 1
ρ
can be interpreted as the co-
efficient of relative inequality aversion. Thus, a higher magnitude of ρ implies a higher
sensitiviy of the utility function to transfers and a lower coefficient of inequality aversion.
It is possible to test the empirical predictions and investigate the magnitude of the param-
eters using county-level transfer data and computing the political variables of interest.
1.4.1 Data
The theoretical framework focuses on the distribution of federal transfers to localities,
analyzing direct allocations and allocations administered through states. In order to em-
pirically test the model’s predictions, I have collected county level data for elections and
transfers at the state and federal levels.
1.4.2 Transfer data
The Census of Governments data is routinely used in research in local public finance
and is considered a reliable source of data. The data is collected by the Census Bureau
which conducts a full census of state and local governments every five years, and a smaller
survey every year. However, it is not possible with this data to obtain a comprehensive and
detailed account of how much federal money is spent in each location through intermedi-
aries because of data availability limitations. While direct federal grants are identified in
the data, pass-through funds are not, and are instead counted together with state direct
transfers. In addition, while the function-level detail of data collected is quite extensive,
no information is available on the type of individual grants received. Data on pass-through
transfers and grants type is available on USASpending, a website through which what was
previously identified as Federal Assistance Awards Data (FAADS) is available. The creation
of the site was a result of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of
2006 (FFATA; P.L. 109-282) which tasked the Office of Management and Budget to create
a public database that would allow users to track the spending of federal funds. This web-
site has been plagued by data quality issues, and in 2014 the responsibility for maintaining
this data has been transferred to the Department of the Treasury with the DATA act (Digital
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Accountability and Transparency Act). A new version of the website has been launched in
2018, and although some issues of completeness and accuracy still remain, (U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office (2019, November)) data quality has substantially improved.
The main advantage of this data source is that for recent years it contains information not
only on prime recipients of grants but also on sub-grants recipients. FAADS grant data from
can be matched through the CFDA number to the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
which contains information on how these grants are disbursed (e.g. formula vs project
grant, matching required). Using FAADS data it is possible to distinguish federal grants
that are passed through states to localities from state grants to localities, and also distin-
guish between formula-based grants and project grants. Project grants are considered to
be more targetable overall than formula grants (although large variation exists within the
category) and constitute around 18% of total pass-through transfers in the sample under
analysis.
The empirical analysis presents results obtained both with Census data and FAADS data.
I create a county level measure of intergovernmental revenue by aggregating transfers re-
ceived by all local governments and jurisdictions within a county. Revenue received by
private entities (such as for example private day-care facilities) is not included. The Cen-
sus data is used for years 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012. The results obtained using
FAADS data instead are for years 2011-2018.
1.4.3 Political data
I use data on state gubernatorial elections, U.S. Senate elections and presidential elec-
tions from the CQ Voting and Elections Collection3, which includes election results at the
county and district level.
In addition, I use data on the partisan composition of state’s legislatures from the National
Conference of State Legislatures4, and on the partisan composition of the U.S. Senate and
House from the official Congress websites.5 I also use data from Klarner et al. (2013) to
account for the timing of state legislature elections.
The turnout rate for gubernatorial elections is calculated as the ratio of total votes cast
over the county voting age population. This differs from the turnout variable of interest
for the presidential and senate elections, which is instead computed as the share of turnout
provided by one county (county total votes over state total votes). Results obtained with






the two different ways of computing turnout in the two cases are also included in appendix
tables A.4 and A.5.
Swingness (γ) is measured as the standard deviation of the share of democratic votes over
the sum of democratic and republican votes in the previous 3 elections. State contestability
(φ) is computed by subtracting the share by which the previous election was won to 1. Fi-
nally, the Voting age population (population above 18 years of age) data is obtained using
Census and American Community Survey data. The political variables collected cover the
period 1990-2018.
1.4.4 Controls
Data on county-level demographic characteristics has been collected from the decen-
nial census and from the American Community Survey using Manson et al. (2017).
1.4.5 Summary statistics
Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 present the summary statistics for the main variables used. Since
the various regressions use different samples due to transfer data availability, the sum-
mary statistics are presented for each sample used. The turnout rate for the state analy-
sis, computed as county-level votes over voting age population, has a mean around 45%.
Swingness, computed as the standard deviation of the share of votes for the democratic
party over the total votes for the republican and democratic parties, has a mean of around
0.1 in both of the state analysis samples. The state intergovernmental grants per capita
are larger than the pass-through grants per capita, as they include both state transfers
and pass-through federal transfers to local governments. Of the $1, 350 per capita state
intergovernmental grants, at least around $340 can be attributed to federal pass-through
transfers. FAADS data allows to differentiate between types of transfers: the majority of
grants is distributed using some type of formula ($307 per capita), whereas project grants
on average amount to around $33 per capita. The demographic characteristics of the two
state analysis samples are also slightly different: the sample for analysis using FAADS data
has on average a higher share of black and hispanic residents per county, and a higher me-
dian household income. The difference between the two samples could be due to the fact
that the census data covers every local government for the years included in the analysis,
whereas the FAADS data instead only includes entities which receive pass-through federal
transfers.
Table 1.4 presents summary statistics for the analysis in Tables 1.9 and A.3. Contestabil-
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ity is computed by subtracting the victory margin of the previous election to 1. Turnout
share in this scenario is computed as the share of votes in the county over the total votes
in the state. The variable Gamma is computed as contestability × turnoutshare and it is
similar across the three different measurements of turnout share presented. Federal direct




The theoretical framework relies on the different electoral systems faced by governors
and presidents to analyze the varying potential patterns of transfer targeting. In equation
(1.12), modelling transfers in the intermediated distribution case, the political variable of
interest pl depends on county level turnout rate and swingness. One concern with this re-
gression design is that there may be county level variables not controlled for in the regres-
sion which are correlated to the locality’s political factors which also affect the transfers
received. In addition, since we assume that voters reward transfers, past transfers may
influence turnout, in which case the assumption that E(ε|Xi) = 0 is no longer valid and
the estimates are biased. For example, if a locality’s economy was historically dominated
by manufacturing and a plant in that area is shut down, local unions might be able to
engage politicians to increase transfers to the locality. At the same time, people might be
disappointed and more likely to become swing voters and show up to the polls to change
leadership. In this case, the closure of a manufacturing plant would have a positive effect
on transfers and therefore enter the error term with a positive sign. On the other hand,
people losing manufacturing jobs and turning to less stable forms of employment might
instead reduce turnout. If the closure of a plant is positively correlated to the local political
sensitivity, then the estimated coefficients will overestimate the effect of political sensitiv-
ity on transfers and viceversa if the closure is negatively correlated to political sensitivity.
The sign of the bias thus cannot be easily determined a priori. I estimate the main results
in the intermediated transfers case by using a share of turnout measure instead of a rate
of turnout measure as well (see section 3.4), and obtain similar results when compared to
the turnout rate, thus addressing some of these concerns.
Equation (1.11) in the direct distribution case can be estimated using county level federal
transfers for q and computing the turnout share tlsynlsy∑
j∈s tjsynjsy
and state contestability φ to
estimate the role of political factors in determining transfer distribution. Since in this case
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the turnout variable of interest is the turnout share, rather than the county-level turnout
rate, some of the endogeneity concerns that may otherwise apply are not as worrisome.
In this case, an unobservable omitted variable would be a threat only if it was correlated
both with the transfers received and with the share of turnout, which is less likely than an
unobservable omitted variable being correlated with transfers and the county level rate of
turnout.
A first way to deal with the potential unobserved factors in the two regressions is to in-
clude fixed effects. Results are presented with state-year effects, which are used in this case
as the effect of county-level political characteristics on the transfers received by the county
depends on a state-specific time shock. When state-year fixed effects are used, the estima-
tion relies on variation within year between the counties of a state. Once fixed effects are
included however, there could still be within state characteristics at the locality level which
are not controlled for, which could cause the issues discussed in the paragraph above. In
the appendix, I perform several alternative estimations. First, I exploit the difference in
timing in elections at the state and federal congressional level. The use of differences in
election timing is common in the political business cycle literature (e.g. Baskaran, Min
and Uppal (2015)) which exploits exogenous election timing to highlight election-driven
political incentives. In the case at hand, it is possible to use the fact that states follow
different gubernatorial election schedules, where the assignment to one group or another
is arguably exogenous to current local conditions. Most states hold elections in even,
off-presidential elections years, some during presidential election years, and some during
odd-numbered years. By comparing the relationship between the political variables of in-
terest and transfers in election-year localities to non election year localities, it is possible to
identify the difference in transfers due specifically to reelection-driven political incentives.
In order to do so, I add a dummy variable for election years and an interaction term be-
tween the political variables of interest and election years to the regression equations in
(1.11) and (1.12) , in addition to state and year fixed effects.
ln(qlsy) = β
e













and where el.year is a dummy variable indicating whether
locality l at time t is in a state s where an election is taking place.
The coefficient on the interaction between election year and the political variable indicates
the percentage increase in transfers associated with an increase in the political variable of
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1 percentage point for localities in an election years. Therefore, βe1 and κ
e
1 in equations
(1.13) and (1.14) are no longer equal to ρ, but rather, to an election-specific ρe which
identifies the increase in political sensitivity during elections years. βe2 and κ
e
2 capture the
baseline effect that political factors have on transfers in non-election years.
Another way to deal with turnout’s potential endogeneity is to use the share of voting
age population instead of the turnout share in estimating (1.12), as done in Stashko (2020)
and Naddeo (2021) (Table 1.7 and Table A.3). In estimating (1.11) moreover it is possible
to exploit the FAADS data to perform a subsample analysis using project grants and formula
grants. Unobserved local characteristics correlated both with turnout and with transfers
may affect both formula transfers and project transfers, however we expect the variables
of interest to have a much stronger effect on more targetable transfers (Tables 1.7 and
1.8).
Finally, I test whether swingness also has a role in determining direct transfers, and




Table 1.5 presents results for intergovernmental grants from states to counties (includ-
ing both pass-through transfers and state transfers). Since the Census of Governments
includes all local governments every 5 years, the years in the sample are 1992, 1997,
2002, 2007, and 2012. The coefficients for the political factor pl and population are pos-
itive and statistically significant in columns 1 and 2, but of negligible magnitude and not
statistically significant in columns 3 and 4 once fixed effects are introduced. The coefficient
on ln(population) corresponds to κ̂4 in (12) and is positive and significant in all specifica-
tions. It is worth mentioning here that these results are consistent to those in Table 4 in
Stashko (2020). While the focus of that paper is on the elections of the lower house of
state legislatures, which depend on districts and thus generate different incentives from
gubernatorial elections, a similar county-level regression of turnout rate on transfers ob-
tains a not statistically significant coefficient on turnout of negligible magnitude as in table
1.5 of this paper. Moreover, a similar result is obtained in columns 3 and 4 of table 1.6,
which focuses only on pass-through grants in years 2011-2018. While the fixed effects
results in columns 3 and 4 of tables 1.5 and 1.6 show coefficients of similar magnitude,
the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 in the two tables are of opposite signs. As mentioned in
the Data section, the Census measure of state intergovernmental transfers includes federal
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transfers that are passed through states as well as states’ transfers to localities. Thus, the
difference in columns 1 and 2 between the two tables may be due to factors which in-
fluence the distribution of state-raised intergovernmental transfers to counties, which are
then controlled for by fixed effects in columns 3 and 4. The negative sign in (1) and (2)
in table 1.6 could be due to a larger weight of education and children-related grants in
the FAADS sample. Since a large rate of turnout may be related to an older population,
and since a large part of pass-through grants are constituted by education and meal grants
targeted to students, a higher rate of turnout may be negatively related to grants overall
when no fixed effects are present.
The results in tables 1.5 and 1.6 however may not paint a fully accurate picture of
the role of political targeting of transfers because of two main reasons: first, the coeffi-
cients on the ln(pl) variable in tables 1.5 and 1.6 reflect the relationship between political
factors and transfers for all categories of transfers. As a large fraction of transfers is dis-
tributed through formulas, this does not reflect precisely the political influence on more
“targetable” grants. In addition, the estimation may suffer from bias as described in sec-
tion 5.
In tables 1.7 and 1.8 I address these concerns at least partially, by including two differ-
ent measures of the ln(pl) variable, a measure of turnout as share of voting age population,
and by performing a sub sample analysis on different types of transfers. The inclusion of
two measures of turnout in computing ln(pl), one resulting as the average of turnout in the
previous three elections, and one corresponding to turnout in the previous election, helps
check whether different lagged values for turnout have a different effect on transfers. In
both tables 1.7 and 1.8, results obtained with the two measures are consistent. Moreover,
results are consistent to using the share of voting age population instead of the turnout
rate (see section 3.4) in columns (3) and (6).
In addition, I am able to use the richness of the FAADS data and distinguish between
more targetable (project) and less targetable (formula) grants. If an unobservable charac-
teristic is influencing both past and current transfers, and through this potentially distort-
ing the estimation of the effect of turnout on transfers, it may be having this effect both
on project grants and formula grants. In table 1.7 however we see that the coefficients for
different types of transfers are markedly different, with coefficients for project grants posi-
tive and larger in magnitude and the coefficients for formula grants small, not statistically
significant, and negative.
An omitted variable such as the closure of a plant, which may trigger higher grants in
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t-1 and t and potentially increase political participation and turnout in t, would potentially
affect both project and formula grants. The existence of a difference between the effect of
the political variables pl on project and formula grants seems to confirm that the estimation
is indeed picking up some of the effect that turnout has on transfers.
The coefficients 0.16 in column 1 of table 1.7 implies that a 100% increase in political
sensitivity would result in a 16% increase in project transfers per county on average, cor-
responding to about $512, 00 per county. Given a voting age population of 50,000, turnout
rate of 35%, and swingness 0.1; increasing pl by 100% would entail for example a change
in turnout from 35% to 40% and in swingness from 0.1 to 0.175. While these changes are
of non-negligible magnitude, they are also not completely unrealistic (as the mean turnout
for gubernatorial elections is 44%). Since not all counties receive project grants every year,
in this case the dependent variables are computed as the inverse hyperbolic since of project
transfers and formula transfers. This allows to deal with the zero-value observations. The
results do not change significantly when using ln(y+1) as transformation. As mentioned
above, the coefficients for ln(pl) in columns 3 and 4 are instead negative, of negligible
magnitude and not statistically significant.
Table 1.8 analyzes the relation between the share of project grants over total grants
received and political factors. In this case, the coefficient on ln(pl) in column 3 implies
that a 10% increase in the political sensitivity of the locality is associated with a 1.4%
increase in the share of project grants over total grants when controlling for state-year
effects.
1.5.2.2 Direct transfers
In order to test the empirical predictions of the model regarding direct federal transfers
to localities, I use U.S. presidential elections, senate elections and federal intergovern-
mental transfers from the Census of Governments. When comparing the results obtained
using state intergovernmental transfers and federal intergovernmental transfers it is im-
portant to keep in mind that direct federal intergovernmental transfers to localities are
much smaller than the sum of pass-through and state transfers to localities, and may cover
different functions.
In table 1.9, the political variable Gamma is computed using the turnout share for the
previous presidential election, or the average of the previous 3 presidential elections, and
the victory share in the previous presidential election for the contestability variable.6 Since
transfer data is obtained from the Census of Governments, the years included are 1992,
6When fixed effects are included, the contestability variable is absorbed by the fixed effects
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1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012. The coefficients on ln(Gamma) are positive and statisti-
cally significant across the various specifications. The magnitude increases when including
state-year fixed effects, such that a 10% increase in political sensitivity is associated with
around an increase in federal direct transfers of around 7%, or about $1M per county on
average. The coefficient on ln(population) is also positive and significant, as predicted by
the model.
Table A.3 in the appendix performs a similar estimation by using the share of voting age
population instead of the turnout share. The results are consistent with the model pre-
dictions and with the results in table 1.9, with the coefficient on the political sensitivity
variable statistically significant and positive across the two specifications. The coefficient
in this case is about 25% larger than in the estimation in table 1.9. This specification, used
also in Stashko (2020) and Naddeo (2021), addresses the concern of turnout endogeneity
in this context, as the voting age population is not likely to be affected by past transfers.
1.5.3 Additional results
Table A.1 presents results obtained by including the interaction with the election year
dummy variable. The results are presented without fixed effects and with fixed effects at
the state and year level. The coefficient on the interacted variable varies between 0.013
and 0.03 and is statistically significant in both specifications. This implies that the relation
between political factors and transfers varies depending on the election year dummy vari-
able, and in this case being in an election year is associated with an extra increase of about
2% in transfer if pl increases by 100% with respect to non-election year localities, where 2%
represents around $660 in state intergovernmental transfers for the median locality. The
coefficients on election-year are negative in all specifications. One interpretation for the
negative coefficient of the election year is that, due to states needing to balance their bud-
gets, an increase in expenditures in certain localities during election years is compensated
by a decrease in others. Localities with lower than average political sensitivity, therefore,
will receive less transfers during an election year. The coefficient on ln(population) is con-
sistent with the predictions for α from the model. The results are obtained using Census
data for years 1997, 2002 and 2007, which contain data for all local governments. The
years 2002 and 2012 have been excluded as those were presidential elections year, which
might make turnout unusually high.
Table A.2 presents results with an election-year dummy for the federal level. Since
all states undergo presidential elections at the same time, in this case I use U.S. Senate
elections to approximate for the political incentives faced at the federal level to obtain the
overall majority of seats. Since U.S. senate elections only take place in even years, there is
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less variation in the election-year variable and the sample for analysis only contains data
from 1997, 2002 and 2007. This implies that only a sub sample of the states is “treated”
with an election year change in 2002, and some states do not hold a senate election in
either year.
The coefficient on ln(Γ) is positive and statistically significant in both (1) and (2). The
coefficient on ln(population) is positive and significant in both specifications as well. The
coefficient of interest on the interaction variable ln(Γ)XElection is positive and consis-
tent in columns (2) to (4), ranging between 0.01 and 0.03. While the measure is not
statistically significant, it is similar in magnitude to the interaction coefficient in table A.1.
The results in column (2) would imply that a 100% increase in the political sensitivity of
a locality to federal politicians (increase in turnout share and state contestability) in an
election year is associated with a 3% extra increase in federal direct transfers compared to
localities not in an election year.
Finally, tables A.4 and A.5 include results that test whether swingness has a role in
transfer distribution in the direct case, and whether state contestability has a role in trans-
fer distribution in the intermediated case. According to the assumptions of the theoretical
framework, swingness is a factor in determining transfers in the intermediated distribution
case, but not in the direct distribution case. In table A.5, the swingness variable is added
in the specifications in columns (2) and (4) but it is always non statistically significant. In
table A.4, the victory margin variable (which I use as a measure of state contestability) is
added in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). While varying in magnitude, the variable is never
statistically significant.
While the results of the empirical regressions should be taken into consideration to-
gether with the potential sources of bias and error presented earlier, they do seem to
confirm the empirical predictions obtained from the theoretical framework. In the next
section, I will use the range of results obtained empirically to calibrate the model to U.S.
data and test how politically-motivated misallocation may change depending on the way
federal transfers are distributed to localities.
1.6 Numerical simulation
1.6.1 Allocations
Using the utility function (1.1) and conditions (1.3), (1.5) and (1.8) it is possible to
compute equilibrium allocations under the three different scenarios explicitly.
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In the scenario in which funds are assumed to be transferred directly by the federal gov-













































where ωs(l) represents the number of electoral college electors per state.




















where pl = nltlγl
1.6.2 Calibration
Using U.S. data,7 it is possible to estimate the differences in allocations that may arise
when switching from an intermediated model to a direct model of transfers. In order
to compute the allocations at (1.15), (1.17) and (1.18) I use county level data from the
United States for population (nl). For the direct transfers allocation I use political data (φ,
tl) from presidential elections and for intermediated transfer allocation I use political data
(tl and γl) from gubernatorial elections. With the utility specification chosen, allocation
shares are independent from the level of y and the total budget is set to be y = 100, 000, 000
for ease of construction. The variable a, indicating how transfers are valued differently in
7Detailed data characteristics in appendix table A.6
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different localities, is estimated with the logarithm of the county level average poverty
index. In Serrato, Wingender et al. (2016), exogenous changes in federal transfers to lo-
calities have greater impact in localities where income is lower on average. In absence
of data on the preferences for the level of intergovernmental transfers, I use the average
poverty rate to capture differences in the effect of public transfers.
The values for ρ and α derive from the results of the empirical regressions in section 5.
As mentioned in the discussion of empirical results, the transfers currently distributed in
a direct and intermediated way may be different. Moreover, as shown in table 1.7, the
targetability of transfers may differ as well. Thus, one may wonder if the coefficients on
the political sensitivity variables found across the different distributions can be compared.
The empirical results help test the assumptions of the model, however the empirical and
data limitations make it so that the coefficients reflect the relation between transfers and
political variables in each separate transfer distribution studied. Therefore, in order to
compute the allocations, I use a range of values for ρ which reflect the range of the em-
pirical results from the different estimations: table 1.7 implies a value of ρ of 0.16 from
the targetable grants estimation, and table 1.9 implies a value of ρ of 0.54 from the direct
federal transfers estimation. The values of α implied from the regression results are close
to one, which according to the utility function specification points to the grants being more
similar to private transfers than public goods.
1.6.3 Atkinson measure
In order to obtain a measure of the difference in allocation driven by political factors in
the two scenarios, I use the approach introduced by Atkinson et al. (1970) and compare the
budget y used in the cases of direct and intermediated allocation with strategic politicians
to the budget yA needed if the same level of welfare was to be achieved using optimal
allocations. The Atkinson’s measure is then defined as














the Atkinson measure can be rewritten as
28
1−







 11− 1ρ (1.21)
The difference in politically-driven misallocation of funds in the two systems can be com-
puted by comparing the Atkinson measure where q∗ = qS for intermediate transfers and
q∗ = qF for direct transfers, where the formula allocations for qS and qF are detailed in
(1.17) and (1.18). The Atkinson measure is computed for the two values of ρ identified in
the previous section, and α = 0.9.
Table 1.1: Atkinson measure
ρ State Intermediation Direct Federal
0.16 0.019 0.005
0.55 0.059 0.019
Under the model’s assumptions and using the values for ρ and α described above, the
distribution of federal transfers through states increases politically motivated misallocation
with respect to the case in which transfers are directly transferred. The difference in
misallocation increases as ρ increases. Using the estimated amount of federal pass-through
transfers of around $100 billion for the sample of counties analyzed in 2012, of which
around $8 billion are “targetable” grants, a reduction in misallocation from 6% to 2% of
more targetable grants would correspond to a reduction in misallocation of at least $320
million.
1.7 Conclusion
In this study, I investigated whether political incentives affect the distribution of state
transfers to localities and used a probabilistic voting model to analyze how political in-
centives and transfer distribution would change if those transfers were instead directly
distributed by the federal government to localities. As a matter of fact, even though a
large share of transfers is distributed to recipients after passing through a series of inter-
mediate governments and agencies, the role of intermediaries has not often been explicitly
studied in the fiscal federalism literature. Using county-level data on political characteris-
tics and transfers received, I show that political factors have a role in determining transfers
to localities, and that pass-through transfers in more fungible categories are indeed more
likely to be targeted to politically sensitive localities. Using US data to simulate the model,
I show that switching from an intermediated distribution to a direct distribution could
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decrease misallocation due to political motives.
My paper focuses on the potential misallocation costs of using intermediaries in the dis-
tribution of transfers. However, another factor that should be taken into consideration in
future research is whether intermediaries are more easily held accountable by voters and
whether intermediated allocation responds more efficiently to local preferences. These




Table 1.2: Summary statistics - state analysis using Census data
mean sd min max N
Swingness 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.40 14,951
Turnout rate (previous election) 0.45 0.12 0.03 0.90 14,951
Turnout rate (mean previous 3) 0.46 0.12 0.03 0.92 14,951
pl (turnout previous election) 3.4 10.9 0 451.9 14,951
pl (turnout mean previous 3) 3.4 11.4 0 507.9 14,951
Transfers state to county ($M) 130.19 708 0.01 2,850 14,951
Transfers state to county per cap. ($) 1350 650 431 15534 14,951
Population 90274.69 294104.52 99 10057155 14,951
Percent urban 0.39 0.30 0.00 1 14,951
Percent Black 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.83 14,951
Percent Hispanic 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.97 14,951
Percent female 0.50 0.02 0.29 0.58 14,951
Percent with less than 9th grade educ 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.54 14,951
Percent unemployed 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.18 14,951
Median Household Income ($1000) 36.54 11.70 10.04 122.18 14,951
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics - state analysis using FAADS data
mean sd min max N
Swingness 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.40 21,774
Turnout rate (previous election) 0.44 0.12 0.08 0.95 21,774
Turnout rate (mean previous 3) 0.44 0.11 0.07 0.90 21,774
pl (turnout previous election) 3.6 10.6 0 233.6 21,774
pl (turnout mean previous 3) 3.6 10.4 0 223 21,774
Passthrough transf. state to county ($M) 30.5 116 0.0003 2720 21,774
Passthrough transf. per cap. ($) 340.5 800.13 0.02 18,943.14 21,774
Project transfers state to county ($M) 3.2 14.9 0 992 21,774
Formula transfers state to county ($M) 27.3 110 0 2.700 21,774
Population 108975 347546 274 10105722 21,774
Percent urban 0.41 0.30 0.00 1.03 21,774
Percent Black 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.90 21,774
Percent Hispanic 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.98 21,774
Percent female 0.50 0.02 0.28 0.58 21,774
Percent with less than 9th grade educ 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.38 21,774
Percent unemployed 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.18 21,774
Median Household Income ($1000) 46.32 11.54 21.19 123.97 21,774
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics - federal analysis
mean sd min max N
Contestability 0.89 0.08 0.60 1.00 14,877
Turnout share (previous election) 0.02 0.04 0.001 0.68 14,877
Turnout share (mean previous 3) 0.02 0.04 0.001 0.70 14,875
Turnout share (voting age population) 0.02 0.04 0.001 0.71 14,875
Gamma (Turnout previous election) 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.62 14,877
Gamma (Turnout mean previous 3) 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.62 14,875
Gamma (Share voting age population) 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.66 14,875
Federal direct transfers to county ($M) 15.1 108.1 0.00 5122 14,877
Federal direct transf. to county per cap. ($) 116.8 218.7 0.00 8662 14,877
Population 89893 295892 70 10057155 14,877
Percent urban 0.39 0.30 0.00 1 14,877
Percent Black 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.85 14,877
Percent Hispanic 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.97 14,877
Percent female 0.50 0.02 0.29 0.58 14,877
Percent with less than 9th grade educ 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.54 14,877
Percent unemployed 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.18 14,877
Median Household Income ($1000) 36.63 11.66 10.04 122.18 14,877
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Table 1.5: County level intermediated transfers: Census data. y=log state intergovern-
mental transfers to county
State Intergovernmental transfers (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(pl(turnout previous election)) 0.06a -0.001
(0.03) (0.01)
ln(pl(turnout mean previous 3)) 0.06b 0.001
(0.03) (0.01)
ln(Population) 0.92c 0.92c 0.97c 0.96c
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Alignment County-Governor -0.001 -0.001 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Alignment County-State Legislature 0.01 0.01 -0.001 -0.001
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94
Observations 14,950 14,950 14,950 14,950
FE No No State-Year State-Year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level in (1) and (2) and state-year level in (3) and (4).
All regressions include as demographic controls the percent of urban population in the county, the percent
of Black people in the county, the percent of Hispanic people in the county, the percent of females, and the
share of people with less than a high school degree. Economic controls include the median household income
and the percent of unemployed. pl is a measure of political sensitivity obtained as swingness × turnout ×
population
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Table 1.6: County level intermediated transfers: FAADS data. y=log federal transfers
passed through states to counties
State Passthrough transfers (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(pl(turnout previous election)) -0.12 0.01
(0.13) (0.02)
ln(pl(turnout mean previous 3)) -0.11 0.003
(0.13) (0.02)
ln(Population) 1.11c 1.09c 0.94c 0.94c
(0.16) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02)
Alignment County-Governor -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.23) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03)
Alignment County-State Legislature -0.21 -0.21 -0.05a -0.05a
(0.23) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.61 0.61 0.75 0.75
Observations 21,774 21,774 21,774 21,774
FE No No State-Year State-Year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level in (1) and (2) and state-year level in (3) and (4).
All regressions include as demographic controls the percent of urban population in the county, the percent
of Black people in the county, the percent of Hispanic people in the county, the percent of females, and the
share of people with less than a high school degree. Economic controls include the median household income
and the percent of unemployed. pl is a measure of political sensitivity obtained as swingness × turnout ×
population
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Table 1.7: County level intermediated transfers: FAADS data. y=inverse hyperbolic sine
of federal transfers by type passed through states to counties
State Passthrough transfers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Project Formula
ln(pl(turnout previous election)) 0.16a -0.02
(0.09) (0.03)
ln(pl(turnout mean previous 3)) 0.14 -0.02
(0.09) (0.03)
ln(pl(share of voting age pop)) 0.16a -0.03
(0.08) (0.03)
ln(Population) 1.77c 1.79c 1.60c 1.03c 1.03c 1.06c
(0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Alignment County-Governor 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Alignment County-State Legislature -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.39 0.39
Observations 21,774 21,774 21,774 21,774 21,774 21,774
State-Year FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. All regressions include as demographic controls
the percent of urban population in the county, the percent of Black people in the county, the percent of
Hispanic people in the county, the percent of females, and the share of people with less than a high school
degree. Economic controls include the median household income and the percent of unemployed. pl is a
measure of political sensitivity obtained as swingness × turnout × population
36
Table 1.8: County level intermediated transfers: FAADS data. y=log(project grants) -
log(total grants)
State Passthrough transfers (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(pl (turnout previous election)) 0.37 0.14a
(0.23) (0.08)
ln(pl (turnout mean previous 3)) 0.34 0.13
(0.23) (0.08)
ln(Population) 0.65b 0.67c 0.78c 0.79c
(0.24) (0.25) (0.09) (0.09)
Alignment County-Governor 1.18c 1.19c 0.09 0.09
(0.29) (0.29) (0.17) (0.17)
Alignment County-State Legislature -0.94c -0.94c -0.15 -0.15
(0.34) (0.34) (0.18) (0.18)
R2 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.10
Observations 21,774 21,774 21,774 21,774
FE No No State-Year State-Year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level in (1) and (2) and state-year level in (3) and (4).
All regressions include as demographic controls the percent of urban population in the county, the percent
of Black people in the county, the percent of Hispanic people in the county, the percent of females, and
the share of people with less than a high school degree. Economic controls include the median household
income and the percent of unemployed. pl is a measure of political sensitivity obtained as swingness ×
turnout× population
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Table 1.9: County level direct transfers: Census data. y=log federal grants directly trans-
ferred to counties
Federal direct transfers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Gamma (Turnout prev. el.)) 0.21c 0.28a 0.54c
(0.07) (0.15) (0.11)
ln(Gamma (Turnout prev. 3 el.)) 0.21c 0.36b 0.67c
(0.07) (0.15) (0.12)
ln(Population) 0.85c 0.90c 0.67c 0.85c 0.83c 0.55c
(0.08) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.11)
Alignment President and Leg. 0.03 0.78c 0.03 0.80c
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11)
R2 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.58
Observations 14,515 14,515 14,515 14,513 14,513 14,513
FE No State State-Year No State State-Year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level in (1),(2), (4), (5) and state-year level in (3), (6).
All regressions include as demographic controls the percent of urban population in the county, the percent
of Black people in the county, the percent of Hispanic people in the county, the percent of females, and the
share of people with less than a high school degree. Economic controls include the median household income




Figure 1.2: Example of federal funds distribution to local governments
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Figure 1.3: Total state intergovernmental transfers per capita by county (in $1000)
Figure 1.4: Total state federal passthrough transfers per capita by county (in $1000)
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Figure 1.5: Total direct federal transfers per capita by county (in $1000)




What Happened to Property Taxes after the Great
Recession?
From a work with Thomas Brosy
Abstract
We use newly collected data on property tax rates, assessment values, and property tax
levies to study the effect of falling home prices associated with the Great Recession on
local property tax revenues. We tease out the mechanical channel through which home
values affected assessed values, and the policy channel through which policymakers re-
sponded to changes in the tax base. We find that the resilience of property tax revenues
can be attributed to two main factors: a small correlation between home price changes
and assessed values after 2007, and large increases in property tax rates in areas facing a
negative shock in their tax base. Contrary to the mainstream perception, we find that the
recession had a small but negative and lasting impact on the tax base. Negative shocks
were offset by as much as 80-85% in the long run, implying that a 10% decrease in the tax
base lead to only a 1.5% decline in property tax revenues. We document a large variation
in responses, and look at the role of property tax rate and levy limits during and post-
recession. Rate limits seem to reduce the ability of policymakers to offset negative shocks
in the tax base and lead to a bigger decline in revenues. Jurisdictions with a levy limit are
much more likely to smooth out negative and positive shocks.
JEL Codes: H12, H20, H71, R31, R51
Keywords: State and Local Taxation, Property Taxes, Great Recession, Property Tax Limits
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2.1 Introduction
Property taxes are one of the main sources of financing for local governments, which
rely on tax revenues and state transfers to provide services such as education and fire pro-
tection. In 2012, property taxes constituted about 1% of state revenues, 27% of county
revenues, and 20% of municipalities’ revenues. There is also a lot of variance in reliance
on property taxes. Property tax collections make up about 31% of all state and local tax
revenues in New Hampshire and only about 7% in Alabama. They are usually administered
locally, with rules varying widely across the nation. This is perhaps one of the reasons why
there is still little evidence of how property rates and revenues changed after the Great
Recession. As the crisis unfolded and home values dropped precipitously, many feared
disastrous consequences for local budgets. However, while the consensus is that the shock
caused by the Great Recession had a negative impact on the finances of local and state
governments, the most dire predictions were mostly avoided. It is true that on average
property taxes did not fall as much as expected during and after the crisis, yet this story
potentially hides important heterogeneity across jurisdictions and locations.
In this paper, we exploit a novel dataset that allows us to shed more light on the effects of
the Great Recession on assessed values - the property tax base - and tax collections, as well
as provide a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms. We collected data on
property tax rates, assessment values and levies for local governments in 44 states between
2000 and 2018, to our knowledge the most extensive collection of this kind so far. The
time period covered by our data moreover allows us to study the effects of the recession
on property tax policy in the short and medium run. We leverage the data to disentangle
the mechanical and policy effects behind aggregate changes in property tax revenues. The
mechanical effect is the change in the tax base following a decline in property values. The
policy effect is the change in the tax rate by policymakers to potentially offset changes in
the base. The property tax levy is generally obtained by multiplying the net assessed value
of a property with the applicable tax rate (often described as millage, or mill rate). The
net assessed value of property depends on the underlying property value, and on the as-
sessment ratio and deductions that apply. Therefore, a change in property values changes
the levy mechanically through a change in the assessed value. As most local governments
face balanced budget requirements, a decline in the tax base implies either an increase in
the tax rate applied - which we refer to as offsetting - or cuts in spending.
An important feature of local property taxation in the United States is the array of rules
and limitations that restrain local policymakers. Limits are widespread, and have been
adopted in some form by the large majority of states. They are usually applied to rates, as-
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sessed values or levies, and may differ substantially in how binding they are. Property tax
limitations are seen as a way to constrain policy makers, and increase their accountability.
Limits have always garnered attention from economists and policymakers, who seek to un-
derstand the extent to which they are binding, and how much they distort local decisions.
In this paper, we additionally collect data on different types of property tax limits, and
shed light on their role and impact on observed tax rates and levies after the recession. In
particular, we focus on whether the presence of limits hinders the ability of jurisdictions to
recover from the shock.
In a preview of our findings, we show that changes in home values have a lagged effect on
assessed values. The lagged effect is likely due to several factors, such as for example the
length of the reappraisal cycles. On average, a 1% increase/decrease in home prices is as-
sociated with a 0.2-0.5% increase/decrease in assessed values. This relationship becomes
weaker after the Great Recession, due to the slowness of adjustment in the tax base, and
the volatility of home prices. We use a first difference model to study the policy channel by
looking at the impact of changes in the tax base on the mill rate. We find that on average,
positive and negative changes in the tax base are offset by an opposite change in the mill
rate: a 10% increase in the tax base is associated with a 5.6% decrease in the mill rate.
We find evidence that the amount of offsetting depends on the intensity of the shock, with
negative shocks resulting in higher offsetting. In addition, while small negative shocks are
offset almost fully, small positive increases in the tax base are typically not offset by policy
makers. This is consistent with policymakers taking advantage of small expansions in the
tax base to increase tax revenue. Turning to the role of limits, we find that localities with
rate limits are able to offset changes in the tax base less, and are on average less likely to
recover to pre-crisis levels of per capita property tax revenues. These findings hold in the
short and medium run, although limits seem to be most binding when looking at yearly
changes. We also study the role of levy limits, and we find that, in presence of levy limits,
localities’ property tax revenues change less in response to a change in the tax base, which
holds true for both for negative and positive changes. Overall, we show that policymakers
seek to smooth shocks and avoid abrupt increases or declines in revenues. The decrease
in property values in the Great Recession had a small but lasting effect on the property tax
base and property tax revenues. Although many localities were able to maintain relatively
stable tax bases and revenues, about a quarter of localities had not recovered to 2007 lev-
els of levy per capita in 2015. We find that declines in the tax base after 2007 were offset
by changes in the tax rates by 80-85% on average in the medium run: a 10% decrease in
property values between 2007 and 2015 is associated with a 1.5% decrease in property tax
revenues.
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Our paper contributes to the broad literature on property tax. In particular, we shed new
light on the relationship between property prices and the tax base, and provide new ev-
idence on the reaction of local policymakers during and after the Great Recession. In
addition, we add to the literature on the role of property tax limits, and their impact on
tax rates and revenues. While the literature on property tax is broadly well developed, still
little is known on how local governments responded to the Great Recession. An impor-
tant reason is the lack of aggregate data on all three fundamental aspects of property tax
systems: the tax base, the tax rates, and revenues. We believe this data collection is a sig-
nificant contribution as well, and can help us deepen our understanding of local property
tax systems overall.
Several studies have sought to shed light on the relationship between home prices
and local tax revenues. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt (2011) find an asymmetric effect, where
a rise in home prices lead to higher revenues, but a decline in market values had little
effect on tax collections. Lutz (2008) and Lutz, Molloy and Shan (2011) provide evidence
on how assessed values respond to changes in property values, and how tax revenues
respond to changes in house prices. Lutz (2008) finds that there is a lag between changes
in property values and changes in assessed values, and that the long run elasticity of tax
levies and market value of properties is about 0.4. Lutz, Molloy and Shan (2011) also find
a small elasticity of property tax revenue with a house price index. They argue that the
lag between market and assessed values, and millage offset can explain this result. Alm,
Buschman and Sjoquist (2011) instead analyze the impact of declining property values on
local government revenues and find that, notwithstanding large variation across localities,
overall local governments have responded differently to the Great Recession than state
governments to avoid pitfalls in revenue. Using school districts in Georgia, they show that
policymakers offset declining home values by increasing the millage rate.
Other studies have focused specifically on the role of policy makers’ reactions to the Great
Recession. The National League of Cities has conducted multiples surveys after the Great
Recession to gather more evidence on how local policy makers react to negative revenue
shocks1. The first course of action was drawing reserves, followed by cuts in non-essential
expenditures, and increases in fees and other utilities. Interestingly, millage rate offset
was rarely used in the survey’s responses. An older study by Wolman (1983) argues that
the optimal response depends on timing and view of policy by citizens. As in the survey,
reserves are drawn first, but then higher taxes are preferred, while cuts in non-essential
expenditures take third place.2
1See for example Hoene and Pagano (2010)
2While surprising, the structure of local taxes may explain this results these seemingly opposite results.
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Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) focus on Michigan and study how localities change ex-
penditures due to fiscal stress, not focusing instead on other mechanisms such as changes
in tax rates. They find that localities experiencing fiscal stress between 2005 and 2009
were more likely to cut non-essential expenditures. Dye and Reschovsky (2008) instead
analyze changes in state aid and whether local governments responded by raising tax rates,
finding that school district increased tax rates by $0.23 for a dollar decrease in state aid on
average. In our paper, we focus on the extent to which policy makers change mill rates in
response to a change in tax base, and are able to study this in the short and medium term
in the majority of states.
The study closest to ours is by Cromwell and Ihlanfeldt (2015), who focus on Florida
and look at millage rate and expenditure adjustments following lower transfers and a
decline in property tax base during the crisis. They find that local policymakers both cut
expenditures and offset the decline in the tax base by raising millage rates, and that the
response varied in part due to the monopoly power of local governments, or the degree of
competition with other neighboring localities. In our paper, we study how assessed values,
levies and mill rates change in response to a change in property values, and highlight the
role of limits.
Property tax limits and their effectiveness have been extensively studied. Examples of
efforts to categorize and study property tax limitations include Paquin (2015), Mullins
(1995), Sapotichne et al. (2015), and Maher and Deller (2013). Amongst others, Dye
and McGuire (1997) and Preston and Ichniowski (1991) have studied the effectiveness of
property tax limitations. At the state level, Poterba (1994) evaluates the role of tax and
expenditure limitations, and fiscal institutions. He finds that states with higher restraint
are typically correlated with faster fiscal adjustment using data from the late 1980s. He
also shows the importance of political factors: states with full party control have a slower
adjustment, and spending cuts and tax increases are smaller during gubernatorial election
years. Our paper exploits data gathered from Paquin (2015) and Lincoln Institute and
of Public Policy (2021b) to evaluate how the presence of rate limits and levy limits, in
particular at the jurisdiction level, has impacted the change in property tax revenues after
the Great Recession. Increasing attention is being devoted in the literature to the effect that
tax limitations have on the erosion of the tax base overall, and on the distortionary effects
that limits and rules related to reappraisal may produce. Berry (2021) and Avenancio-
León and Howard (2019) are two examples of recent research focusing on assessment and
In many jurisdictions the tax rate reflects changes in local expenditures, and is not a policy choice per se.
The mechanical effect on rates will be to offset cuts in other revenues, although many policymakers may not
interpret it that way.
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reappraisal values and shedding light on limitations of the methods used in assessment.
More work is needed to fully appreciate the role that limits and assessment rules have on
property tax collection. Our paper contributes in particular to the role of limits in a time
of property values and tax base decrease.
Note that throughout the paper, we commonly use the term of tax levy when referring
to the amount of revenue generated, as it is common terminology in property taxation.
We also sometimes refer to assessed value as NAV, or net assessed value. The word net
implies that NAV captures the actual tax base, after taking into account exemptions and
reductions in assessment.3 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides
more details on property tax systems in the United States and describes the data collection
process, as well as other data used in the analysis. Section 3 details the mechanism behind
the relationship between home values and local tax revenues, and provides theoretical
predictions. In section 4, we present our methodology and empirical findings, and section
5 concludes.
2.2 Property taxes and data
Property taxes are critical for local revenues and a major source of funding for services
such as schools, but also fire or police departments. All states rely on property taxes to
some extent, and while they may be levied by all levels of jurisdictions in some states, they
are most commonly used as a tool by municipalities and school districts. Counties often
impose a property tax as well, however with the exception of some states where most of
the levy occurs at the county level and is then redistributed to lower jurisdictions, counties’
collections are typically small. State governments may also levy a state level property tax
(e.g. Georgia), however they often largely rely on other sources of income such as sales
taxes and income taxes.4
The tax base for the property tax is broadly determined by the value of taxable property
in a state. The largest share of taxable property is residential real estate, however, differ-
ent classes of properties may be taxed, including for example commercial and agricultural
property. The importance of commercial property taxes as a fraction of local revenue varies
wildly. Colorado is notable as its laws require that a certain percentage of ad valorem taxes
3In some states we are not able to distinguish both. For the majority of tax collected, we either collect
assessed values clearly described as the net taxable amount, or when gross and net values are available, we
use net amounts in the analysis.
4Another fundamental source of revenue for both state and local jurisdictions is transfers. We typically
mean own source of revenue when we talk about revenue, but transfers are important for policymakers, and
will affect their decisions about spending and taxation.
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come from commercial property, which leads to a large discrepancy between the taxation
of residential and commercial property. Some states impose different tax rates on property
types, while others have a uniform rate. When collecting data, some states only report
the total assessed value of taxable property at the jurisdiction level, while others report
it by categories. Throughout the analysis, when we refer to assessed value, we typically
mean real estate value, which combines commercial and residential properties. This ex-
cludes public utilities, agricultural land, or the value of natural resources in certain areas.
Although we use a residential property index, it is reasonable to expect residential and
commercial values to be correlated over time.
States in general use market value to assess the taxable value of property, but may differ in
the fraction of market value they tax, or in the exemptions available. Typical exemptions
include primary residences, or homestead, buildings of historical value, business incen-
tives, or special treatment of older property owners. While market and assessed values are
strongly correlated, there are several factors that can weaken that correlation. First, sev-
eral states implement limits on how much the assessed value of a property can change on
a yearly basis.5 Second, some properties may not be reappraised every year, and there is
typically a lag between actual change in market value and appraisal. Appraisal is done by
individuals and methods vary across time and jurisdictions. Most states implement ways
to limit the variability of taxes paid across areas and use equalization methods to optimize
horizontal equity for homeowners.6 Third, and related to the specification of our estima-
tion strategy, if residential and commercial values are not highly correlated, the coefficient
associated with the home price index will be biased downward because of measurement
error. In areas where commercial property makes up a sizeable portion of the tax base, we
expect the estimated correlation to be a lower bound of the true relationship. We discuss
these issues in more details in the mechanism section of the paper.
Once the taxable value of property is determined, the actual tax collected depends on the
rate imposed. The property tax works differently than other main taxes, such as the sales
or income tax, as in combination with the tax base, the tax rate is the main feature chosen
by state policymakers when implementing tax reform. In the example of the sales tax,
typically few changes in the tax base happen over time. On the other hand, the property
5The most well known example of this is Prop 13 in California which limits the yearly change in assessed
value for residential property of 2% a year, and allows full reappraisals to happen only when the property
is sold. This leads to a large discrepancy between assessed and market values in areas with large increases
in housing values over time. In addition, the maximum tax levy on a property cannot exceed 1% of its real
market value.
6In this context, horizontal equity implies that for a given tax rate and market value, taxes paid will be
the same regardless of location. Another way of saying it is to have the same relationship between market
and assessed value on all jurisdictions of the state.
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tax rate is typically never chosen directly and depends on the amount of revenue needed
in a jurisdiction and the tax base - in this case the value of assessed property. For example,
in New York, school boards and municipal policymakers decide a budget in May, and using
the value of assessed property in March that year, set the tax rate equal to the total levy
needed divided by the net taxable value of property. This mechanism is what stands be-
hind the view of property tax as a “residual” tax, or a tax that is determined once all other
variables in the budget are set.
The tax rate for property taxes is often referred to as the mill rate, because it is usually
expressed as the amount of dollars paid per $1000 worth of assessed property. Multiplying
the mill by 10 effectively gives the amount of taxes to be paid as a percentage of assessed
value. Depending on the state, different taxing jurisdictions may impose different mill
rates, so that the overall property tax paid by a homeowner will depend on the combined
rate of all the applicable jurisdictions. Local politicians can also face significant restrictions
in managing property tax revenues. The majority of states impose some rate limits, levy
limits, assessment limits, or a combination of the three which may require that changes go
through a vote and need to be approved by residents of the jurisdiction. We discuss this in
more details later.
In the next section we describe the data collection process for property tax revenues, mill
rates, assessment values, and property tax limits.
2.2.1 Local property tax data
We collected data on local property tax rates, assessment and levy in 45 states in the
United States between 1990 and 2018.7 We only have the mill rate for a handful of states
(Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia).
We are also missing data on tax revenues in Kentucky. All remaining states have data
for at least two of the three variables mentioned.8 To our knowledge, there is no current
database that aggregates local property tax data. The Census of Government collects data
on spending and revenue from all levels of government every five years, as well as yearly
for states, and large counties and municipalities. However, it does not contain information
on tax rates and assessment values.
We gathered our data from three main sources: state annual reports, state tax adminis-
tration - through their website or direct contact - and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
7We do not have any data available for the states of Alaska, Hawaii, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Washington D.C.
8We typically have full panels between the start and end date of data available for a state, with the
exception of three states (NH, ID, KY) which have some missing years.
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The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy collects data on the features of local tax systems and
raw property tax rate data from states9. We transcribed the data obtained from the three
sources above and restructured it to have consistent series over time for each state and
across areas.
Our paper focuses on total net taxable assessed values, property tax levies, and mill rates
by county. Table 2.1 lists the data available for all states, as well as the years covered. The
majority of states reports aggregate data at the county level. However, states may vary
with some reporting data at the taxing jurisdiction level (e.g. school district, municipality,
etc.). In those cases, we aggregated the available data at the county level. The column
“Aggregated” denotes states for which we calculate the mill rate based on the average of
mill rates from all taxing jurisdictions at the county level. This method can lead to slightly
skewed averages in either directions depending on whether smaller jurisdictions have a
lower or higher tax rates.
In addition, states may differ in how information on property tax is delivered. In some
cases, only the the tax base (assessed values) and total levy are provided, while in others
more details on the source of levy by jurisdiction, the type of property assessed and taxed
(e.g. residential or commercial property), or the use of the levy are available. More de-
tailed information on the data cleaning and gathering process, and state specific details on
sources and available information and variables is described in the appendix.
Note that in the paper, we refer to tax levies, tax revenues, or tax collections interchange-
ably. It is important to notice that the data we collected is on taxes levied. In other words, it
is based on the local government’s budget, and represents what the constituents owe. This
is not the same as tax collections if there is some level of tax delinquency. Unfortunately,
data on both the taxes levied and the taxes actually collected is not always available for
every state, and thus our results should be interpreted only regarding taxes levied. There
is a potential concern as to whether the taxes collected deviate substantially from the taxes
levied, and how this might potentially affect our results. One factor that might ease this
concern is that local governments often set property tax levies in a residual manner, mean-
ing that the mill rates are chosen so that the resulting levy covers the portion of the budget
that is not funded after other sources of revenue are taken into account. Thus, one might
think that local governments would not set levies that are very different from the amount
of taxes they are able to collect. Anecdotal evidence suggests delinquency rates are overall
small and below 3% in most states.10
9Lincoln Institute and of Public Policy (2021a), Lincoln Institute and of Public Policy (2021b)
10See https://www.corelogic.com/intelligence/buy-stories/property-tax-delinquency-varies-across-states
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2.2.2 Property tax limitations
Property tax limitations have been adopted by all states with the exception of Hawaii,
New Hampshire, Tennessee11 and Vermont. Limits are usually applied to increases in as-
sessed values, levies or rates with the aim to regulate property tax revenue. Tax rate limits
may be applied at the jurisdiction level, or there could also be an overall limit on the tax
rate that any property owner pays on their property. Similarly, levy limits may be formu-
lated as a limit on the growth rate of the aggregate levy at the jurisdiction level, or as a
limit on the growth rate of individual property owners’ tax obligations. Limitations regard-
ing assessments tend to put constraints on how fast assessments can rise. This is helpful in
avoiding increases in tax burden which are not determined by policy, but instead by a rise
in market values.
The formulation of limits varies widely across states and even jurisdictions, and can in-
clude a possibility for local governments to override the limit with a pre-determined ma-
jority vote. In other cases, limits are determined through formulas and depend on other
quantities such as inflation.
The share of states with some limits has not changed significantly in the last few years,
as fewer new limits have been established. Data gathered by Paquin (2015) shows that
74% of states have some limits on rates, 34% of states have some limits on assessments,
and 72% of states have some limits on levies. Only 14% have a combination of some rate,
assessment and levy limits. The presence of limits by itself is not indicative of how binding
they might be: as rules vary widely state by state, some limits may be substantially stricter
than others. Table B.1 in the appendix shows which states have some type of assessment,
rate and levy limits in year 2007, specifying whether rate limits and levy limits apply to
the property or the jurisdiction aggregated amount. In addition, the appendix contains
additional information on the data on property tax limitations used.
While property tax limits are often popular with taxpayers, as they are seen as a way to
gain more control over unexpected or unwarranted increases in property taxes, an increas-
ing amount of attention has been devoted in the literature to the effects that limits have
on horizontal equity in property taxation (especially regarding assessment limits and reap-
praisal rules) and on resilience of local finances to economic shocks. Including data on
the presence of limits allows us to broaden our question to include the role of limits as
well. In this paper, we use data by Paquin (2015), and Lincoln Institute and of Public Pol-
icy (2021b), as well as direct research state by state to find which states have limits, and
classify them. In the mechanism section, we describe in more details how limits may affect
11Tennessee has a truth in taxation requirement
51
policymakers’ decisions when facing different types of shocks.
2.2.3 Other data
We collected two measures for local property values. The first home price index is
issued by the the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The FHFA index is computed
using sales prices and appraisal values for mortgages bought or guaranteed by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. Small counties with few transactions are typically missing from
the data. The number of counties covered was 1435 in 1990, and 2412 after 2000. The
sample is consistent throughout our estimation period (2000-2016). A second housing
price measures comes from Zillow.12 Zillow separates its price index into three category:
low-tier, mid-tier, and high-tier. Mid tier represents the typical home value in the 35th to
65th percentile range. Zillow data covers fewer counties than the FHFA index so it is not
our primary choice but we leverage it to validate some results from the FHFA index.13.
The main data source on state and local revenues and expenditures in the United States is
the Census of Governments.14 We use this data to compute the share that several sources
of revenues represent at the county level, as localities may differ on how much they rely
on revenue sources such as property taxes, other taxes, or intergovernmental transfers
from states and the federal government. The Census of Governments data only covers
all jurisdictions every five years, in years ending with ’02 or ’07. The Annual Survey of
State and Local Government Finances covers all years but limits the sample to state level
finances, and large cities and counties.
Demographic data at the county level (total population, and share of the population by race
and age groups) comes from the Census and is based on revised intercensal estimates. We
also use data from NHGIS15, which is based on the Census and the American Community
Survey on the share of population with a college degree, and the share of urban residents at
the county level. Data on unemployment rate used as a control in some estimations comes
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 16 We adjust all price related variables (including the
home price index) for inflation in 2010 dollars using the GDP deflator provided by the
12Data from the FHFA can be found at https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/
House-Price-Index.aspx. Data from Zillow Research can be found at https://www.zillow.com/
research/data/
13Top-tier ZHVI is the typical value for homes within the 65th to 95th percentile range for a given region,
and bottom-tier ZHVI the typical value for homes that fall within the 5th to 35th percentile range. All data
is seasonally adjusted.
14Census of government data:https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cog.html
15National Historical Geographic Information System
16Census population data:https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/
2010s-counties-detail.html. NHGIS data:https://www.nhgis.org/user-resources/
datasets-overview Unemployment rate: https://www.bls.gov/lau/
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Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis.
2.2.4 Summary statistics
Figure 2.1 plots the log HPI, NAV, millage and tax levy between 2002 and 2015. The
top panel includes all information available for all four variables, while the bottom panel
removes counties for which the home price index is missing. Note that all values are ad-
justed for inflation (except for the mill rate which is not a price variable), and levy and
assessed values are calculated per capita. Behind the aggregate change in home values
and property tax features displayed in figure 2.1 lies a lot of variation. Table 2.2 displays
summary statistics for the four variables mentioned. The first panel computes statistics
based on yearly variation between 2000-2016, 2000-2007 and 2008-2015. The bottom
panels display 3, 5 and 8 year differences summary statistics for three periods: the imme-
diate aftermath the recession (2007-2010), the difference between the highest and lowest
average home price index in our period (2007-2012), and the difference before the reces-
sion and after recovery (2015)17.
Over our entire time period, the average yearly change was 0.5% for home prices, 1.6%
for assessed values, 2.3% for tax levy, and about 0.9% for the mil rate. However, these
results are the outcome of averaging between drastically different pre and post recession
periods. In addition, the percentiles and standard deviation show significant variation
across counties. HPI, NAV, and property tax revenues increased in similar proportion be-
tween 2002 and 2007, indicating that there was not a lot of millage offsetting on average
and that policymakers used the rise in home values to raise taxes. In post-recession peri-
ods however a different story emerges. Between 2008 and 2015, we see that home prices
were experiencing on average a 1.8% decrease but assessed values were instead increasing
by around 0.8%, and revenues by about 1.9%, while the mill rate was on average 1.2%
higher. The yearly patterns post-2007 are consistent with the longer time differences in
terms of signs but of larger magnitude. While assessed values went down in some areas
(as we can observe from the 25th percentile), the tax base remained stable on average,
while property taxes increased despite the fall in home values. This can be attributed to
the rise in property tax rates.
For all time periods, we can observe a large variation in the distribution of changes in our
variable of interests. This is also highlighted in figure 2.2 which plots the yearly average
and median change, as well as the inter-quartile range, in boxes, and 1.5 times the 25th
and 75th percentile with whiskers. We can observe substantial variation across units. Fig-
17We choose 2015 rather than 2016 or 2017 as a handful of states have missing data after 2015.
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ure 2.3 plots the trends in states with and without rate limits and levy limits. The trends
for HPI and assessed value per capita are comparable across the four panels. In absence
of rate limits, the mill rate is on average decreasing before 2010 and starts inverting trend
only after 2010, whereas in presence of rate limits the mill rate starts increasing sooner.
We can also see different patterns between areas with and without levy limits. In particu-
lar, localities with levy limits are characterized by larger increases in the mill rate, whereas
localities without levy limits seem to offset less with mill rates. Surprisingly, the levy seems
to also start increasing after 2011 in localities with levy limits, whereas in localities with-
out levy limits it is decreasing between 2011 and 2013.
These results highlight the variation over time and across localities on the effect that chang-
ing home prices have on tax revenues. The following section focuses on the mechanisms
behind this relationship.
2.3 Mechanism
Let us start by defining the total revenue as R = Transfers + Property Taxes +
NonProperty Taxes (R = Rg + Rp + Rnp), where Rp = A × τm = T , the assessed
value times the mill rate. We can then decompose the change in revenue as follows.
∆Rp = ∆A× τm + A×∆τm. The first item is the mechanical effect of a change in the tax
base, the second item is the policy effect from a change in the tax rate based on the cur-
rent tax base.18 For exposition, we assume that transfers and other taxes are not directly
impacted by home values.19
Given that local policymakers typically choose a budget which then determines the
property tax liability, and by extension the tax rate, we can determine the change in the
mill rate based on policymakers’ choice of levy




∆At × τm,t−1 + ∆Rnp,t + ∆Rg,t
}
where ∆B is the chosen change in a local government’s budget. Overall the degree of
millage offset will depend on the change in assessed values, the amount of revenues from
18Note that here for simplification we assume that assessed values are not a variable impacted by policy
choices. However, assessed values may be affected by policy. A prime example is the large number of states
with limits on assessment growth - either on individual properties, or on the aggregate value of property in
the state. Local governments also affect the taxable value of property by allowing exemptions or reductions
for specific goods. Homestead residences typically are granted exemptions and reduction on their assessed
value. Local incentives that reduce tax liability for businesses are also very common.
19There is an extensive literature on the relationship between home values and consumption, which finds
that higher housing wealth leads to higher consumption. Home prices may also affect the consumption of
goods associated with home purchases and construction, affecting sales tax and fee collections.
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other sources, and the chosen budget, which together determine the levy required.
To understand why the decline in home values had little impact in the aggregate but large
variation across areas, we must first tease apart the role of the Great Recession on 1) the
tax base, 2) local tax policy. The first mechanism is the relationship between the housing
market and the taxable value of real estate - the property tax base. Home values are
typically assessed by county officials based on the estimated market value by the assessor,
and the assessment ratio, which multiplied by the market value determines the assessed
value, effectively the property tax base:20
Levy = Assessment ratio×Market V alue×MillRate÷ 1000
While we expect assessed values and housing markets to be correlated, there might be
significant differences between the two for several reasons.
First, there is a natural lag as property tax levies are typically based on the previous
year’s assessed values. For example, in Minnesota, assessed values are determined by
January 1st 2020, tax levy is chosen by the legislature in the summer and taxes are payable
by January 2021. Our dataset determines the year of the tax base when it is used to
determine levy, which is 2020 in this example. However, the tax base reflects values from
2019, creating this short lag.
Second, property is typically not appraised every year. Many states have re-appraisal
schedules every two to three years, creating a lag between changes in market values and
assessed values. In jurisdictions with infrequent reappraisal, temporary changes in value
may not be reflected in assessment at all. An extreme example of this is Delaware, where
the most recent assessment of the three counties was in 1983. Although county assessors
have guidelines on how to estimate the market value of property, they ultimately have
some discretion in determining the taxable value. This can create disparities across and
within jurisdictions, as well as across time. Recent research has highlighted how the rela-
tive tax burden can vary substantially based on the value of the home (Berry (2021)), or
the demographic characteristics of a neighborhood (Avenancio-León and Howard (2019)).
These are important findings that highlight how property appraisal and its relationship
with market value is murky and varies widely. In addition, in it common to reassess homes
when they are bought and sold. As the number of homes sold in the years following
20As previously discussed,numerous states and localities have exemptions and deductions which lower the
taxable value of specific properties. Nonetheless, the final taxable value would be the estimated market value
times the assessment ratio, minus applicable exemptions. While the exemptions can, and are revised by state
and local officials, they are typically specified amount and thus do not depend on the value of a home. E.g.
in Michigan the base exemption was $40,475 in 2020, and that figure is revised every three years.
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the Great Recession dropped, it is likely that the share of property reassessed dropped as
well.21
Third, many states have assessment limits, which restrict the maximum amount by
which the assessed value of a house can increase year to year. In areas with rapidly rising
real estate prices, these limits can create substantial wedge between the taxable value
and the market value of property.22 The extent to which assessment limits are binding
and their effects on property tax collections are fascinating questions, which we leave for
future research. 23
Finally, our measure of local values will be measured with error. The distribution of
home values and how property at different end of the distribution is not captured by a
single index. The presence of non residential property in the tax base, mainly commercial
property, will also lead to measurement error if their change in value is not highly corre-
lated, which may also be more likely in the short run.
The second mechanism behind the relation between property values and tax revenues is
what determines the millage rate - the tax rate applied to taxable assessed values to de-
termine the property tax levy. For other sources of government revenues such as sales or
income taxes, the exact tax base is unknown when policymakers determine the tax rate.
The property tax base on the other hand is known in advance of the fiscal year. Hence the
mechanism through which the millage rate is set is different from the mechanism through
which other tax rates are set. Usually, local governments decide on a budget and then
estimate the property tax levy to be the total amount of spending minus expected other
revenues. This mechanism coined the “residual view”, whereby policymakers decide on a
budget, and the mill rate offsets changes in the tax base accordingly. Assuming no changes
in spending and other revenue sources, a rise in assessed values should be accompanied
by a similar decline in the mill rate. Critiques of this view offer an alternative hypothesis
called “Fiscal Illusion”. They posit that a rise in the tax base can be followed by a rise in
tax levy, as policymakers exploit the salience of the tax rate, and “hide” increases in levy
21The number of homes sold went from 7 millions in 2005 to just above 4 millions in 2008, and 5 millions
in 2013 (See https://www.statista.com/statistics/226144/us-existing-home-sales/).
22E.g. this is the case in Florida where assessed values are required to not exceed market values. As an
example, take a house that was bought for $100,000 in 2000, and assessed at $50,000. Assessed value
should be the minimum between the estimated market value times assessment ratio (e.g. here 0.5), and
the maximum amount allowed to increase given the limits. In 2007, that house was worth $200,000, but
because of assessment limits was assessed at $75,000. If the value of the house goes down to $150,000,
the assessed value will remain the same. If the value goes below $150,000, then the assessed value will go
down. In either case the correlation between assessed value and home market value is either zero or much
lower than in periods when the housing market was going up.
23We do not include assessment limits in our analysis as we focus here on the Great Recession, and the role
of the real estate crash. Theoretically, we do not expect assessment limits to be binding in areas experiencing
declines in property values.
56
behind partial offsets in the mill rate, which nonetheless is declining. An alternative view
is that changes in the tax base and home values can also imply a shift in preferences for
public goods provision and taxation, explaining the partial offsetting. In this paper, we
hone down on disentangling the effect of the tax base and policy changes and abstract
from changes in preferences. Our estimation strategy uses first-differences, essentially re-
moving constant local regulations, characteristics and preferences. The extent to which
the Great Recession changed preferences toward local taxation is another important and
fascinating question for future research.
2.3.1 Limits and local policy-making
As we discussed earlier, in addition to assessment limits the other two common main
types of limits are levy and rate limits. Policymakers may offset declines in assessed values
to manage or avoid a decline in tax revenue. In that situation, rate limits are most likely
to be binding. Rate limits may have different effects in the short and medium run as well.
For example, they may be more likely to be binding in the short run. Imagine a county
that experiences a one-year temporary decline in assessed values. Policymakers will offset
that decline by increasing the tax rate as much as the limit allows. If assessed values go
back up the following years, they will be able to recover the previous loss in revenues by
keeping the mill rate the same, or not lowering it as much as another county which has not
experienced a previous decline in revenues. Essentially, in this scenario the limit creates
short run variation in tax revenue but is not binding in the medium run. On the other
hand, a persistent decline in the tax base may imply that the rate limit is forcing lower tax
revenues permanently. After the Great Recession, home prices bottomed out in 2012, and
assessed values shortly after. This scenario is more likely to make rate limits binding on a
yearly basis, and in the short and medium run.
We also evaluate the role of levy limits, which may have an impact on recovery post
Great Recession for two main reasons. First, areas experiencing small declines in prop-
erty values, or even increases may want to increase revenues coming from property taxes,
especially if they face declines from other sources, such as local sales taxes, or intergovern-
mental transfers. Second, jurisdictions with stringent levy limits facing negative shocks in
their tax base may be reluctant to reduce levy, as it may be more difficult for them to “catch
up”. Thus, while the levy limit itself may not be binding, forward looking policymakers
may optimize their current decisions based on expectations about the future tax base and
the stringency of the limits.
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2.4 Empirical analysis
In this section we present evidence on the relationship between the home price index
and assessed values, as well as on the effect of a change in the tax base on local property
tax revenues and tax rates. We investigate the role of levy and rate limits in the aftermath
of the Great Recession, and the extent to which they are binding and affected recovery.24
2.4.1 Housing market and assessed values - the role of the tax base
The first step in our analysis involves evaluating the effect of home prices on the tax
base, i.e. total county assessed value per capita. Given the large heterogeneity in assess-
ment rules and methods both across and within states, we evaluate our model in first
differences. Essentially, we exploit the variation in home prices over time in a county
between 2000 and 2016
∆ logNAVt = β∆ logHPIt + εt (2.1)
where NAV is the net assessed value per capita, and HPI is the county level home price
index. Both variables are adjusted for inflation.25 We cluster standard errors at the state
level to take into account serial correlation over time. As we discussed and observed in
figure 2.1, there can be a significant lag between assessed values and market values. To
test for this, we estimate the following equation with three lag changes in the home price
index.
∆ logNAV = β0∆ logHPIt + β1∆ logHPIt−1 + β2∆ logHPIt−2 + β3∆ logHPIt−3 + εt
Column 3 in table 2.3 shows that, on average, a 1% increase in home prices is associated
with an increase of 0.3% in the property tax base the same year. However, we know that
assessed values typically lag home values, depending on assessment rules across coun-
ties.26 Adding three lagged values confirm that lagged changes have stronger predictive
power. The coefficient with the contemporaneous change is unsurprisingly now only 0.1,
24In our yearly analysis, we remove yearly changes in the tax base, tax collection or tax base where the
amount more than doubled or was reduced by more than half (i.e. a change higher than 100% or smaller
than -50%. In our long-difference analysis, we remove the highest 1% change in magnitude of the same
three variables. The main reason behind this decision is the potential for mistakes in the raw data. In addi-
tion, translating some PDFs and scanned documents sometimes results in small discrepancies as well. Not
removing outliers results in almost identical results, with slightly lower estimates due to measurement error,
and slightly higher standard errors. The qualitative findings and statistical significance remains however.
25We use the GDP deflator provided the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to adjust all price related
variables, effectively levy, assessed values, and the home price index.
26In the first two columns we estimate the model in levels, with and without county fixed effects.
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and likely the result of inter-temporal correlation in property changes. All lags have sig-
nificant coefficients and larger estimates (βlag1 = 0.21, βlag2 = 0.18, βlag3 = 0.13). Column
(5) replicates the analysis but weighing results by population. The overall outcomes are
very similar, indicating that in the aggregate, population is not associated with large dif-
ferences in the relationship between home values and the tax base. Although not likely,
changes in demographic and economic characteristics could be associated with changes in
assessment rules. Column (6) includes controls variables and the coefficients are virtually
similar. Column (6) also restricts the sample to counties we observe every year between
2000 and 2016 and yields similar results as well. In column (7), we use a different mea-
sure for home values: the price of a median home value sold in a county. Coefficients are
about 10-20% smaller but again the qualitative results are comparable.
Columns (8) and (9) split the sample before and after 2008. The relationship between
changes in home values and the tax base is much weaker in the second period: the coef-
ficients on log hpi are between 50 and 60% smaller after the Great Recession, indicating
that the tax base was less likely to be affected by changes in home prices after recession.
Long differences and asymmetric responses
To focus on the effect post-2007, we estimate our models using 3, 5 and 8-year differ-
ences.27 This allows us to estimate whether the relationship between the tax base and
property values is different for positive changes and negative changes in home values.
Essentially, we estimate
∆3y logNAVt = β1∆3y logHPIt × (HPIt > 0) + β2∆3y logHPIt × (HPIt < 0) + εt
The first striking observation is that there is essentially no correlation between changes in
home prices and changes in assessed values between 2007 and 2010, for both positive and
negative changes. Note that very few observations had positive changes, only 164 counties
experienced increases, while 2,264 counties saw a decline in property values.
Looking at the 2007-2012 and 2007-2015 changes, we notice that the coefficients as-
sociated with both positive and negative changes in home prices strengthen, and the coef-
ficient associated with lower home values becomes statistically significant (β07−12 = 0.18).
Weighted results are consistent, with a higher estimated relationship in magnitude be-
tween lower home values and a lower tax base. This could be an indication that the home
27We choose 2010 as it was the first year when the recession ended officially, 2012 as it was the year home
prices bottomed out, and 2015 rather than later years for sample reasons, since we start losing states after
2015.
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price index is less subject to measurement error in more populated areas, or that assess-
ment rules, limits, and the frequency of appraisal is correlated with population density.
However, the coefficient on log positive HPI is large and negative, implying that a rise in
home prices is associated with a decline in the tax base. This is likely the result of volatil-
ity in home prices throughout this time period, and the fact that recovery in values only
started in 2012 in most places. With the exception of the last column of weighted results,
we cannot reject that in the aggregate, and over the medium run, adjustment in the tax
base is symmetrical for increases and declines in home values. 28
Taking stock of the mechanical effect
Before moving to the policy analysis, it is worth recapping what we have learned so far
about the relationship between home values and assessed values. First and unsurprisingly,
the home price index has a precise and strong effect on the tax base, whereby a 10%
change in the former will lead to a 3-5% change in the latter. Second, there is a significant
lag - up to several years - until changes in property values are reflected in the tax base.
Third, the relationship between home prices and assessed values is significantly weaker
after the Great Recession. The main explanation is the combination of slow adjustment
and high volatility in home prices. Fourth, we typically find symmetric effects of changes
in the home price index on net assessed values.
2.4.2 Housing market and property tax revenues - the role of policy
We can now turn to the role of policy. Given a specific change in assessed values, how
did the levy and tax rate change? To answer this question, we estimate the following
equation
∆ logLevyt = β∆ logNAVt + εt (2.2)
where ∆ logLevyt is the difference in log property tax revenue per capita adjusted for in-
flation. The upper panel of table 2.5 shows results for this regression. The first column
coefficient implies that a 1% increase in the tax base leads to a 0.5% increase in tax rev-
enue. We test for asymmetric responses in column (2): a positive shock yields a stronger
effect compared to a negative shock (β∆>0 = 0.56 and β∆<0 = −0.4). It is possible that
areas relying on different sources of income experience different trends in their adjustment
to the tax base. In addition, changes in population and income may change preferences
28To further test for symmetrical responses, we estimate the yearly model with third lagged differences -
i.e. regressing ∆ logNAV on logHPIt − logHPIt−3. Results are shown in table B.4 in the appendix and
confirms that we typically cannot reject symmetrical adjustment of assessed values to local home values.
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toward local taxation.29 In column (3), we include the change in demographic character-
istics, change in income per capita and unemployment rate, as well as the fraction of local
income coming from property taxes, other own revenues and transfers. The qualitative
results are similar, but the response to a positive shock is smaller, and the response to a
negative shock is larger in magnitude. While this could indicate changes in preferences,
it is also possible that controls are correlated with local home prices, and by extension
the tax base. In that case, such controls would be characterized as ”bad controls”, since
their effect stems from their correlation with the underlying variation in the explanatory
variable. By taking first differences, we effectively control for all time consistent varia-
tion across jurisdiction. We choose not to include controls in following estimations, given
that the likelihood of having bad controls outweighs the omitted variable bias issue in our
opinion.
The weighted specification gives consistent results, with estimates being slightly lower
in magnitude.30 Estimated coefficients shown in columns (5) and (6) are similarly consis-
tent before and after 2008.31
We now turn to the effect of the tax base on the mill rate, which is shown in the
lower panel. Unsurprisingly, we find estimates of the opposite sign and similar magni-
tude as the levy. Both positive and negative shocks are roughly 50% offset by mileage
decrease/increase. Offsetting of negative shocks is a bit smaller on average (50% for neg-
ative shocks versus 40% for positive shocks on average). In different words, this means
a 1% increase in the tax base is associated with a decrease in the mill rate of about .4%,
implying that 40% of the positive shock is offset. 32
Finally, we may worry that assessed values are endogenous. An example would be local
policymakers changing rules of assessment, such as reducing the frequency of re-appraisal,
limiting downward changes in assessment, or giving local assessors new instructions on
how to assess homes, either formally or informally. Changes in assessment regulations
however usually take place less frequently than decisions on tax levies, which are taken
29This type of sorting pioneered by Tiebout(1953) could imply that trends are accentuated over time until
a local area reaches an equilibrium. If sorting is orthogonal to observable characteristics, we cannot control
for it. However, if Tiebout sorting is uncorrelated with changes in assessed values, our coefficient will not be
biased.
30E.g. a 10% decline in the tax base is associated with a 3.6% decline in revenues, compared to a 4%
decline in our baseline.
31The smaller effect in magnitude of a negative change in NAV may be a reflection of samples and hetero-
geneous responses, given the small number of places experiencing a negative shock in their assessed value
before 2008.
32As policymakers react to assessed values, it is the correct variable to use to understand policy changes.
However, it can also be interesting to look at the correlation between home values and policy outcomes. We
show the results of regressing levy and mill rate on the third lagged difference in the home price index in
table B.5
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every time a new budget is decided. This difference in timing may ease the worry that en-
dogenous changes in assessed values are driving our results. In addition, while there is no
concrete and systematic evidence that changes in assessment rules took place, we evaluate
the previous model using an instrumental variable specification, where the change in tax
base (NAV) is instrumented using the change in home prices. We show the instrumented
results in column (7) of table 2.5. The estimated coefficients are largely similar, indicating
that the level of endogeneity of assessed value to changes in home prices is potentially not
very large or common.
Testing for non-linear effects
It is possible that policymakers react differently to small and large shocks. For example,
small shocks may be adjusted using other sources of income. For small positive shocks, a
lower degree of rate offsetting may be less salient. Large shocks may force policymakers
to have referendums in states with rate limits. We estimate a quadratic polynomial version
of equation 2.2 for both levy per capita and mill rate as the outcome variable of interest.33
We then plot the predicted outcomes based on the change in positive or negative net as-
sessed values in figure 2.5. The left-hand side panels display the predicted values for the
linear model, which confirm the symmetric responses with slightly more rate offsetting
for negative shocks. Turning our attention to the polynomial model, we see that there is
very little rate offsetting for negative shocks up to roughly a 30% decline in the tax base,
after which it increases with a steeper slope. The effect of positive shocks are much closer
to the linear model outcome, with the exception of small shocks, which are not offset at all.
These results overall shed light on policy responses as a function of the intensity of the
shock on the tax base. Small negative shocks (less than a 5-7% change) are offset almost
fully, while small positive shocks are not offset at all. Policymakers seek to smooth tax
revenues as much as possible, and potentially take advantage of less salient changes.
The Great Recession and long-differences
Next we turn to the short and medium run analysis of how changes in the tax base
affected local tax rates and levies. We use the same periods as in our earlier tax base
analysis, 2007-2010, 2007-2012, and 2007-2015. Results are shown in table 2.6. The first
observation is that the average effect of a change of 1% in the tax base is linked to a .5%
33Effectively, we estimate ∆ logLevyt =
∑4
k=1 βk(∆ logNAVt)
k × (∆ logNAVt > 0)k +∑4
j=1 βj(∆ logNAVt)
j × (∆ logNAVt < 0) + εt.
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change in levy. This result however hides important difference between areas experiencing
positive and negative shocks in their tax base. While a positive shock is strongly correlated
with an increase in tax levy, a negative shock has a small and imprecise effect - for the
2007-2012 difference, β∆>0 = 0.71 and β∆<0 = −0.12.
The mill rate results show that declines in the tax base are offset by a much larger
magnitude: mill rates hikes offset between 70 and 80% of a decline in the tax base. On
the other hand, increases in the tax base are barely offset by a lower mill rate - between
25 and 30%. This is different from the yearly estimation, where the offsetting was roughly
symmetrical. One may wonder then if this offsetting behavior may lead to ever-increasing
tax levies over time. While more work is needed to fully assess this hypothesis, figures
2.1 and 2.7 may help illustrate two phenomena: figure 2.1 shows that average tax levies
per capita, while relatively flat between 2009 and 2011, have been increasing since 2011,
figure 2.7 instead shows that changes in levy per capita have been heterogeneous across
the country, with about 30% of counties not yet recovering the amount of levy collected
before 2007.
2.4.3 The role of levy and rate limits after 2007
The previous results investigate how changes in assessed values relate to changes in
property taxes levied and changes in mill rates. The majority of states however impose
some form of property tax limits, the most common being rate limits and levy limits,
followed by assessment limits. Limits can be formulated in a variety of ways, but overall
their aim is to prevent sudden tax increases. We focus on the role of rate and levy limits.
Assessment limits typically restrict growth in assessed values, and since we focus on the
period between 2007 and 2012 they are likely to be less binding. In times of steeply
declining assessed values localities would need to increase mill rates substantially to offset
the change in the tax base and maintain a constant levy. Limits on tax rates are then more
likely to become binding in periods of sustained assessed value decrease and to limit the
capability of localities to avoid a decrease in levy. We use a “rate limit” dummy variable
that takes value 1 for localities in which any type of rate limits hold, and a “levy limit”
dummy variable that takes value 1 whenever a locality has an aggregate levy limit. More
detail on limits data is available in the appendix.
We investigate the role of rate limits and levy limits during the Great Recession by
estimating the following model for ∆ logLevyt and for ∆ logMillt:
∆ log Yt = β1∆ logNAV post + β2∆ logNAV negt + γ1∆ logNAV post × Levy Limit
+γ2∆ logNAV negt × Levy Limit+ εt
(2.3)
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In table 2.7, we find that the presence of levy limits reduces the change in levy after a pos-
itive change in assessed values, so that in jurisdictions with levy limits, a 10% increase in
assessed values is associated with an increase in levy of 6.4%, lower than localities without
limits, for which it is 7%. Interestingly, levy limits reduce the change in levy also in the
case of declines in assessed values. A 10% decrease is associated with a 6% lower levy
in localities without levy limit, and a 3.1% decrease in localities with levy limits. Even
though they are not likely to be binding when the tax base is decreasing, this observation
could be explained by localities with strict levy growth limits being reluctant to allow large
drops in levies. The presence of growth limits would then make the “catch up” phase in
tax revenues more difficult. In column 1, we observe that in the presence of a rate limit,
a negative change in assessed values is a associated with a larger decrease in tax revenue.
This implies that in presence of rate limits, offsetting the change in the tax base becomes
more difficult, and the levy declines more as a result. In case of a positive change in as-
sessed values instead, the rate limit is not affecting the change in levy.
The bottom panel of table 2.7 analyzes the patterns related to changes in the mill rate.
The presence of rate limits decreases the extent to which localities are able to offset the
impact of a change in assessed values, in particular in the case of negative shocks. If in
localities without any rate limits a 10% decrease in net assessed value is on average asso-
ciated with a 7.9% increase in mill rate, the presence of limits reduced this effect to 4.4%
on average. The results for aggregate levy limit are consistent with the model with levy
as the dependent variable: in presence of a levy limit, localities tend to offset a negative
change in assessed values more. In columns 3 and 4, the weighted results show a negative
and significant coefficient associated with positive shocks and levy limit interaction. This
is likely driven by few localities experiencing an increase in assessed values between 2007
and 2012, which they offset by a larger decrease in mill rates.
While table 2.7 presented results for one-year differences, Table 2.8 looks at 3,5 and 8
years changes. We find that in the medium run, rate limits do not have significant effects
on the change in levy. Levy limits, on the other hand, have a significant impact: in column
6, localities with levy limits are associated with smaller increases in levy in response to
positive changes in assessed values. Coefficients on the 3 and 5 years positive changes
and levy limits instead are not significant: this is not surprising, as the majority of the
sample sees a decline in the tax base between 2007-2010 and 2007-2012. In all three
specifications, however, the coefficient on negative changes in tax base and levy limits is
statistically significant.This implies that in the presence of a levy limit, a decrease in tax
base between 2007-2010, 2007-2012, and 2007-2015 is associated with a small increase
in levy. This is consistent with the results found in the previous table, which suggested
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that localities with levy limits are more likely to offset changes in the tax base. This is
also visible in the bottom half of the table, which shows that localities with levy limits
are associated with larger offset in mill rates in response to both negative and positive
changes in assessed values. The coefficients on the presence of rate limits instead are only
significant for the short term, and not in the medium term. This seems to indicate that
rate limits are binding in the short run, on a yearly basis, but less likely so over longer
periods of time. A potential explanation is the possibility of overrides, through referen-
dums for example, or other changes in property tax collection. In addition, localities that
face stringent limits in some years may “catch up” in years when the limits are not binding.
Non-linear effects: when are rate limits effective?
To shed light on the effect of rate limits on mill rates and tax levy for a given tax
base shock, we evaluate the four degree polynomial version of equation 2.2 separately for
counties with and without a jurisdiction rate limit. As in the previous section, we plot the
predicted values in levy and local mill rate for a given change in the tax base in figure
2.6.34
Looking at the linear predicted values first, we observe that counties with a jurisdiction
rate limit experience similar effects, with the magnitude of the mill response being slightly
larger for both positive and negative shocks in areas without limits. Turning to the polyno-
mial plot a different picture emerges. For negative shocks below a 40% decline in the tax
base- which is effectively more than 95% of counties for our sample - places with a rate
limit offset the decline in the tax base less. For larger shocks the reverse happens. This
suggests that when the negative shock is large, even counties with a limit are able to raise
the mill rate. For example, a large number of states with rate limits allow referendums
to increase the rate beyond the maximum authorized. On the other hand, the effect of
a positive shock is almost identical for areas with and without limit, an expected result
when limits are least likely to be binding. To read the graph more easily, we don’t plot the
confidence intervals for the polynomial model. It is worth noting that intervals overlap for
areas with and without a limit, implying heterogeneity in how binding limits actually are.
As we discussed the stringency and details vary widely state to state, and we would expect
some limits to be virtually never binding, while others would severely restrain the ability
of policymakers to adjust tax rates.




We can now take stock of our analysis on how the decline in home prices between
2007 and 2012 affected the tax base, and how policymakers responded to positive and
negative shocks, to provide answers to some broad questions in the literature. First, upon
observing a decline in property tax revenue, we can weigh in on how much of the change
can be attributed to a change in the tax base, and how much can be attributed to a change
in policy.35 Second, we can provide an estimate of the short and medium run correlation
between home prices and local property tax policy. These questions are intimately related
to our previous discussion focusing on the policy response to a change in the tax base.
Here we take one step back and use our findings to shed light on the mechanism between
home prices and our outcomes of interest.
Looking at table 2.9, the first observation is that outcomes are very similar both shortly
after the great recession (2007-2010), and in the medium run (2007-2015). In a nutshell,
the change in home prices had very little explanatory power on revenue per capita, with
an effect close to zero (β07−15 = −0.05 with s.d. = 0.10). This result is mostly driven by
negative shocks (which make up a vast majority of counties for all time periods). The few
areas with positive changes in home values actually increased their revenues per capita
substantially, whereby a 1% increase in the home price index was associated with an in-
crease in levy of 1.6%. That result should however be understood with a grain of salt, as
it is driven by a small number of counties. Very few places experienced positive changes
in property values, and these increases were small. Perhaps jurisdictions with more stable
home prices shifted to higher reliance on property taxes, especially if they faced declining
revenues from other sources. These are important questions for future research.
Turning to the results on mill rate at the bottom of table 2.9, we see that negative shocks
were offset by an increase in the mill rate: a 10% decline in the home price index lead to a
1.2% increase between 2007 and 2010, and a 3% increase between 2007 and 2015. These
numbers highlight the importance of having data on assessed values. One could wrongly
conclude that policymakers only partially offset decline in home values. However, table
2.4 highlighted that between 2007 and 2015, the correlation between home prices and the
tax base was only 0.2 on average. This implies that the mill rate response to the change
in the home price index fully offsets the decline in the tax base and more, which explains
why levies have not decreased.
35Where the change attributed to the tax base can be larger than 1%, and the change in policy negative,
effectively offsetting the negative shock.
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2.4.5 The road to recovery
Figure 2.7 plots the share of counties with values of HPI, NAV, levy and mill rate higher
than in 2007. We can observe that, while the property values remained lower than 2007
through 2016 for the large majority of localities, assessed values remained at 2007 val-
ues or higher in about 50% of localities. The majority of localities were able to retain
levels of levy per capita to the 2007 level or higher, however a fraction (around 30%)
of localities had not recovered the same level of levy per capita in 2016. When looking
at the unweighted plots in figure 2.8, one can notice that in localities with rate limits in
the medium run the mill rate was at the 2007 level in a lower share of localities, and
similarly the levy 2007 level was recovered in a lower share of localities. Figure 2.9 in-
stead analyzes the share of counties with higher outcomes compared to 2007 by levy limit
subsample. Overall, in both weighted and unweighted plots, a lower share of counties
without levy limits seems to recover 2007 level levy than counties with levy limits. While
the trajectory regarding mill rate levels is similar, this may hide heterogeneity in how much
localities increase the mill rate, as the plot in figure 2.9 is only taking into consideration
whether the rate is at the level of 2007 or higher. In table 2.7 though, we had found that
localities with levy limits tend to offset changes in nav more than localities with no levy
limits. Thus, the levy limits results in figure 2.9 could be driven by the inframarginal effect
of some localities with levy limits increasing mill rates more than localities without levy
limits.
We also evaluate a probit model to study how the presence of rate limits may affect the
ability of localities to recover the level of levy per capita they had in 2007 before the Great
Recession. 36 We plot the margins from the unweighted regressions in figure 2.10, and find
in Panel a that the presence of a mill rate does not have a statistically significant impact
on the probability that the rate in t is greater than the 2007 rate. In Panel b, we plot the
average effect of a mill rate limit on the probability that a locality recovers the level of
levy per capita available in 2007. We find that the effect is negative and significant for
some years, with the probability that the levy per capita is recovered lower by between 14
and 19 percentage points between 2012 and 2016 for localities with rate limits. Finally,
36Specifically, we run the following estimations for t ∈ [2008− 2015]:
1(Mill Ratet > Mill Rate2007) = β1∆t−2007 logNAV per capita+ β2Rate Limit+ εt
1(Levy per capitat > Levy per capita2007) = β1∆t−2007 logNAV per capita+ β2Rate Limit+ εt
1(Levy per capitat > Levy per capita2007) = β1∆t−2007 logNAV per capita+ εt
1(NAV per capitat > NAV per capita2007) = β1∆t−2007 logHPI + εt
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we also plot the marginal effect of changes in net assessed values on the probability that
levy recovers to the 2007 levels in Panel c, and the marginal effect of changes in property
values on the probability that assessed values recover the 2007 levels in Panel d.37. In
Panel c, a 1 percentage point increase in NAV per capita between 2008 and 2007 increases
the probability that levy per capita is higher in 2008 than in 2007 by almost 3 percentage
points. The effect of an increase in NAV on the recovery of levy remains positive and signif-
icant through 2016, albeit with a lower margin coefficient of around 0.01. In Panel d, the
effect of a 1 percentage point increase in HPI between 2008 and 2007 on the probability
that the per capita net assessed value in 2008 is higher than in 2007 is not statistically
significant and close to zero. The margin coefficient steadily increases between 2008 and
2011 and hovers around 0.01. Thus, for years between 2011 and 2016, a one percentage
point increase in HPI is associated with a one percentage point increase in the probability
that the net assessed values per capita have recovered or surpassed the 2007 levels.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we seek to shed some light on what happened to property taxes during
and after the Great Recession. As home prices plummeted throughout the United States,
many economists and policymakers wondered how that would impact property taxes, one
of the largest sources of local revenues. Some worried that fiscal crisis would be com-
monplace in many areas of the country. Undoubtedly, many state and local governments
faced hardships in the years following the recession, yet the most dire predictions did not
materialize. Leveraging a newly collected dataset on local assessed values, property tax
levies, and local tax rates between 2000 and 2016, we provide some new answers.
First, local assessed values, i.e. the tax base, was on average not affected until a few
years after the initial decline in home prices. Even by 2015, a 10% decline in average
home values from 2007 lead to a decline in assessed values of only about 2%. One pos-
sible explanation is the difference between when values are determined for the tax base,
and the time they are levied and collected, as well as infrequent reassessments. Future
research could shed light on other factors, such as the role of jurisdiction specific assess-
ment rules, the role of county assessors, changes in assessment rules before and after the
crisis, as well as the effect of assessment limits. Identifying what features of local property
tax systems yield more or less stable assessed values would be of importance for tax policy
37Results for Panels c and d refer to percentage point changes in NAV and HPI
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understanding.
Second, we show that policymakers react strongly to changes in assessed values. Both
increases and decreases in the tax base are offset by adjusting the millage rate. We find
that yearly changes in the tax rate are about symmetrical - i.e. the policy response to pos-
itive and negative shocks is similar and indicates that policymakers seek to avoid abrupt
changes in local property tax revenues. However, the length and severity of the decline in
property values between 2007 and 2012 implied that shortly after the recession, and up
to 2015, the compounded millage offset for negative shocks was large. Between 2007 and
2015, a 10% decline in the tax base lead to an increase in the mill rate of 8%, an almost
complete offsetting, which contrasts with positive changes. Over the same time period,
a 10% rise in the tax base lead to a decline in the rate of about 3%, and an increase in
revenues of 7%. Again, this suggests that policymakers seek to avoid decline in tax rev-
enues across many years, but take advantage of increases in the medium run. Comparing
weighted and unweighted results, we find qualitatively similar responses, but of slightly
different magnitudes. While our estimates are typically very precisely estimated, this also
suggests that local responses to shocks are quite heterogeneous. More research is needed
to understand what drives different policy responses, such as the role of local property tax
features, reliance on local taxes, or local preferences.
Third, and regarding the last point, we look at one of the most (in)famous features
of local property tax systems: levy and rate limits. Rate limits may restrain policymakers
in their ability to offset declines in the tax base, while levy limits may create incentives
to avoid temporary declines in tax revenues, as limits on levies’ growth would make it
more difficult to make up for current losses in future periods, or forbid the use of property
revenues to compensate for changes in other sources of income.
We find that areas with property tax rate limits offset yearly shocks in their tax base
less, which implies a larger decline in revenue. While still having a reducing millage off-
setting effect, rate limits seem to be less important in the short run. This is consistent with
some areas being restrained some years, while in years where the limit is not binding,
policymakers are able to “catch up”. Levy limits reduce the rise in tax levy in years where
the tax base increases, consistent with theoretical predictions. Levy limits also reduce the
effect of negative shocks on tax revenues and are associated with higher offsetting. A
potential explanation is that policymakers seek to smooth out negative shocks and avoid
larger declines, which are likely to stick longer. Overall, we show that tax limits are associ-
ated with very different responses to shocks in that tax base, and we believe more research
is warranted to hone down on the exact mechanism through which they work.
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To summarize, our research exploits newly collected data on assessed values and millage
rates to disentangle the role of policy and the effect of the tax base when evaluating how
property values affect property tax revenues. We show that policymakers respond to both
positive and negative shocks. The combination of a stable tax base and increases in tax
rates explains why property tax collections remained stable after the Great Recession. Rate
limits seem to restrain millage increases following negative shocks. Both the tax base, pol-
icy responses, and the effect of limits display a lot of variation across jurisdictions. A lot
of exciting questions remain, such as how the shock affected reliance on and local prefer-
ences toward property taxes, how shocks in other local sources of revenues shaped policy,
or which specific features of tax limits were most binding post 2008.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Data collected: summary
Our baseline mill rate is computed as the total tax levy divided by the taxable assessed value × 1000. The
column Aggregated indicates whether the data was collected at the county level or for at the taxing district
level, and then aggregated for all counties.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: %∆ by periods: HPI, tax levy, assessed values, mill rate
Yearly statistics
∆ Yearly - 2000-2016 Mean Median p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI 0.47 0.39 -2.43 3.13 5.45 29,247
%∆ NAV per capita 1.60 0.33 -1.98 3.74 7.83 38,385
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 2.28 1.50 -1.08 4.80 8.20 38,385
%∆ Mill rate 0.92 0.22 -1.45 3.04 8.22 38,385
∆ Yearly - 2000-2007 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI 2.77 1.88 -0.02 4.58 4.86 12,414
%∆ NAV per capita 2.73 1.27 -1.47 5.08 7.97 16,405
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 3.08 2.45 -0.37 5.65 7.45 16,405
%∆ Mill rate 0.75 0.24 -1.82 3.30 7.73 16,405
∆ Yearly - 2008-2015 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -1.99 -1.89 -4.59 0.73 5.11 13,927
%∆ NAV per capita 0.81 -0.28 -2.43 2.83 8.02 18,137
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 1.91 0.94 -1.50 4.24 8.85 18,137
%∆ Mill rate 1.21 0.28 -1.12 3.05 8.78 18,137
Long differences
∆2007− 2010 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -11.74 -9.49 -16.60 -4.59 10.72 1,776
%∆ NAV per capita 3.98 1.64 -5.09 10.67 16.85 2,230
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 6.47 5.68 -0.53 12.37 13.22 2,230
%∆ Mill rate 3.19 1.60 -2.35 8.49 11.91 2,230
∆2007− 2012 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -17.95 -16.29 -25.78 -8.97 13.41 1,768
%∆ NAV per capita 3.53 0.35 -9.53 12.59 21.86 2,243
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 8.81 6.99 -1.47 16.89 18.14 2,243
%∆ Mill rate 6.60 3.43 -2.25 13.76 16.39 2,243
∆2007− 2015 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -14.89 -15.93 -23.84 -7.36 13.46 1,767
%∆ NAV per capita 8.95 1.44 -12.26 17.35 36.83 2,182
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 14.45 10.33 -1.40 24.84 26.22 2,182
%∆ Mill rate 8.26 4.96 -2.05 17.95 22.38 2,182
HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. NAV refers to Net
Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes. Lvy per capita is
the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county level. Mill rate is the millage
rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base.
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Table 2.3: The tax base: Home price index and assessed values 2000-2016
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
All variables are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the reference year. HPI
denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. NAV refers to Net
Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes. Zillow referes to
the median typical home sold. Weights are based on the average national share in the county population
between 2000 and 2010. Demographic controls include the share of white, black, college-educated, and
urban residents, as well as the share of 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59 years old in a county. Income controls
include the county log personal income per capita, log employment, log wage income, and unemployment
rate. Fraction includes the share of county revenues from own source, from property taxes, from other taxes,
and from transfers. The balanced sample refers to counties which are observed every single year between
2000 and 2016.
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Table 2.4: The tax base: long differences
Unweighted results
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAVt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI 0.03 0.18b 0.22b
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
∆ logHPI > 0 0.02 0.16 0.42
(0.42) (0.21) (0.58)
|∆ logHPI < 0| -0.03 -0.18b -0.21b
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05
Observations 1,839 1,839 1,825 1,825 1,826 1,826
Weighted results
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAVt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI 0.17 0.36c 0.44c
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
∆ logHPI > 0 -0.07 -0.11 -1.47b
(0.58) (0.31) (0.59)
|∆ logHPI < 0| -0.17 -0.36c -0.48c
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.41 0.41 0.27 0.36
Observations 1,839 1,839 1,825 1,825 1,826 1,826
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
All variables are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the reference year. Assessed
values are computed per capita. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem
property taxes. Weights are based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and
2010.
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Table 2.5: The policy effect: the tax base and property tax revenues
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account county level policy and serial correlation.
All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the
reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes.
Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county level.
Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are based
on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010. Demographic controls
include the share of white, black, college-educated, and urban residents, as well as the share of 20-29, 30-
39, 40-49, and 50-59 years old in a county. Income controls include the county log personal income per
capita, log employment, log wage income, and unemployment rate. Fraction includes the share of county
revenues from own source, from property taxes, from other taxes, and from transfers.
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Table 2.6: The Great Recession: disentangling the tax base and policy effect
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV 0.47c 0.47c 0.52c
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
∆ logNAV > 0 0.60c 0.71c 0.68c
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.14 -0.12 -0.11
(0.20) (0.17) (0.24)
R2 0.28 0.34 0.27 0.37 0.31 0.39
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV -0.43c -0.47c -0.44c
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.32c -0.24c -0.29c
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.68c 0.82c 0.82c
(0.23) (0.18) (0.25)
R2 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.34
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the
reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes.
Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county level.
Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are based
on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.
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Table 2.7: The Great Recession: The role of rate and levy limits 2007-2012 (any rate limit
- aggregate levy limit)
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the
reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes.
Log levy per capita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county level.
Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are
based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010. Rate limit equals 1
when a state has some type of rate limit as defined in the text and table ?? in the appendix. Aggregate levy
limit equals 1 when a state has a levy limit on the change in total revenues for counties, cities and other
jurisdictions such as school districts.
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Table 2.8: The Great Recession: the role of limits - long differences
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 0.55c 0.61c 0.72c 0.71c 0.72c 0.94c
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.05)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.16a -0.57c 0.01 -0.51c 0.23c -0.63c
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.09 -0.02 -0.06
(0.13) (0.16) (0.21)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim 0.03 -0.16 -0.39
(0.27) (0.24) (0.28)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim -0.01 -0.01 -0.28c
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.81c 0.67c 0.89c
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
r2 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.46
N 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.47c -0.40c -0.28b -0.28b -0.27 -0.06
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.05)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.79c 0.35c 0.99c 0.46c 1.16c 0.32c
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) (0.10)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.23b 0.06 -0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.20)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim -0.13 -0.21 -0.39
(0.30) (0.25) (0.30)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim 0.11 0.06 -0.24b
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.62a 0.64b 0.85c
(0.35) (0.25) (0.26)
r2 0.26 0.29 0.38 0.42 0.34 0.41
N 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the
reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes.
Log levy per capita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county level.
Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are
based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010. Rate limit equals 1
when a state has some type of rate limit as defined in the text and table ?? in the appendix. Aggregate levy
limit equals 1 when a state has a levy limit on the change in total revenues for counties, cities and other
jurisdictions such as school districts. 78
Table 2.9: Tax base versus policy effect: taking stock
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.12 -0.05 -0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
∆ log HPI > 0 1.25c 1.24c 1.59c
(0.28) (0.43) (0.22)
|∆ log HPI < 0| 0.12 0.06 0.10
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11)
R2 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.12
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ log HPI -0.11b -0.21c -0.29c
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
∆ logHPI > 0 0.13 0.00 0.11
(0.97) (0.76) (1.05)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.12b 0.22c 0.31c
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
R2 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Observations 1,685 1,685 1,712 1,712 1,685 1,685
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the
reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes.
Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county level.
Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are based
on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate
(a) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - full sample
(b) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - areas with HPI available
Top figure plots the county unweighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2002. The bottom figures plots the unweighted US average change of the four denominated variables
onlly using counties for which the home price index is available.
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Figure 2.2: Median and inter-quartile range of yearly changes 2000-2016
Our baseline mill rate is computed as the total tax levy divided by the taxable assessed value × 1000. The
column ”Mill avg.” indicates whether the mill rate was computed by finding an average of the mill rate for
multiple jurisdictions in the county. When both are available, we use the baseline mill rate. The column
Aggregated indicates whether the data was collected at the county level or for at the taxing district level,
and then aggregated for all counties.
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Figure 2.3: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate - subsamples
(a) Counties with some rate limits (b) Counties without some rate limits
(c) Counties with some levy limits (d) Counties without some levy limits
This top figure plots the county unweighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2003, by whether counties are in a state with or without any rate limit, or with/without any aggregate
levy limit. Refer to tables and text for exact definition of rate and aggregate levy limits.
82
Figure 2.4: States with aggregate levy limit, and jurisdiction rate limit
The map depicts which states have some rate limit, some levy limit or both. A rate limit here is defined as
either limitation on the maximum rate applied to specific property as a percentage of market or assessed
value, or limits on the mill rate chosen by local jurisdictions.
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Figure 2.5: Testing for non linear effects - Full sample
(a) Log mill rate - Linear model (b) Log mill rate - Polynomial 4 model
(c) Log levy per capita ita - Linear model (d) Log levy per capita ita - Polynomial 4 model
These figures plot the predicted value from the linear and four polynomial regression of the change in levy
on assessed value: ∆ logLevyt =
∑4
k=1 βk(∆ logNAVt)




(∆ logNAVt < 0) + εt. The top figures look at change in mill rate as the outcome, while the bottom figures
look at the change in levy per capital.
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Figure 2.6: Testing for non linear effects - By rate limit
(a) Log mill - Linear model w/ and w/o some rate
limit
(b) Log mill - Poly 4 model w/ and w/o some rate
limit
(c) Log levy per capita - Linear model w/ and w/o
some rate limit
(d) Log levy per capita - Poly 4 model w/ and w/o
some rate limit
These figures plot the predicted value from the linear and four polynomial regression of the change in levy
on assessed value: ∆ logLevyt =
∑4
k=1 βk(∆ logNAVt)




(∆ logNAVt < 0) + εt. The top figures look at change in mill rate as the outcome, while the bottom figures
look at the change in levy per capital.
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Figure 2.7: Recovery: share of counties with higher values compared to 2007
(a) U.S. unweighted average change
(b) U.S. population unweighted average change
These figures plot fraction of counties with higher HPI, NAV, levy, and mill rate, compared to 2007. The
bottom panel weighs results by average county population in our sample period. All values are calculated
per capita and adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 2.8: Share of counties with higher outcomes compared to 2007 - by jurisdiction
rate limit
(a) Counties with some rate limit - Unweighted
(b) Counties without some rate limit - Un-
weighted
(c) Counties with some rate limit - Pop Weighted
(d) Counties without some rate limit - Pop
Weighted
These figures plot fraction of counties with higher HPI, NAV, levy, and mill rate, compared to 2007 in states
with and without some rate limit in the top panel. The bottom panel weighs results by average county
population in our sample period. All values are calculated per capita and adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 2.9: Share of counties with higher outcomes compared to 2007 - by levy limit
(a) Counties with some levy limit - Unweighted
(b) Counties without some levy limit - Un-
weighted
(c) Counties with some levy limit - Pop Weighted
(d) Counties without some levy limit - Pop
Weighted
These figures plot fraction of counties with higher HPI, NAV, levy, and mill rate, compared to 2007 in states
with and without some levy limit in the top panel. The bottom panel weighs results by average county
population in our sample period. All values are calculated per capita and adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 2.10: Likelihood of recovery - 2007-2016
(a) Probit mill ratet >mill rate2007 (b) Probit levy per capt >levy per cap2007
(c) Probit levy per capt >levy per cap2007 (d) Probit nav per capt >nav per cap2007
The tables plot the average marginal effects from yearly probit regressions. In Panels a and b we control for
the log change in net assessed values between t and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Results for panels c and d refer to percentage point changes in NAV and HPI.
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CHAPTER III
The Single Audit Policy and its Effect on Local
Governments
Abstract
In the U.S., the federal government transfers funds to local and state governments to
implement federal programs. This creates potential accountability issues, and non-federal
governments which spend more than $750,000 of federal funds in a fiscal year have to
undergo a Single Audit, a comprehensive examination of entities’ financial statements and
compliance to federal programs’ requirements. Using data on audited entities from the
Federal Audit Clearinghouse as well as detailed expenditures data from the Census of
Local Governments, I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the change in
threshold for audit exemption in fiscal year 2015. The estimates suggest that complying
with the audit requirements on average increases expenditures directly related to financial
administration.
JEL Codes: H83, H72
Keywords: Public Sector Accounting and Audits, State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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3.1 Introduction
Audits are commonly used tools in different sectors of government: one well-studied
example is the use of audits by fiscal authorities to ensure that taxpayers are complying to
fiscal rules. Less is known instead about the effects of audits on public entities and non-
profit firms and on their potential behavioral responses. Previous studies on tax audits
have shown that that audits increase taxes paid (Choudhary and Gupta (2019)), and that
when the audit probability depends on profits or revenues being greater than a set thresh-
old, taxpayers may avoid being audited by manipulating declared profits or revenues to
make them fall under the threshold, resulting in “bunching” (e.g. Almunia and Lopez-
Rodriguez (2018a), Kleven and Waseem (2013)).
In the United States, public entities and non profits have to undergo an audit process
known as Single Audit if the amount of federal funds they spend in a fiscal year is above
$750, 000. This threshold was raised in 2015 from $500, 000, in an attempt to balance
the need to monitor recipients of federal funds with that of reducing the burden imposed
on smaller localities. As in the case of audits of individuals or private firms, policy makers
must weight the cost of audits in terms of financial expenditures as well as potential behav-
ior distortions, with their benefits, which in the case of the Single Audit include ensuring
that federal funds are spent according to the rules regulating their disbursement.
In this paper, I study how the Single Audit requirement affects local governments, fo-
cusing in particular on the financial burden it may impose, and I find that Single Audits
significantly increase expenditures in financial and administration services. In addition, I
uncover descriptive evidence that supports the hypothesis that some non-federal entities
may bunch in order to avoid being audited.
The Single Audit requirement was introduced in 1984 to provide a standardized and
streamlined process to audit recipients of federal transfers, specifically states and local
governments. In successive changes to the legislation, the requirement was extended
to non-profit organizations. According to the regulations, entities spending more than
$750, 000 in federal transfers in a fiscal year are subject to the Single Audit, which includes
both a standard financial audit and a broad investigation of the operations and manage-
ment of the entity, with in-depth examination of some of the federal programs through
which transfers were received. Depending on several factors, such as performance in pre-
vious audits and total transfers received, the examination of federal programs can be more
or less extensive.
This paper studies the effect of the Single Audit focusing on local governments (includ-
ing counties, cities, towns, and school districts). While previous studies have focused on
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the effect of audits on non-profit organizations, and shown that non-profit organizations
tend to bunch before policy thresholds to avoid extra audits or regulations, the case of
local governments is less straightforward. As a matter of fact, most local governments are
already subject to audits and monitoring from other entities such as states, and therefore
the Single Audit might not have a strong effect on local governments’ finances. In addition,
local governments might not be able to or prefer to reduce the amount of federal transfers
spent to avoid another layer of audit.
In order to analyze the question of how local governments’ expenditure patterns change
with the audit, I exploit a change in the audit threshold, which switched from $500, 000
before 2015 to $750,000 after 2015. I define treated entities as those entities with transfers
between $500, 000 to $750,000 before the change in threshold, and control entities as those
entities with transfers between $750, 000 to $1,000,000 before the change in threshold. I
compare the change in expenditures and intergovernmental revenues between treatment
and control groups and before and after the change in threshold. In order to perform the
analysis, I use data from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC) and from the Census of
Governments. The audit data from the FAC allows me to precisely identify the amount
of federal transfers spent each year by each audited entity. However, since the FAC data
only records audited entities, after 2015 only entities spending more than $750, 000 in
federal funds are recorded. By merging this data with the census of governments, I am
able to observe how expenditure patterns change for those entities that are less likely to
be audited after the change in threshold.
This analysis shows that treated entities decrease expenditures in financial administra-
tion after the threshold is raised, spending on average between $40, 000 and $80, 000 less
than control group entities after the change in threshold. However, overall direct spending
decreases more on average for treated entities than for control group entities. The ro-
bustness checks section addresses the concern this raises about the validity of the financial
estimation coefficient estimate. While the difference-in-differences results are consistent
with the idea that the single audit may indeed impose an administrative burden on locali-
ties, it is unclear whether the money saved is reallocated in an effective way. Further work
in this area is needed to fully evaluate the dynamic consequences of not having to undergo
single audits in the long term, and whether the benefits of saving financial administration
expenditures are outweighed by future inefficient reallocation of expenditures.
Finally, using the universe of audited firms from the FAC data, I compare the distribu-
tion of entities before and after the change in threshold and uncover evidence of potential
missing mass above the threshold. The incentive to bunch could be due to the possibility
that the extensiveness of the single audit is able to pick up on non-compliance issues more
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than other audits, or to the willingness to avoid the extra administrative costs brought
about by the audit. The structure of FAC data, which collects only data for entities to the
right of the threshold, makes it impossible to observe whether there is bunching below
the threshold. Other data (from UsaSpending.gov, or Census of Governments), does not
identify total federal transfers spent but only total federal transfers received (UsaSpend-
ing.gov) or direct federal transfers received (Census of Governments). As more and more
entities will find themselves undertaking the Single Audit as a result of the massive outlay
of Federal Funds in response to the public health crisis in 2019-2010, understanding the
costs ad benefits of this policy will be useful to calibrate the threshold so that smaller enti-
ties are not unduly burdened. More work is needed to bring together data from individual
states and localities that, together with FAC data, can help paint a clearer picture of the
effects of the Single Audit.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the broad
literature evaluating the effect of audits in several sectors of public administration. While
several important contributions in this area are based on experimental evidence, e.g.
Kleven et al. (2011) , Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (2001), others also use quasi-
experimental evidence brought about by policy discontinuities at notches (e.g. Almunia
and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018b)). More specifically, the effects of the Single Audit have also
been studied in the Accounting and Public Budgeting literature. For example, Keating
et al. (2005) analyze audit reports to paint a picture of overall compliance to regulations
in non-profit organizations, and Jakubowski (1995) analyzes data from the introduction
of the Single Audit in 1984 to provide evidence on the evolution of control structures in
local governments. Secondly, this paper also relates to the literature on the role of private
external agents in the support of governments’ actions, as the policy considered includes
the use of independent auditors. The peculiarity of the case under study is that the enti-
ties audited are themselves units of government, as for example in Caselli and Wingender
(2018), where bunching behavior is shown to exist also in governments in response to
fiscal regulations. Finally, it relates to the literature broadly evaluating behavioral changes
at policy thresholds. While the literature in this area has mostly focused on for-profit firms
or individuals, e.g. Kleven and Waseem (2013), bunching analysis is now being applied
to multiple areas as described in Kleven (2016). For example, St. Clair (2016) shows that
in New York non-profit organizations bunch before a state-specific audit threshold, and
Marx (2018) uses bunching to test whether charities bunch below thresholds. The last
two papers also use dynamic bunching, which improves on static analysis by exploiting
panel-data. Other papers incorporating dynamic considerations in bunching analysis in-
clude Blomquist et al. (2018), Bertanha, McCallum and Seegert (2019) and Choudhary
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and Gupta (2019).
The rest of the paper continues as follows: section 2 describes the Single Audit policy
and the institutional background, section 3 presents the empirical strategy, section 4 de-
scribes the data used, section 5 presents the results, section 6 includes a discussion of the
evidence found and future avenues for research, and section 7 concludes.
3.2 The Single audit
The United States federal government provides billions in transfers to state govern-
ments, local governments, public universities and non-profit organizations. These trans-
fers are issued by several agencies and encompass many different programs, which all have
different requirements about how the funds can be spent. The Single Audit was introduced
with the Single Audit Act of 1984 and the OMB Circular A-133 with the aim of providing
a uniform audit requirement for federal transfers.
The single audit streamlines the audit process in the sense that, instead of receiving
entities being audited for each separate federal award received, they are audited as a
whole. In December 2013, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announced that
the threshold to be audited would be raised from $500, 000 to $750, 000 starting with fis-
cal year 20151 in an effort to focus the audit efforts on the largest spenders and reduce
administrative expenditures and duplicate burdens for smaller entities.
Single Audits are performed by external independent certified public accountants, and
are intended as an entity-wide assessment of compliance to the rules regulating how trans-
fers are spent in addition to a more traditional financial audit. The entities potentially
subject to audit are assigned by auditors to a low or high risk category, depending on their
past audits. Subsequently, auditors identify the federal expenditures that will be audited:
this will depend on the share represented by that program over the total amount of fed-
eral expenditures for the entity. For example, if a non-federal entity spends more than
$750, 000 but less than $25M in a year in federal assistance, individual federal programs
with spending greater than $750, 000 will be categorized as “Type A”, and any program
with spending lower than $750, 000 as “Type B”. The thresholds for the program type de-
termination depend on the total amount of federal awards spent in the fiscal year. Thus, a
$800, 000 expenditure may be considered as Type A in a locality, and Type B in another.
Auditors are then required to assess the risk of non-compliance, with stricter rules in place
for Type A programs. Auditors assess compliance to the general areas introduced in the cir-
cular (Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget (2017, April)),
1Specifically, the change took effect for fiscal years beginning after December 2014.
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which include controls on allowed activities, allowable costs, cash management, compli-
ance to the Davis-Bacon Act, respect of eligibility norms for recipients, respect of require-
ments regarding equipment and real property management, rules on funds matching, the
time period of availability of federal funds, rules regarding procurement, potential income
generated through the federal program, acquisition of real property, reporting, and the
monitoring of potential subrecipients. Finally, auditors perform a financial audit of all the
entity’ operations, including also non-federal transactions.
Potential findings include material weaknesses in the financial statement, material
weaknesses in compliance in a federal program, questioned costs, or a “qualified” or “ad-
verse” report on financial statements or compliance to federal programs requirements. If
a high level of risk of non-compliance is assessed in a Single Audit, the entity is likely to
be classified as high risk the subsequent year, and be audited more thoroughly. In case
a Single Audit is not performed when required, or previous findings are consistently not
resolved, there could be sanctions such as partial or full suspension of the award where
the noncompliance was identified. While federal awards rules usually allow awardees to
use federal funds to pay for the independent certified public accountant to perform the
audit, preparing the necessary documentation and complying to the audit findings and
recommendations is still likely to require extra administrative investment from localities.
The following section presents the empirical strategy to estimate how local governments’
finances are affected by the presence of the Single Audit.
3.3 Empirical strategy
In the private sector, the presence of an audit notch has been shown to be associated
with bunching behavior (e.g. Choudhary and Gupta (2019)), where firms manipulate
the running variable to fall below the threshold and avoid the audit. When the audit is
triggered by funds spent however, and assuming non-federal entities are not able to hide
federal funds expenditures, manipulating the running variable to fall below the threshold
involves being able to spend less federal funds. In investigating how the presence of an au-
dit may affect local governments’ finances, it is useful to first look at evidence of whether
some bunching below the threshold occurs.
Given the structure of the data collected however, it is not possible to conduct a traditional
bunching analysis, as data on the total amount of federal funds spent in a fiscal year is only
available for audited entities. Bunching analysis relies on identifying excess mass below
the threshold, as well as missing above the threshold, and the available data allows only to
potentially identify the presence of missing mass. Since the audit threshold changed in fis-
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cal year 2015, data for years before 2015 include entities receiving upwards on $500, 000.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot a polynomial distribution fitted to the 2012 distribution of trans-
fers of audited entities, and the actual distribution of audited entities in 2017, after the
change in threshold. The sample in figure 3.1 includes all audited entities, whereas the
sample in figure 3.2 includes only local governments (and not non-profits). In figure 3.1,
the 2017 distribution is well approximated by the fitted 2012 distribution for higher trans-
fers, however between $750, 000 and $850, 000 the 2017 distribution is consistently below
the fitted 2012 distribution. A similar patter can be observed in figure 3.2, where the 2017
plot is consistently below the fitted 2012 distribution between $750, 000 and $810, 000.
Appendix figures C.1 and C.2 offer a snapshot of the evolution of the distribution of au-
ditees between 2012 and 2018. Since the change in threshold was introduced for entities
with fiscal years ending on or after December 31, 2015, in 2015 there is still a number of
entities audited with federal funds expenditures of less than $750, 000. After 2015 how-
ever, it is possible to notice how the distribution of all non-federal entities in figure C.1,
and local governments in figure C.2, evolves in comparison with the distribution in 2012.
While there is still a considerable number of entities above the threshold, the seems to be
some evidence of missing mass between $750, 000 and $825, 000.
Unfortunately, given the lack of precise information on spending to the left of the thresh-
old, it is difficult to determine whether this missing mass is due to bunching behavior,
or simply to a change in the distribution over time. The potential presence of bunching
behavior leads to the question of what is the effect of an audit on firms finances, why lo-
calities may want to avoid the audit, and also which localities would be more likely to try
to avoid being audited.
3.3.1 Difference-in-Differences analysis
In order to answer some of the questions formulated in the previous section, I exploit
the change in audit threshold happening in 2015 and implement a difference-in-differences
analysis to compute the intention-to-treat effect of lifting the audit requirement2. I de-
fine the local governments (counties, towns, cities and school districts) which, before the
change in audit had federal expenditures between $500, 000 and $750, 000 as the “treated
group”. Comparing this treatment group to a control group not affected by the change in
threshold, it is then possible with a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to analyze
potential changes in the finances of the treated group after 2015. In order to implement
a difference-in-differences strategy it is necessary to identify a suitable control group not
2similarly to Choudhary and Gupta (2019)
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affected by the treatment (change in threshold). I use a group of local governments with
federal expenditures between $750, 000 and $1, 000, 000 before the change in threshold.
The local governments in both the control group and treatment group are audited before
the change in threshold.
After the change in threshold, local governments in the treatment group are less likely to
be audited again since their federal expenditure is less likely to grow above the threshold.
However, it is possible that in the second period some entities from the treatment group
will still be audited, and some entities from the control group will instead no longer be au-
dited. This could be an issue in a multi-period analysis with period and group fixed effects
(as described in De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020)). Reducing the analysis to
two periods, before and after the change in threshold, addresses this issue by reducing the
time comparison between two periods. The presence of treated units still being audited
after the change in threshold, and of control units not being audited after the change in
threshold will have the effect of biasing the estimates downwards.
The regression performed is the following:
yi,t = αi + β1treatment× post+ γt + χst + εist (3.1)
where in addition to entity fixed effects and year fixed effects, I also control for state
time trends. The effect of the change in audit threshold is evaluated for direct general
expenditures, education direct expenditures, fire protection direct expenditures, central
staff direct expenditures, public welfare direct expenditures, financial administration direct
expenditures, state intergovernmental revenues and federal intergovernmental revenues.
Financial administration expenditures are identified in the census of governments as those
related to managing functions of accounting and auditing, in addition to the offices of
comptroller and treasurer. This expenditure category therefore is likely to be one of the
most affected by the requirements of the single audit.
One potential concern with the control group would arise if it was affected by other factors
in a different way than the group with smaller transfers. In this case, the difference-
in-differences treatment might pick up a difference due to other unrelated factors and
not the change in Single Audit threshold. In order to address this concern, I run several
robustness checks. First, I analyze whether any pre-trends are present by running the
following regression:
yi,t = αi +
∑
j
βjtreatmenti × I(year = j)t + γt + χst + εist (3.2)
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The main variables of interest are also plotted in appendix figures C.3 and C.4 for the treat-
ment and control groups. Finally, table C.5 performs a similar difference-in-differences
analysis but identifies the treatment group as composed by localities with federal expen-
ditures between $1M and $1.25M , and the control group as composed by localities with
federal expenditures between $1.25M and $1.5M before the change in threshold. Since
these two groups have federal expenditures positioning them well above the threshold for
audit, they are not expected to be affected by the change in threshold.
3.4 Data
In order to study how local governments react to the presence of an audit threshold
based on federal funds spent, focusing in particular on their expenditures, I use data from
the Census of Governments and from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse. The census of gov-
ernments data is collected by the Census Bureau which conducts a full census of state and
local governments every five years, and a smaller survey every year. The data collected
includes expenditures and revenues for local governments broken down by function. Rev-
enues from intergovernmental aid from the federal government and state government are
identified, however the amount of federal funds spent every year is not (as expenditures
are grouped by function, for example fire protection). In addition, the total amount of
federal funds received every year by a locality is also not identifiable with this dataset.
The reason is that federal pass-through funds are not identified separately, and are instead
counted together with state intergovernmental transfers.
For the reasons described above, I complement the use of the Census of Government data
with data from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse. The Federal Audit Clearinghouse website
collects data on Single Audits. Data on Single Audits is available starting in 1997, with
more detailed data on audit findings available starting in 2013. This data includes infor-
mation on the audited entity, on the Certified Public Accountant performing the audit, and
importantly on the total federal funds spent during the fiscal year, including both funds
received directly from the federal government, and federal funds passed through states.
For each entity audited, the reported information also includes whether material weak-
nesses were found in either the financial statements or the requirements’ compliance, and
whether the report issued on the financial statements and program requirements’ compli-
ance is unqualified, qualified or adverse.3 For more recent years, detailed information is
available at the program level including findings on every compliance category as listed in
3An unqualified report signifies that the audit did not find material misstatements, whereas a qualified
and adverse reports signify that some problems are present, with adverse being a more severe judgement.
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the previous section.
The data from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse allows me to identify without errors the
entities audited in every year, but it has the downside of including only audited localities,
and not the universe of potential auditees. Thus, the data includes entities spending more
than $500, 000 in federal funds before fiscal year 2015, and after fiscal year 2015 only en-
tities spending more than $750, 000 in federal funds.
By linking counties, municipalities and school districts from the two datasets, I am able
to identify local governments from the treatment group in the census data and track their
expenditures even when they are no longer audited and thus no longer present in the audit
dataset. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the Census of Governments collects
a complete sample of data on local governments every five years, specifically in years end-
ing in 2 and in 7. Therefore, I am able to exploit the full samples in 2012 and 2017 for my
analysis, as the change in threshold lies in between those two years.
3.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 plots the frequency distribution of the main findings for all audited entities
between 2013 and 2018. A small minority of audits (3.75%) received a qualified or ad-
verse report in the financial statement or compliance to major programs’ requirements
(4.55%). Questioned costs, or costs flagged by the auditor because of suspected or known
noncompliance to grant requirements, lack of documentation or reasonable justification,
were identified in 4.74% of cases. Finally, material weaknesses were found in the financial
statement in 12.75% of cases, and in compliance to programs’ requirements in 6.48% of
cases. Material weakness in compliance indicates that a reportable condition or signficant
deficiency was disclosed as a material weakness for a major program in the Schedule of
Findings and Questioned Costs. Material weakness in financial statement indicates that the
audit disclosed some reportable condition or significant deficiency in the financial state-
ments.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the treated and control groups, before and
after the change in threshold in 2012 and 2017. As discussed in the empirical strategy
section, I define the treatment group as composed by those local governments with federal
assistance spending between $500, 000 and $750, 000 before the threshold change in 2012,
and the control group as composed by those local governments with federal assistance
spending between $750, 000 and $100, 000 before the threshold change in 2012. The stan-
dard variation is high within each group, with the control group having higher magnitudes
for both expenditures and intergovernmental revenue as expected. Average direct expen-
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ditures are close to $16M for the treatment group in 2012, and $21M for the control group.
Average total state intergovernmental revenue amounts to $3.4M for the treatment group
and $4.8 for the control group, whereas total federal (direct) intergovernmental revenue
is on average $331.800 for treated units and $377.940 for control units. The total federal
expenditures from the audit data reflect a combination of spending of total federal (direct)
intergovernmental revenue and state intergovernmental revenue, since state intergovern-
mental revenue can include federal passthrough transfers and the threshold for the single
audit is computed taking into account both direct and passthrough federal funds spent.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Difference-in-Differences
The results of the difference-in-differences estimation for the full sample are presented
in table 3.3. Column 1 has total direct expenditures as dependent variable, columns 2-6 list
the major categories of direct expenditures for local governments, and columns 7-8 have
state and federal intergovernmental revenue as dependent variables. The expenditure cat-
egory which is more likely to be directly affected by the change in audit requirements is
the one concerning financial administration expenses. Financial administration expenses
include all expenses related to financial management and control at the locality level, and
we would expect this cost to decrease after the locality is no longer subject to the audit. As
a matter of fact, in table 3.3 the interaction coefficient is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, with magnitude implying that after the change in threshold, financial administration
costs increased by around $80, 000 less for localities in the treatment group. The finan-
cial and administration costs in 2012 were on average $435, 000 for treated localities and
$460, 000 for non treated localities. Thus, a differential in increase of $80, 000 represents
a sizable share (18%) of the initial cost. One concern with the results in table 3.3 is that
total direct expenditures also increase less for treated localities than non treated localities
between 2017 and 2012, with the statistically significant coefficient implying that direct
expenditures increased by about $1.6M less for the treated units over the period of analy-
sis. While the coefficient has non-negligible magnitude, it is nonetheless worth noting that,
with average direct expenditures hovering around $16M for treated units and $21M for
non-treated units in 2012, the $1.6M difference represents a much lower share (around
10%) over the initial amount than the share of financial costs. All other costs are also
increasing less for treated units than for control units, however none of the results with
the exception of total general direct expenditures and financial administration costs is sta-
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tistically significant. In terms of coefficients’ magnitude, the coefficient on education costs
is the only one with larger magnitude than the one related to financial costs. Once again
however, education costs represent one of the largest spending items for local govern-
ments, which on average spent $3.7M in education for treated units, and $5.5 for control
units in 2012. Thus, the coefficient on column 2 (even though not statistically significant)
implies that education costs increased by 228, 000 less for treated localities on average than
non treated localities, where 228, 000 is 6% of the initial expenditure for treated units. This
result seems to confirm that the single audit imposes some extra administrative burden,
and that once localities are not subject to it anymore they are able to reduce spending on
financial administration. However, from the analysis of other categories of expenditures,
it is unclear whether the treatment had an effect on spending overall, and in particular on
how the potential savings from lower administrative burden were utilized. If the decrease
in financial burden is interpreted in a context of decreasing expenditures overall, it is pos-
sible that relative increases in other expenditures (for example central staff) may not be
captured by the analysis.
The results in table 3.3 present the full sample, and thus are limited to years 2012 and
2017, as those are the only years right before and after the change in threshold when
the Census of Governments data is available for all units. I also repeat the estimation for
a restricted sample covering only the localities present each year in the census. Tables
C.1 and C.2 present the results with individual years (table C.1) and pooled estimation
(table C.2). In table C.1, the coefficients on financial administration expenditures are neg-
ative and increase in 2017, however they are not statistically significant. The coefficients
on public welfare expenditures instead are now negative and statistically significant, al-
though constant between 2016 and 2017. In table C.2, the “post” estimate is pooled for
year 2016 and 2017. In this case, the financial administration expenditures coefficient is
again statistically significant, however it is smaller in magnitude than in the full sample
estimation. The difference in results between the full sample and the yearly sample may
be due to the difference in composition of the yearly sample, which lists mostly the largest
school districts and counties.
3.5.2 Robustness checks
The statistically significant and non-negligible coefficient on total expenditures in table
3.3 can raise the concern that the parallel trends assumption does not hold, and thus that
the estimated coefficient for change in financial administration costs cannot be interpreted
as a result of the change in threshold, but rather as a result of overall decreasing expendi-
tures. To address this concern, I first run an estimation to check whether pre-trends exist,
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and if they do, whether they can constitute a threat to the validity of the estimation in table
3.3. Secondly, I repeat the estimation of table 3.3 but changing how treatment and control
groups are defined. In this way, I can test whether pre-trends exist for the new treatment
and comparison groups, and if they do, whether the presence of similar pre-trends implies
a statistically significant coefficient for financial expenditures in this case.
In order to test for the presence of potential pre-trends between treatment and control
group, I estimate regression equation 2 in table 3.4. The coefficients represent the differ-
ence in the dependent variable between the treatment group and the control group entities
for each year compared to the omitted year, in this case 2012. Column 1 represents esti-
mates for the financial administration expenditures variable. The difference between the
treatment and control group in this case is not significant until 2017. Column 2 instead
displays coefficients for the total direct expenditures dependent variable. The change in
coefficients implies that the difference between control and treatment group compared to
the omitted year is changing in size. However, the coefficient is quite stable and negative
after 2013. If the comparative differential in financial costs identified in table 3.3 was in-
deed only due to overall costs increasing more for comparison units than treatment units,
then the pre-trends should be evident in column 1 of table 3.4 as well. Thus, the fact
that the coefficient on the interaction of treatment group and year dummy is statistically
significant and larger in magnitude only starting in 2017 is reassuring. As a matter of
fact, while the change in threshold was introduced in fiscal year 2015, the discrepancy in
definitions of fiscal years across localities meant that many units were still audited in fiscal
year 2015 and only started potentially benefitting from the change in threshold starting in
FY2016-2017.
Appendix table C.3 reports the pre-trends analysis for the restricted yearly sample. In this
case, the omitted year is set to 2014. In this case, the coefficient on financial adminis-
tration expenditures is negative and largest in 2017, however it starts decreasing already
in 2013. The financial administration expenditures coefficients in this case are also less
stable, with the coefficient decreasing between 2015 and 2016. The restricted sample
pre-trends analysis thus is less clear in confirming a differential trend after the change
in threshold between treatment and control group. Appendix table C.5 report the re-
sults from the estimation of equation 1, but with differently defined treatment and control
groups. In this case, treated units are those local governments with total federal expendi-
tures between $1M and $1.25M in 2012, and the comparison units are local governments
with total federal expenditures between $1.25M and $1.5M . In this case, the differential
change between treatment and control group is again sizeable, albeit not statistically sig-
nificant, and the coefficient on education expenditures is similar in magnitude to the one
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in table 3.3. The financial administration coefficient instead is not statistically significant
and positive. While this does not imply that the estimate in table 3.3 is unbiased and not
affected by the presence of total expenditures pre-trends, it shows that the change in fi-
nancial administration costs is specific to the estimation with those treatment and control
groups.
Finally, figures C.3 and C.4 plot the distribution of average direct expenditures and aver-
age financial costs for years 2002, 2007, and 2012 for the full sample, and yearly for the
restricted sample. In the full sample, while direct expenditures increase more for the con-
trol units than for the treated ones, the differential growth is more pronounced in the plot
depicting average financial costs. The plots for the restricted sample represent a similar
differential trend in growth after 2016, with financial costs increasing more sharply for the
control group. The differences between the two figures are due to the fact that the yearly
sample is different from the full sample, as it includes only some of the largest localities
and school districts.
Overall, the evidence seems to support the idea that financial administration expenditures
decreased for entities less likely to be audited after the change in threshold, however some
questions remain, in particular regarding how the overall trend in differential decrease
of total expenditures affected the estimation and the possibility to identify how potential
savings in financial costs were reinvested. Future research, exploiting locality-level yearly
data, and expanding to the effect of the audit on non-profit organizations, is needed to
further assess the impact of the audit on non-federal entities.
3.6 Discussion
This study analyzes the Single Audit policy for non-federal entities, which requires that
entities spending more than a specified threshold in federal grants undergo a detailed au-
dit of their overall compliance and risk level and financial operations. The single audit can
be onerous for local governments and non profits, both in terms of preparing for the audit,
and also as it entails paying an external Certified Public Accountant to conduct the audit.
Using data from the Federal Audit Clearing House, I compared the distribution of audited
entities in 2012, when the audit threshold was $500, 000, and 2017, when the thresh-
old was $750, 000. A descriptive analysis of the graphical evidence seems to indicate the
presence of a missing mass to the right of the threshold, which could happen in case of
bunching at the notch. As bunching in this scenario would imply that entities are spending
less federal funds in order to avoid being audited, it would indicate that the single audit
imposes a burden on audited entities, either in terms of financial and audit expenses, or
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potentially also in terms of increased monitoring on several requirements on funds’ use.
In order to analyze the effect of the single audit on local governments, I exploit the change
in threshold. Using counties, towns, cities and school districts with total expenditures be-
low the notch after the change in threshold as treatment group and local governments
with transfers above the treatment group as control, I show that expenditures in financial
administration decrease for treated localities, or in other words, localities which are less
likely to be audited after the change in threshold, see their financial administration expen-
ditures rise differentially less with respect to the control group. Thus, this result shows that
the single audit is financially onerous for local governments. However, it does not explain
whether there may be other reasons for local governments and non-profit organizations to
want to avoid being audited.
Appendix table C.4 analyzes the effect of negative audit findings on the probability that
entities in the treatment group are audited in 2017. The coefficients on all types of findings
are negative and significant: column 1 for example implies that the presence of a material
weakness in the financial statement report before the change in threshold decreases the
likelihood that the entity will be audited after the change in threshold by 8 percentage
points. While this could be due to several factors, it is also consistent with the idea that
some non-federal entities, if close to the threshold, may be able to manipulate the amount
of funds spent to avoid undergoing the Single Audit. More work is needed in this area to
assess how the potential benefits of audit on long term internal control and governance in
local governments weight against the costs described.
3.7 Conclusion
The Single Audit was implemented as a tool to ensure the monitoring of entities receiv-
ing federal funds, and at the same time reduce the administrative burden by bringing all
controls related to federal funding under one single umbrella. While the threshold of the
audit was raised in 2015, questions remain about the cost of the audit for local govern-
ments, and its effectiveness and benefit.
By exploiting the change in audit threshold, this paper shows that the single audit is still
associated with an increase in financial administration expenditures for local governments,
and quantifies the increase in financial expenditures due to the audit to between $40, 000
and $80, 000 for local governments in the treated group. Moreover, the single audit could
impose a burden on localities also in terms of requiring that rules regarding funds’ use are
more strictly followed. On the other hand, the audit may have potential benefits in terms
of better internal control and compliance practices which however are more difficult to
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observe in the short term. This paper also shows descriptively that, even when there is a
real cost in term of reduction in federal funds spent, entities near the threshold may bunch
to avoid undergoing a thorough audit.
The increase in federal funds distribution related to the COVID health crisis is bound to
generate a large increase in entities which have to undergo the Single Audit, many for the
first time. More work is needed in this area to shed light on the potential long term benefits
of the Single Audit, on the costs it imposes on local governments, and on the behavioral
changes of entities in proximity of the audit threshold.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Single Audit average findings
Yes No
Presence of qualified or adverse report in the financial statement 3.75% 96.25%
Presence of qualified or adverse report in major programs’ compliance 4.55% 95.45%
Presence of questioned costs 4.74% 95.26%
Material weakness in the financial statement 12.75% 87.25%
Material weakness in major programs’ compliance 6.48% 93.52%
N 81589














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Pre-trends analysis
(1) (2)
Fin. Admin. Expenditures Direct Gen. Expenditures
Treatment × 2007 -0.69 787.28b
(24.25) (390.97)
Treatment × 2008 17.53 1272.83b
(37.03) (526.28)
Treatment × 2009 -14.95 548.09
(32.55) (428.89)
Treatment × 2010 17.50 -103.41
(28.14) (389.32)
Treatment × 2011 -13.36 245.68
(23.87) (333.78)
Treatment × 2013 -28.83 -628.32b
(22.55) (275.92)
Treatment × 2014 -5.22 -1296.98c
(29.19) (475.65)
Treatment × 2015 -42.02 -1486.27c
(27.34) (537.58)
Treatment × 2016 -18.60 -1801.76c
(36.15) (550.81)




Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the entity level in parentheses. This table presents estimates from equa-
tion (2) in the text. Treated units are local governments with federal funds expenditures between $500000




Figure 3.1: Distribution of non-federal entities
Data Source: Federal Audit Clearinghouse. The Fitted 2012 line is a 4th order polynomial which has been
fitted to the 2012 distribution. The Actual 2017 connected line represents the actual distribution of non-
federal entities in 2017.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of local governments
Data Source: Federal Audit Clearinghouse. The Fitted 2012 line is a 4th order polynomial which has been




Chapter I Supporting Material
A.1 Additional Tables
Table A.1: County level intermediated transfers: Census data. y=log state intergovern-
mental transfers to county. Election year
State Intergovernmental transfers (1) (2)
ln(pl(turnout previous election)) 0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.01)
ln(pl)× Gov. Election year 0.03b 0.01a
(0.01) (0.01)




Alignment County-Governor -0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.01)




FE No State and Year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All regressions include as demographic controls the
percent of urban population in the county, the percent of Black people in the county, the percent of Hispanic
people in the county, the percent of females, and the share of people with less than a high school degree.
Economic controls include the median household income and the percent of unemployed. pl is a measure of
political sensitivity obtained as swingness× turnout× population.
112
Table A.2: County level direct federal transfers: Census data. y=log federal intergovern-
mental transfers to county. Election year
Federal Intergovernmental Transfers (1) (2)
ln(Gamma(Turnout previous election)) 0.25c 0.13a
(0.07) (0.07)
ln(Gamma) × Sen. Election Year 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.02)






FE No State and Year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. All regressions include as demographic controls the
percent of urban population in the county, the percent of Black people in the county, the percent of Hispanic
people in the county, the percent of females, and the share of people with less than a high school degree.
Economic controls include the median household income and the percent of unemployed. Gamma is a
measure of political sensitivity obtained as Contestability × TurnoutShare.
Table A.3: County level direct transfers: Census data. y=log federal intergovernmental
transfers to county. VAP
(1) (2)








FE No State and Year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level in (1) and (2) and state-year level in (3). All regressions
include as demographic controls the percent of urban population in the county, the percent of Black people in
the county, the percent of Hispanic people in the county, the percent of females, and the share of people with
less than a high school degree. Economic controls include the median household income and the percent of































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: County level direct Transfers: Census data. y=log federal intergovernmental
transfers to county. Turnout rate
Federal Intergovernmental Transfers (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Gammal(turnout share previous election)) 0.60c 0.60c
(0.10) (0.10)




ln(Population) 0.50c 0.50c 1.08c 1.08c
(0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
Observations 14,515 14,512 14,512 14,512
FE State-year State-year State-year State-year
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. All regressions include as demographic controls
the percent of urban population in the county, the percent of Black people in the county, the percent of
Hispanic people in the county, the percent of females, and the share of people with less than a high school
degree. Economic controls include the median household income and the percent of unemployed. Gammal
is a measure of political sensitivity obtained as Contestability × TurnoutShare
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Table A.6: Political characteristics of states
Population sd t. sd t. mean t. mean t. swingness contestability
(in 1000) gub. pres. gub. pres.
Alabama 4841 0.07 0.08 0.39 0.59 0.07 0.78
Arizona 6729 0.07 0.08 0.35 0.48 0.13 0.91
Arkansas 2968 0.06 0.05 0.37 0.49 0.10 0.80
California 38654 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.54 0.10 0.76
Colorado 5297 0.12 0.12 0.50 0.67 0.12 0.91
Connecticut 3589 0.05 0.04 0.44 0.62 0.05 0.78
Delaware 935 0.02 0.03 0.58 0.60 0.08 0.75
Florida 19934 0.07 0.09 0.37 0.59 0.03 0.97
Georgia 10099 0.06 0.09 0.31 0.54 0.11 0.95
Idaho 1635 0.07 0.08 0.45 0.61 0.07 0.75
Illinois 12852 0.06 0.05 0.44 0.60 0.08 0.75
Indiana 6590 0.05 0.05 0.56 0.57 0.09 0.99
Iowa 3107 0.04 0.04 0.47 0.66 0.03 0.90
Kansas 2898 0.08 0.08 0.45 0.59 0.18 0.85
Maine 1330 0.05 0.05 0.55 0.70 0.11 0.83
Maryland 5960 0.07 0.07 0.44 0.61 0.05 0.75
Massachusetts 6742 0.08 0.09 0.47 0.64 0.08 0.74
Michigan 9910 0.06 0.06 0.52 0.65 0.10 0.84
Minnesota 5451 0.05 0.05 0.58 0.71 0.27 0.90
Missouri 6038 0.06 0.06 0.60 0.61 0.07 0.97
Montana 1023 0.09 0.09 0.66 0.66 0.10 0.98
Nebraska 1881 0.09 0.08 0.53 0.63 0.14 0.85
Nevada 2839 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.55 0.10 0.88
New Hampshire 1328 0.04 0.04 0.44 0.70 0.14 0.90
New Jersey 8915 0.06 0.07 0.36 0.60 0.05 0.84
New Mexico 2082 0.09 0.09 0.41 0.56 0.11 0.85
New York 19697 0.07 0.07 0.38 0.55 0.22 0.73
North Carolina 9941 0.06 0.06 0.59 0.60 0.03 1.00
North Dakota 736 0.06 0.06 0.63 0.63 0.12 0.91
Ohio 11587 0.05 0.06 0.47 0.63 0.13 0.95
Oklahoma 3876 0.07 0.06 0.36 0.52 0.13 0.69
Oregon 3982 0.07 0.07 0.52 0.63 0.12 0.84
Pennsylvania 12784 0.05 0.06 0.41 0.56 0.11 0.90
Rhode Island 1054 0.06 0.06 0.52 0.62 0.02 0.72
South Carolina 4835 0.04 0.04 0.33 0.56 0.05 0.91
South Dakota 837 0.09 0.09 0.61 0.66 0.07 0.91
Tennessee 6548 0.05 0.06 0.39 0.52 0.18 0.85
Texas 26956 0.11 0.10 0.33 0.50 0.06 0.88
Utah 2948 0.07 0.07 0.56 0.57 0.13 0.72
Vermont 626 0.05 0.05 0.49 0.66 0.10 0.63
Virginia 2903 0.07 0.09 0.38 0.63 0.09 0.98
Washington 7073 0.09 0.10 0.61 0.62 0.06 0.83
West Virginia 1846 0.05 0.06 0.52 0.48 0.12 0.87
Wisconsin 5755 0.05 0.06 0.51 0.68 0.08 0.86
Wyoming 583 0.06 0.06 0.51 0.63 0.15 0.68
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B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Data description for selected variables
Variable Description
HPI Average house price index at the county level
Nav Net assessed value of properties at the county level
Mill rate Property tax on $1, 000 of assessed value averaged
at the county level
Aggregate levy lim. Limit on the growth of levy at the jurisdiction level
Jurisdiction rate lim. Limit on the growth of mill rate at the jurisdiction level
Assessment limit Presence of assessment limit in the county
Demographic controls Share of white population, share of black population
share of population age 20-29 - share of population age 30-39
share of population age 40-49 - share of population age 50-59
share of college educated population - share of urban area
in county, unemployment rate
Public finance controls Fraction of own source revenues
Fraction of property tax on total revenues
Fraction of other taxes on total revenues
Fraction intergovernmental revenues on total revenues
Income controls Personal income, employment income, wage income
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Table B.2: Summary statistics: limits by state
Assessment limit Rate limit Rate limit Levy limit Levy limit
on property for jurisdiction on property in aggregate
Alabama X X
Alaska X
Arizona X X X X
Arkansas X X X
California X X X
Colorado X X X X
Connecticut X
Delaware X X





Illinois X X X
Indiana X X













Nevada X X X
New Hampshire
New Jersey X
New Mexico X X X X
New York X X X
North Carolina X
North Dakota X X
Ohio X X X
Oklahoma X X
Oregon X X X
Pennsylvania X X
Rhode Island X
South Carolina X X
South Dakota X
Tennessee X




Washington X X X
West Virginia X X X
Wisconsin X X
Wyoming X
Notes: Data from Paquin (2015) and Lincoln Institute and of Public Policy (2021b)
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Table B.3: Summary statistics: by local property tax limits
All values are adjusted for inflation with 2000 as the base year. Jurisdiction rate limits are limits on what
mill a local jurisdiction can impose. Aggregate levy limits are limit on the maximum growth in tax levy.
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Table B.4: The tax base: Home price index and assessed values 2
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAV per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years All All < 2008 ≥2008 < 2008 ≥2008
(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) > 0 0.17c 0.15c 0.19c 0.13c 0.18c 0.09b
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
|(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) < 0| -0.18c -0.19c 0.66b -0.18c 0.28c -0.19c
(0.04) (0.06) (0.28) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06)
Weighted X X X
R2 0.14 0.30 0.22 0.10 0.39 0.26
Observations 23,814 23,814 7,487 16,327 7,487 16,327
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the
reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes.
Weights are based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.The
independent variables are the three year first difference in home prices between 2002 and 2015.
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Table B.5: The policy effect: the tax base and property tax revenues - 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logmill ∆ log levy cap
(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) > 0 -0.03 -0.02 0.14c 0.13c
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
|(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) < 0| 0.10c 0.09b -0.07b -0.10b
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Weighted X X
R2 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.19
Observations 22,861 22,546 22,546 22,546
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logmill ∆ log levy cap
Years < 2008 ≥2008 < 2008 ≥2008
(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) > 0 -0.05a 0.01 0.14c 0.15c
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
|(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) < 0| 0.04 0.10c 0.75c -0.07b
(0.30) (0.03) (0.21) (0.03)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.05
Observations 7,203 15,658 7,090 15,456
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account county level policy and serial correlation.
All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the
reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes.
Weights are based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010. The
independent variables are the three year first difference in home prices between 2002 and 2015.
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Table B.6: The Great Recession: disentangling the tax base and policy effect - Pop Weighted
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV 0.37c 0.33b 0.29a
(0.13) (0.12) (0.17)
∆ logNAV > 0 0.54c 0.48c 0.59c
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.30 -0.30b -0.23
(0.20) (0.14) (0.21)
R2 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.20
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV -0.55c -0.63c -0.65c
(0.14) (0.13) (0.18)
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.35c -0.35c -0.24c
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.65c 0.67c 0.74c
(0.22) (0.16) (0.22)
R2 0.39 0.42 0.55 0.56 0.48 0.52
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account state level policy and serial correlation.
This table presents results from table 2.6 weighting outcomes. Weights are based on the average national
share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.
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Table B.7: The Great Recession: The role of rate and levy limits 2007-2012 (by jurisdiction)
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Yearly ∆ for years 2007-2012
∆ logNAVt > 0 0.70c 0.63c 0.76c 0.42c
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| -0.33b -0.42c -0.51c -0.42c
(0.14) (0.09) (0.16) (0.14)
∆ logNAVt > 0× jurisd. rate limit -0.08 -0.36b
(0.12) (0.18)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × jurisd. rate limit -0.16 0.06
(0.16) (0.22)
∆ logNAVt > 0× ind. property levy lim. 0.22a 0.47c
(0.12) (0.16)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × ind. property levy lim. -0.28a -0.24
(0.16) (0.22)
R2 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.43
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,877 12,877
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Yearly ∆ for years 2007-2012
∆ logNAVt > 0 -0.29c -0.30c -0.24 -0.51c
(0.08) (0.04) (0.15) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| 0.66c 0.53c 0.49c 0.55c
(0.14) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16)
∆ logNAVt > 0× jurisd. rate limit 0.00 -0.28
(0.09) (0.17)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × jurisd. rate limit -0.21 0.03
(0.17) (0.23)
∆ logNAVt > 0× ind. property levy lim. 0.15 0.40b
(0.11) (0.16)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × ind. property levy lim. -0.24 -0.21
(0.17) (0.23)
R2 0.20 0.20 0.35 0.36
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,877 12,877
Pop. Weighted X X
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. This table presents results from table 2.7 using jurisdiction rate limits rather than overall rate limits.
Jurisdiction rate limits are specified as limits on the mill rate a local jurisdiction can impose. Levy limits on
individual property are limits that restrict the maximum effective tax rate on a property to a certain percent-
age, either based on market value or assessed value. See text and appendix for more details on the data
sources and which states have such limits.
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Table B.8: The Great Recession: the role of limits - long differences - Pop Weighted
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 0.47c 0.92c 0.53c 0.85c 0.65c 1.08c
(0.09) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22) (0.13) (0.18)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.03 -0.60c 0.01 -0.62c 0.11 -0.70c
(0.11) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.12 -0.08 -0.08
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim -0.30 -0.35b -0.36
(0.24) (0.16) (0.24)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim -0.52b -0.45 -0.58b
(0.25) (0.27) (0.24)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.75c 0.54c 0.77c
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16)
r2 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.41 0.21 0.43
N 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.54c -0.09 -0.47c -0.15 -0.35b 0.07
(0.09) (0.22) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.18)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.94c 0.32c 1.00c 0.33b 1.08c 0.23c
(0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.31a 0.18 0.14
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim -0.32 -0.37b -0.37
(0.26) (0.17) (0.26)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim -0.36 -0.25 -0.38a
(0.24) (0.24) (0.20)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.82c 0.58c 0.84c
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
r2 0.43 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.53 0.68
N 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table presents weighted results for table 2.8. Weights are based on the average national share in the
county population between 2000 and 2010.
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Table B.9: Tax base versus policy effect: taking stock - Limited sample
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAV per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.01 0.16c 0.21b
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
∆ logHPI > 0 -0.02 0.18 0.37
(0.42) (0.25) (0.69)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.01 -0.16c -0.21b
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV 0.46c 0.42c 0.47c
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
∆ logNAV > 0 0.57c 0.65c 0.64c
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.22 -0.17 -0.18
(0.18) (0.15) (0.20)
R2 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.35 0.31 0.39
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table presents results from table 2.4 limiting the sample where both levy and assessed values are avail-
able for the years evaluated (2007-2015). The bottom panel estimates the top panel of table 6, limiting the
sample where the Home Price Index is available.
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Table B.10: Tax base versus policy effect: taking stock - Weighted results
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.00 0.10 0.09
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13)
∆ logHPI > 0 1.47c 1.46c 1.11c
(0.35) (0.38) (0.14)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.00 -0.10 -0.08
(0.08) (0.07) (0.14)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.07
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.13c -0.24c -0.34c
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
∆ logHPI > 0 0.37 0.28 2.41c
(1.46) (1.28) (0.86)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.13c 0.24c 0.39c
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
R2 0.11 0.12 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.39
Observations 1,685 1,685 1,712 1,712 1,685 1,685
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table presents weighted results for table 2.9. Weights are based on the average national share in the
county population between 2000 and 2010.
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Table B.11: Correlations between changes in income, demographics, limits and change in
the home price index
Correlation with ∆ logHPIt
∆Share whitet -0.07c Fraction revenue own source 0.46c
(0.02) (0.12)
∆Share blackt -0.55c Fraction revenue property tax 1.30c
(0.15) (0.23)
∆Share population 20-29t 1.32c Fraction revenue other taxes -0.43
(0.19) (0.44)
∆Share population 30-39t -0.38b Fraction inter-gov. transfers -0.77c
(0.18) (0.13)
∆Share population 40-49t 1.67c
(0.13)
∆Share population 50-59t 2.95c Some rate limit 1.72c
(0.15) (0.14)
∆Share colleget -0.90c Rate lim. on jurisdiction -1.48c
(0.05) (0.13)
∆Share urbant -0.13c Rate lim. on property -0.15b
(0.02) (0.06)
∆Unemployment ratet -1.21c Some levy limit -1.03c
(0.05) (0.11)
∆Log income per capt -0.03b Levy lim. - aggregate 0.90c
(0.01) (0.10)
∆Log employmentt 0.41c Levy lim. on property 0.27b
(0.03) (0.12)
∆Log wage per capt 0.05c
(0.01)
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table reports coefficient from four separate regressions to find the correlation between the yearly change
in log home price index and the relevant variables reported. The data covers yearly changes between 2000
and 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the Each horizontal separation denotes a separate regression.
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B.2 Additional Figures
Figure B.1: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate - 2
(a) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - population weighted
full sample
(b) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - full sample un-
weighted / non adjusted for inflation
The top figure plots the county weighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2002. The bottom figures plots the unweighted US average change of the four denominated variables
not adjusted for inflation. Values are standardized from base year 2002. See text and appendix for more
details on how variables are computed.
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Figure B.2: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate - subsamples
Weighted
(a) Counties with some rate limits (b) Counties without some rate limits
(c) Counties with aggregate levy limits (d) Counties without aggregate levy limits
The top figure plots the county weighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2003, by whether counties are in a state with or without any rate limit, or with/without any aggregate
levy limit. Refer to previous tables and text for exact definition of rate and aggregate levy limits. See text
and appendix for more details on how variables are computed.
130
Figure B.3: Median and inter-quartile range of yearly changes 2000-2016 - By rate limits
(a) % Change in property tax levy - aggregate levy
limit
(b) % Change in property tax levy - NO aggregate
levy limit
(c) % Change in mill rate - rate jurisdiction limit
(d) % Change in mill rate - NO rate jurisdiction
limit
Our baseline mill rate is computed as the total tax levy divided by the taxable assessed value × 1000. The
column ”Mill avg.” indicates whether the mill rate was computed by finding an average of the mill rate for
multiple jurisdictions in the county. When both are available, we use the baseline mill rate. The column
Aggregated indicates whether the data was collected at the county level or for at the taxing district level,
and then aggregated for all counties.
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Figure B.4: County level 5-year %∆ change levy and nav
(a) Change in levy per capita 2002-2007 (b) Change in levy per capita 2007-2012
(c) Change in nav per capita 2002-2007 (d) Change in nav per capita 2007-2012
These maps show the 5-year percentage change in levy per capita and assessed value per capita between
2002 and 2007, and between 2007 and 2012. All values are adjusted for inflation.
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Figure B.5: County level 5-year %∆ change mill rate and HPI
(a) Change in mill rate 2002-2007 (b) Change in mill rate 2007-2012
(c) Change in HPI2002-2007 (d) Change in HPI 2007-2012
These maps show the 5-year percentage change in mill rate and county home price index (HPI) between
2002 and 2007, and between 2007 and 2012. All values are adjusted for inflation.
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B.3 Property tax variables and data collection procedure
County level mill rate
We determine the mill rate from three different methods
1. Dividing levy by total net taxable assessed value × 1000
2. Using the average county mill rate given directly in tax reports (assumed to be cal-
culated as 1), unless stated otherwise). When both 1) and 2) are available, we check
they are the same.
3. Using the average county level mill rate calculated from the average of all sub ju-
risdictions within a county. For instance, average county mill rate = county rate +
average city rate + average school rate.
1) is our preferred option when others are available. When computing 3), we typically
don’t include special districts. Special districts (e.g. fire departments, library, etc.) only
make up a tiny fraction of property tax levy. The main issue is that because not every
property in the state will be subject to a levy from a special district, a simple average will
cause an upward bias in the mean county mill rate.
Assessed value
There are two main issues to consider. The first one is that some states report the net
taxable value, which is used to determine the tax rate based on the required levy. Some
states may report assessed value before exemptions. Unless specifically stated, we assume
that assessed values reported in annual property tax reports are the net taxable value.
Some states are not specifically reporting assessed values before exemptions, in that case
we assume they report the taxable value only.
The second issue with assessed value is that it can be different for counties and school
districts. While most states order assessment to be made at the county level (sometimes at
the state level), school district and counties may have different exemption levels, implying
a different net taxable assessed value at the county level for either jurisdictions. When
multiple assessed values are reported, our preferred choice is the county assessed value,
as some school district borders cross county limits. In states where school districts do not
cross county limits, we can also compute the average of the two to find the average taxable
value at the county level.
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Tax levy
Tax levies are rather straightforward and typically reported at the county level for the
total of all sub jurisdictions within a county, or by jurisdictions. When reported individu-
ally, we compute the county level total of each sub-jurisdiction (e.g. county total from all
levies by school districts), and the county total for all jurisdictions.
Type of property considered
In many cases the disaggregated values for different types of property are not available,
and the data reported refers to all property tax categories. Usually, personal property
constitutes only a fraction of real property. Therefore, as standard, we will use the Total
Residential Land, Improvements & Personal Property valuation.
Year vs Fiscal year
In some cases, data is reported according to the fiscal year and not the calendar year.
In addition, different states have different definitions of fiscal year, for example New York’s
state fiscal year begins April 1 and ends on March 31, while Michigan’s begins October 1
and ends September 30. In the majority of cases, we follow the state reports in assigning
data to the calendar year in which taxes are levied.
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B.4 Cleaning log
The following list details for each state the source of the data, the variables collected
and / or computed, the years available and specific issues if present. In addition to the
state-specific sources referenced, materials from the Lincoln Institute have been used in
producing this section1.
B.4.1 Alabama
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute for mill rates, and Alabama Department of Revenue2
for Annual Reports.
• Data available:
– Net taxable assessed valuation by county (Including Real, Business Personal,
and Motor Vehicle Property (State))
– Net collections (levy) after all exemptions by State, Counties, Municipalities and
Schools at the County level.
– Mill rates: Millage available by county as imposed by the state, the county, the
school districts within the county and the municipalities within the county
• Computed variables: County level millage is computed by summing the total state
and county-wide mill rates to the average of the mill rates for municipalities and
school districts within the county.
• Years: Data for assessment collected from 1997-2019, for levies collected for 2000-
2019. The data on levy is based on year the levy is determined. Taxes are collected
the following year. The data on millage rates is available from 2000-2019, but miss-
ing for 2013 and 2015. Alabama begins the fiscal year on October 1st. Assessment
data reported by fiscal year.
1Significant Features of the Property Tax. https://www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data-
toolkits/significant-features-property-tax/access-property-tax-database/property-tax-rates Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy and George Washington Institute of Public Policy. (Property Tax Rates; accessed: 05/19/2021
09:26:50 PM)
State-by-State Property Tax at a Glance. https://www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data-
toolkits/significant-features-property-tax/state-state-property-tax-glance. Significant Features of the
Property Tax. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and George Washington Institute of Public Policy. (Property
Tax at a Glance; accessed: 10/31/2017 4:41:21 PM)
2
Retrieved May 12, 2021, from https://revenue.alabama.gov/category/publications/annual-reports/
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• Assessment and levy data includes Real, Business Personal, and Motor Vehicle Prop-
erty.
B.4.2 Alaska
No data is available for Alaska.
B.4.3 Arizona
• Source of data: Arizona Department of Revenue Annual Reports, available at the
Arizona Department of Revenue3 for years 2008-2020, and Lincoln Institute for years
1999-2019.
• Data available:
– Asssessed value computed using the primary limited property value (LPV) and
the secondary full cash value (FCV). LPV is always lower or equal to full market
value and has limits placed on how much it can increase.
– Primary and secondary Levies by jurisdictions (state, county, municipality, school
districts, community colleges, and all other jurisdictions)
– Primary and secondary mill rates.
• Computed variables: We compute the total levy at the county level by summing
primary and secondary levy for all jurisdictions within a county. Using the secondary
net assessed value and the computed total levy, we obtain a measure of county-level
mill rate.
• Years: We collected data from 1999 to 2017. Data in Arizona is given based on the
fiscal year. The fiscal year is the 12-month period beginning on July 1 and ending
June 30 of the following year.
• Property Classification: In Arizona property is categorized into 9 different groups.
Each classification is assigned a specific assessment ratio prescribed by law which
is then multiplied by the full cash and limited values to produce an assessed value.
Properties in all classes are subject to the same tax rate.
3Retrieved May 14, 2021 from https://azdor.gov/reports-statistics-and-legal-research/annual-reports
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• Other: Beginning in Tax Year 2015, both primary and secondary taxes are levied
against the limited (primary) value.
B.4.4 Arkansas
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute for levies by class, assessed values by class and
effective rates by class between 1995 and 2005, and average county mill rates for
2005-2018. Arkansas department of property tax through direct contact for assessed
values at the county level between 2012 and 2018.
• Data available:
– Mill rates by class at the county level between 1995-2005.
– Mill rates by jurisdiction (school district, cities, county) between 2005-2018.
– Assessed values by class at the county level between 1995-2005
– Levies by class at the county level between 1995-2005
– Assessment at the county level between 2012-2018
• Computed variables: For years 1995-2005, compute mill by dividing total levy across
classes over total assessed value across classes. For 2006-2018, average mill rate at
the county level already provided in the data.
• Years: 1995-2018 for mill rates, 1995-2005 for levies, 1995-2005 and 2012-2018
for assessed values. Data in Arkansas is reported for years levied. Taxes reported
would be collected the following year. Data in Arkansas is based on levy, the year of
collection is the following year. The Fiscal Year begins in July in Arkansas.
• Property Classification: Real property is assessed at 20% of true and full market




• Source of data: Lincoln Institute for years 1999-2016. Data also available from the
California State Board of Equalization for 2012-20195
• Data available:
– Net taxable assessed value at the county level
– Levies by jurisdiction (city, county, school, and other districts)
– Average tax rate at the county level
• Computed variables: The mill rate is computed by dividing the sum of the levies
within a county, over the overall net taxable assessed value in the county.
• Years: Data collected from 1999-2016. The year refers to when the tax is levied (not
collected). The fiscal year in California start on July first.
• Property Classification: California does not have a statewide classification of real
property.





• Source of data: Annual reports available from the Department of Local Affairs6 and
from the Lincoln Institute.
• Data available:
– Assessed valuation at the county level
– Total levy raised at the county level
– Mill rate by jurisdiction (county, average municipal, average school district, av-
erage special district) and average by county
• Computed variables: Average mill rate by county already provided in the raw data
• Years: Data collected from 2001-2018. The fiscal year in Colorado runs from July to
July. The year reported in the data refers to when taxes are levied, which are payable
the following year.
• Property Classification: Colorado has a statewide classification of property. Property
in different classes is assessed at different ratios.
• Other: Assessment is done at the county level, and the State Board of Equalization
has the task to make sure the burden is equally distributed.
B.4.7 Connecticut
• Source of data: Mill rates from direct contact with the Connecticut Office of Policy
and Management. Assessment data available on the Office of Policy and Manage-
ment’s website7
• Data available
– Mill rates at the municipality level
– Assessed value at the municipality level: listed as Net Grand List, or the assessed




• Computed variables: we compute the average mill rate at the county level by averag-
ing out the mill rates in the municipalities within the county. We compute the county
level net assessed value by summing the total assessed values of the municipalities
within the county. We compute the levy using the county level mill rate and net
assessed value.
• Years: Mill rates data collected from 1991-2017, assessed values data collected from
1996-2018. The fiscal year in Connecticut begins on July 1st. The Grand List is
certified before the fiscal year, so a Grand List for 2019 is certified in February 2020
and is used for taxes in Fiscal year June 2020-June 2021, while taxes are due January
2021. The year thus refers to when taxes are levied, not collected.
• Property Classification: Connecticut does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
B.4.8 Washington DC
No data is available for Washington DC
B.4.9 Delaware
• Source of data: Mill rates from the Lincoln Institute
• Data available:
– Mill rates at the county and municipality level, by jurisdiction within municipal-
ity (County rate, school rate, city rate, library rate, others)
– Taxable values at the county level (incomplete - available only for two counties)
– Levy: incomplete, only for one county
• Computed variables: we compute the average mill rate at the county level by aver-
aging out the municipality-level mill rates within the county.
• Years: Data on average mill rate collected from 2005 to 2015. Partial assessment
data collected from 1997 to 2017.
• Property Classification: Delaware does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
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• Other: The three Delaware counties have different dates of assessment; they tax a
different proportion of that assessment, and they tax at different rates. Municipal
and school district rates also vary throughout the state.
B.4.10 Florida
• Source of data: We obtain data on mill rates, levies and taxable value from the
Lincoln Institute and from the Florida Department of Revenue8
• Data available
– Taxable value and just value, where just value represents the market value of
the property, and taxable value represents the just value minus exemptions.
– Millage rate at the county level by function and jurisdiction (County, School,
Special Districts, Municipal and others)
– County-wide levy (total and by jurisdiction / function)
• Computed variables: County-wide totals are already available in the raw data
• Years: Data collected from 1999-2019. Data for a year is based on assessments made
on January 1st. Tax collection is determined mid-year, and taxes are collected the
following year. The state tax year runs June-June but local tax years follow calendar
years.
• Property Classification: Florida does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
B.4.11 Georgia
• Source of data: Information on mill rates, levies and taxable values is available on
the Georgia’s Department of Revenue Website9
• Data available





– Levy at the jurisdiction level
– Assessed value and taxable value at the jurisdiction level for different property
classes.
• Computed variables: we use the net taxable value reported at the county level
(schools net taxable value is reported as well, the two differ slightly due to different
exemptions), and compute the sum of all levies of jurisdictions within the county. We
compute the average county level mill rate using the total levy and taxable value.
• Years: We use data from 1994-2018. Local policymakers determine the millage rate
around July, and they do so based on an estimated assessed value based on the
previous year’s value.
• Property Classification: Georgia has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In Georgia property is required to be assessed at 40% of the fair market value
unless otherwise specified by law.
B.4.12 Hawaii
No data is available for Hawaii
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B.4.13 Idaho
• Source of data: Assessed values, levies, and millage rates can be accessed through
the Idaho State Tax Commission’s website10
• Data available:
– Taxable value by property type at the county level
– Levy by property type at the county level
– Average property tax rate in urban and rural areas within the county, and over-
all.
• Computed variables: Years 2001 and 2003 only report separate urban and rural data
for tax rates. For these years, we get the mill rate as the average between urban
and rural times the ratio between the true average and calculated (urban and rural)
average for years 2002 and 2004. We compute the total levy by summing the levies
on different types of property. The total value at the county level is already provided
in the data.
• Years: Data for levies collected for 2004-2012 (2010 missing), data for values col-
lected from 2004-2020, data for mill rate collected from 2001-2017.
• Property Classification: Idaho does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: In FY 2007, a change was implemented in the funding of schools. Thus,
property taxes were reduced dramatically starting in calendar year 2006, FY 2007.
B.4.14 Illinois
• Source of data: Data available on the Illinois Department of Revenue’s Website11
• Data available
– Equalized assessed value at the county level. The equalized assessed value is
computed multiplying the assessed value of property times the state equaliza-




– Taxes levied at the county level
• Computed variables: the average mill rate at the county level is computed using the
equalized assessed value and the total levy.
• Years: data collected from 1990-2018.
• Property Classification: Illinois does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: The equalization is required so that counties have a median level of assess-
ment at 33% of fair market value. This is necessary since some counties assess prop-
erty at different ratios of market value.
B.4.15 Indiana
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute.
• Data available:
– Gross millage rates by municipalities and property type. The gross tax rate is
applied to the net taxable value of a property. After that, properties may receive
a credit, to which a homestead credit may be added.
• Computed variables: the tax rates available are gross tax rates. We take the average
at the county level of tax rates imposed within the county.
• Years: data collected for years 1999-2016.
• Property Classification: Indiana does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: In 2002, there was a change in the assessment method, from a formula based
one to a market value-in-use assessment practice. This change was accompanied by
increased deductions for homeowners. This explains a sharp decrease in effective tax
rates between 2001 and 2002: due to the new rules on assessment, the gross value
of real property grew at a faster rate than levies.
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B.4.16 Iowa
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute
• Data available
– Taxable value by jurisdiction
– Levy by jurisdiction and function
• Computed variables: We compute the levy at the jurisdiction level using jurisdiction
level taxable value and mill rate. We then use total levy and total taxable value at
the county level, and compute the average mill rate at the county level.
• Years: Data collected for 2000 to 2017. In the reported data, the tax rate applied
for a fiscal year is based on the taxable value of the previous year. For example, the
assessed value as of January 2011 is used to calculate the tax liability in summer
2012. Taxes are due in September 30th and March 30th. In our data, year 2011
refers to the fiscal year 2011-2012. The fiscal year for the state starts on July 1st and
ends on the following June 30th.
• Property Classification: Iowa has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.17 Kansas
• Source of data: Annual reports from the Kansas Department of Revenue’s website12
• Data available
– Average mill rate by county
– Property taxes levied by county
• Computed variables: we compute the net assessed value from the mill rate and the
levy.
• Years: We have data from 2004-2018.




• Source of data: Kentucky Department of Revenue for Property values13, Lincoln In-
stitute for mill rates
• Data available
– Mill rates by jurisdiction and type of property
– Full value of property subject to local taxes
• Computed variables: We compute the average county level mill rate by summing the
county level rate to the average city rate. In this case, we exclude school district rates
because the data is incomplete. In Kentucky, the average mill rate for counties is 2.5
times as large as for school districts, and the average city mill rate is 2 times as large
as school districts.
• Years: Assessment data collected from 2007-2020. Data on mill rates collected from
1999-2018.




• Source of data: Louisiana Tax Commission14
• Data available
– Assessed value by type of property
– Levy by function/jurisdiction (parish levy, road levy, school levy, levee levy,
drainage levy, other levy)
– Millage rate by function/jurisdiction
• Computed variables: The millage rate is equivalent to the rate obtained by dividing
the total levy collected within the jurisdiction and the total assessed value exclusive
of Homestead Exemption within the parish.
• Years: Data for assessments and levies collected for 2004-2017. Data for millage
rates collected for 2002-2017.
• Property Classification: Louisiana has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In Louisiana, assessed value is supposed to be 10% of the market value for
land and residential property, 15% for commercial and movable personal property,
and 25% for public service property.
B.4.20 Maine
• Source of data: State of Maine Department of Administrative and Financial Ser-
vices1516
• Data available
– Mill rates derived by dividing the levy at the municipal level by the state equal-
ized valuation of property (excluding homestead adjustments and exemptions).
– State equalized valuation of municipal assessments: the state certifies the full





• Computed variables: We compute the levy at the county level by multiplying the mill
rate times the net assessed value.
• Years: Data on millage rates collected from 2001-2016, and data on state equalized
value from 1986-2017. The state valuation lags the values assessed by municipalities
by almost two years.
• Property Classification: Maine does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
B.4.21 Maryland
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and Maryland Department of Assessment and Taxa-
tion17
• Data available:
– Tax rates by jurisdiction and by type of property
• Computed variables: we compute the mill rate by first computing the sum of county
and municipality/district rate imposed in jurisdictions within the county on real prop-
erty, and then taking the average at the county level.
• Years: Data for mill rates collected for 2002-2017. Data for every year refers to mill
rates imposed on July 1st. For example, data for 2002 refers to mill rates imposed
on July 1st.
• Property Classification: Maryland does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
• Other: In Maryland, all property is assessed at the fair market value. The assessments





• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and Massachusets Department of Revenue Division
of Local Services19
• Data available:
– Mill rates by municipality and type of property
– Tax levy by municipality and type of property
– Assessed values by municipality and type of property
• Computed variables: We compute the average mill rate by county by dividing the
levy from the total assessed value. We compute the total assessed value and levy at
the county level by summing assessed values and levies of the jurisdictions within
the municipality
• Years: Data collected from 2003-2019 for tax levies and assessed values, and from
1981-2017 for tax rates. The data is presented for fiscal years. Fiscal years in Mas-
sachusetts the fiscal year runs from July 1st to June 30th.
• Property Classification: Massachusetts does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
B.4.23 Michigan
• Source of data: Michigan Department of Treasury20
• Data available
– County level total taxable valuation
– Total taxes levied in the county
– average tax rage within the county
• Computed variables: All variables provided in the raw data




• Property Classification: Michigan does not have a statewide classification of real
property
• Other: The information is based on all classes of property (real and personal). Michi-
gan relies on an equalization process.
B.4.24 Minnesota
• Source of data: Minnesota Department of Revenue21 22
• Data available:
– Estimated market value
– Tax exemptions
– Taxable market value
– Net tax capacity
– Tax levies
– Tax credits
– Net tax payable.
• Computed variables: We use net tax payable for levy, which includes property taxes
paid for jurisdictions within the county excluding credits, and taxable market value,
which is defined as the assessed value of the property minus exemptions. We com-
pute the average tax rate at the county level by dividing the total levy over the net
assessed value.
• Years: We have data from 2001 to 2018. The year indicated in the reports is the
year in which property taxes are paid. Property taxes paid in the current year use
property valuations (assessments) from January 1 of the previous year. For example,
property taxes paid in 2018 are based on the assessment from January 1, 2017. In
our dataset, we use the year for which property was assessed and taxes levied (the
previous year).




• Other: In Minnesota, there is a referendum market value (RMV), which is applied
to property tax levied through referendum. It is similar to the taxable market value
minus agricultural land. Although RMV may be different than TMV, we combine
all levies (including referendum levies) when calculating payable taxes. We then
compute the effective mill rate by dividing the net tax payable by the taxable market
value. In Minnesota, the assessment ratio varies across counties, which implies the
effective rate on property will differ across jurisdictions.
B.4.25 Mississippi
• Source of data: State tax office23 and annual reports24
• Data available
– Total assessment by county and type of property
– Mill rate by county and function (schools, colleges, roads, fire and police and
other county level operations). The county mill rate does not include city level
mill rates.
• Computed variables: We estimate the county levy using the data on assessed value
and millage rates at the county level.
• Years: We have data from 1995-2018. The fiscal year runs from July to July in
Mississippi. Data are given for fiscal years. E.g. we define data for fiscal year 2004-
2005 as data for year 2004, since mill rates and assessed values are determined based
on 2004 data.
• Property Classification: Mississippi has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.26 Missouri






– Assessed value by jurisdiction and function
– Mill rate ceiling
– Mill rate actually levied
• Computed variables: Using the jurisdiction level assessed value and mill rate, we
compute the levy for each jurisdiction. Since assessed values are reported multiple
times within a county for different taxes (e.g. General Revenue, Fire, Debt Service),
we use the assessed value used by the county for General Revenues. We calculate the
effective average mill rate by dividing the total aggregate levy at the county level by
the total county level assessed value.
• Years: We have data from 2000-2018. The fiscal year in Missouri runs from June
to June. Property tax bills are sent out in November each year and are to be paid
by the end of the year. The data covers years based on regular calendar year, which
corresponds to the year when property taxes were decided and levied.
• Property Classification: Missouri has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.27 Montana
• Source of data: Annual reports retrieved from the Lincoln Institute
• Data available
– Mill rate by jurisdiction at the county level (state, county, schools, other dis-
tricts)
– Levy by jurisdiction at the county level (state, county, schools, other districts)
• Computed variables: Taxable value computed at county level using the given mill
rates and levies’ values. Average mill rate at the county level computed using total
county level assessed value and levy.
• Years: The data is available from 1999-2016. The fiscal year in Montana runs from
July to July. The year defined in the data is the base in the fiscal year, e.g. for
FY2003-2004 we indicate 2004.
• Property Classification: Montana has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: Properties are assessed at the state level in Montana.
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B.4.28 Nebraska
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and Nebraska Department of Revenue26
• Data available
– Total taxable value by county
– Total property taxes levied by county
– Average tax rate at the county level
• Computed variables: Variables reported as in the raw data
• Years: Data collected for 1997-2020
• Property Classification: Nebraska has a statewide classification of real property
• Other: In Nebraska the assessed value is computed differently for agricultural prop-
erty and other property. It is assessed at full market value by all counties for non
agricultural property, and 75% of market value for agricultural property.
B.4.29 Nevada
• Source of data: State of Nevada Department of Taxation27
• Data available
– Total assessed value by county
– Levies by taxing jurisdictions within county (schools, county, cities, towns, spe-
cial districts, state)
– Average county wide tax rate
• Computed variables: All variables are already available in the raw data
• Years: Data collected from 2000-2017. Data is presented in fiscal years, we attribute
data to the second part of the fiscal year, so data for fiscal year 2016-2017 is at-





• Property Classification: Nevada does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: In Nevada property is assessed at 35% of the taxable value. Taxable value
is not equal to market value, but follows different determination rules for real and
personal property.
B.4.30 New Hampshire
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and Department of Revenue Administration through
direct contact
• Data available
– Municipality level valuation
– Municipality level rates by function / jurisdiction (Town, Local Education, State
Education, County)
– Total tax commitment / levy
• Computed variables: We compute the total valuation and levy at the county level by
summing municipality-level valuation and levy. We compute the average mill rate at
the county level using the computed total valuation and levy.
• Years: Data is available for years 2000-2017.
• Property Classification: New Hampshire does not have a statewide classification of
real property.
• Other: The tax rates presented represent the estimated tax rate for a municipality if
all the taxable property was assessed at 100%.
B.4.31 New Jersey




– Net Valuation Taxable
– Net valuation on which county taxes are apportioned (or net equalized valua-
tion)
– Total tax levy on which tax rate is computed
• Computed variables: Using the total net taxable value and the total levy at the county
level we compute the average mill rate at the county level
• Years: Data collected from 1995-2015. Data is reported following the timing on the
annual reports, which assigns data for (for example) the fiscal year ending on June
30 1996 to 1995. The New Jersey fiscal year begins on July 1st and ends on June
30th.
• Property Classification: New Jersey does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
B.4.32 New Mexico
• Source of data: Property tax facts reports of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue
Department, sourced from the Lincoln Institute and New Mexico Department of Fi-
nance and Administration29
• Data available
– Net taxable value at the county level by type of property (residential vs nonres-
idential)
– Property tax obligations at the county level by type of property (residential vs
nonresidential)
• Computed variables: Using the county level net taxable values and property tax
levies, we are able to compute the average tax rate at the county level.
• Years: Data collected from 2003-2020. The fiscal year runs from July to July in New
Mexico. The data reported for fiscal year 2020, e.g. refers to fiscal year 2019-2020.
As such, we define the year as 2019 for data from fiscal year 2020.





• Source of data: New York State30
• Data available
– Tax levy by jurisdiction
– Rate by jurisdiction (for years until 2011, not equalized)
– Equalization rates by jurisdiction
• Computed variables: Using the equalization rates, we compute full tax rates (mean-
ing tax rates that apply to the full value of the property, not to the assessed value
which is computed differently in different jurisdictions in New York) for all years.
Using full tax rates and levies at the jurisdiction level, we compute taxable values.
Using the computed taxable values and the levies, we obtain average municipality
rates and average school district rates per county. We compute the average rate im-
posed at the county level as the sum of the average county, municipality and school
district rates imposed within a county.
• Years: The data was collected for 2003-2018. We use the roll year, which is identified
as the year in which taxes are levied.
• Property Classification: New York does not have a statewide classification of real
property/
• Other: In New York, different jurisdictions may determine different levels of assess-
ment. Therefore, in order for rates to be comparable within the state, there is an
equalization rate which allows to compare the rates on the full values of properties,





• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and North Carolina Department of Revenue31
• Data available
– County and Municipality millage rates (not equalized) by county and munici-
pality
• Computed variables: We compute the average rate at the county level by first com-
puting the mean rates by county and municipality at the county level, and then
summing them.
• Years: We use data from 1999 to 2017. The data for a year refers to the fiscal year
starting in that year, e.g. data for fiscal year 2009-2010 is attributed to 2009. The
fiscal year in North Carolina starts on July 1st and runs until June 30th.
• Property Classification: North Carolina has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In North Carolina, property is assessed at the county level. In addition, prop-
erty has to be reappraised at least once every eight years.
B.4.35 North Dakota
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute
• Data available
– Taxes raised at the county level (Ad Valorem Taxes)
– Taxable value at the county level
– Average mill rate at the county level
• Computed variables: The variables are used as presented in the raw data
• Years: Data is available from 2000-2017. The fiscal year in North Dakota runs from
July to July. Property taxes are mailed to individuals in December of the calendar
year and are then payable the following January. Property tax reports are published
in June and report taxes from the previous year. We compute the year as published
in the reports since it matches when property taxes are decided and levied.
31https://www.ncdor.gov/news/reports-and-statistics/county-and-municipal-effective-tax-rates
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• Property Classification: North Dakota has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In North Dakota, the assessed value is 50% of the market value, and then
each class of property has a different assessment ratio. The assessment ratio is mul-
tiplied by the assessed value to obtain the taxable value. In 2009, North Dakota used
revenues from oil taxes to reduce school district mill levies. This resulted in a sharp
drop in average rates from 2008 to 2009.
B.4.36 Ohio
• Source of data: Ohio Department of Taxation32
• Data available
– Taxable value by type of property and county
– Gross taxes levied by type of property and county
– Net taxes charged by type of property and county
• Computed variables: We compute the average county rate using the total net taxes
levied at the county level and the total taxable value at the county level.
• Years: The data is available between 1990 and 2019. The data is presented by the
calendar year in which taxes are levied (they are collected in the following calendar
year).
• Property Classification: Ohio does not have a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In Ohio, most real property has a common assessment ratio of 35%.
B.4.37 Oklahoma





• Source of data: Oregon Department of Revenue33
• Data available
– Real Market Value of Property by county
– Net Assessed Value of Property by county
– Property Tax Imposed by county
– Average tax rate (computed with net assessed value and levy)
• Computed variables: The variables used are as presented in the raw data
• Years: Data collected for 2001-2016. Data reported for fiscal years, and attributed to
the base year (e.g. data for fiscal year 2011-2012 recorded as data for 2011.
• Property Classification: Oregon does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty
B.4.39 Pennsylvania
• Source of data: Pennsylvania Department of Community Economic Development34
• Data available
– Tax rates by municipality, county, and function
• Computed variables: We compute the average tax rate at the county level by first
computing the average real estate tax rate of municipalities within a county, and
then summing the the average municipality real estate tax and the county real estate
tax.
• Years: Data collected from 1988-2018. The data is attributed to the year reported in
the raw data.





• Other: In Pennsylvania the assessment ratio may vary at the county level.
B.4.40 Rhode Island
• Source of data: State of Rhode Island Division of Municipal Finance35
• Data available
– Municipality level property tax rates for different classes of property (residential
real estate, commercial real estate, personal property, motor vehicles)
• Computed variables: We use the municipal level property tax rate for residential real
estate to compute the average mill rate imposed in a county (note that this does not
include the fire districts rates).
• Years: Data available from 2000-2018. The data is presented by tax roll year.
• Property Classification: Rhode Island has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: All real property is assessed at 100 percent of full fair market value (with
some minor exceptions as farmland and forests).
B.4.41 South Carolina
We do not have data for South Carolina.
B.4.42 South Dakota
We do not have data for South Dakota.
B.4.43 Tennessee
• Source of data: Data from tax aggregate reports available from the Tennessee Comptroller





– County level and municipality level mill rates by counties and municipalities
– Assessed values by counties and municipalities by type of property (not includ-
ing utilities).
• Computed variables: We take the average of the total rate imposed in municipalities
within the county to obtain the average rate imposed at the county level. Using the
total county assessed value and the county-level average rate, we estimate the total
tax levied.
• Years: Data collected for 2000-2017.
• Property Classification: Tennessee has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: Property is divided in 6 classes in Tennessee, each with different assessment
rules (public and personal 55%, industrial and commercial real 40%, industrial and
commercial personal 30%, residential at 25%, farm 25%, other personal 5%. In
Tennessee the assessment is performed at the county level except for “utilities” such
as railroads, buses, where it is done centrally.
B.4.44 Texas
• Source of data: Texas comptroller’s website37 and direct contact via email.
• Data available
– Market Value by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special dis-
tricts)
– Taxable value by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special dis-
tricts)
– Total rate by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special districts)
– Levy by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special districts)
• Computed variables: We compute the total levy by county by summing the taxes
levied in all taxing jurisdictions within a county. We then use the total assessed value
at the county level and the total levy computed to get a measure of the average mill
rate imposed within a county. Note that the county taxable value of a certain county
and the sum of the school districts taxable values within the same county may vary
slightly due to potential differences in exemptions / boundaries differences.
37https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/property-tax/rates/index.php
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• Years: Data is available from 1999-2017. The year refers to when taxes are levied,
not collected.
• Property Classification: Texas does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: Assessed value in Texas is based on Market value. However the market as-
sessed value has some limitations on how it can increase year to year. Second, there
are exemptions that lower the taxable value.
B.4.45 Utah
• Source of data: Utah property tax division38
• Data available
– Total taxable value of all property by county (excludes total motor vehicle prop-
erty)
– Average tax rates, computed by dividing the total levies charged by total taxable
value
– Total property tax charged by county (excluding fee for motor vehicles)
• Computed variables: All variables used are already available in the raw data
• Years: The data is available from 2000-2019. The data is attributed to the year
reported, which is the tax year.
• Property Classification: Utah has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.46 Vermont






– Tax rate by municipality and use (state education tax rate, local share tax rate,
municipal rate). From 2004 also by homestead vs non-residential.
– Levies by municipality and use (state education tax rate, local share tax rate,
municipal rate), only for 2001-2012
• Computed variables: We compute the net assessed value using the levies and rates
available year by year for years 2001-2012. Specifically, when the homestead and
non-residential categorization is present, we compute net assessed value as the av-
erage between the net assessed value obtained with municipal share rate and levy,
and the total net assessed value from education taxes and rates (homestead plus non
residential).
• Years: Data is available from 2001-2016 for mill rates, and from 2001-2012 for tax
levies.




• Source of data: Virginia Department of Taxation40
• Data available:
– Property tax rates for every taxing jurisdiction, by type of property (real estate,
tangible personal property, machinery and tools, merchants’ capital).
– Real Estate Fair Market Value, Fair Market Value, Taxable Fair Market Value and
Levy by county
• Computed variables: In order to compute the total average mill rate imposed at the
county level, we first take the average of the rates imposed on real estate by mu-
nicipalities at the county level, then sum the county real estate rate and the average
municipality rate. We use the fair market taxable value and total levy as presented
by county in the raw data.
• Years: Data is available from 1998-2017. The data refers to the tax year (e.g. data
for 2018 is data for the tax year 2018, fiscal year 2019) as presented in the reports.
• Property Classification: Virginia does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: Cities are independent in Virginia, meaning they are not part of a county.
Thus, cities’ rates are not part of the computed county average rate.
B.4.48 Washington
• Source of data: Washington State Department of Revenue
• Data available:
– Total assessed value of all taxable property by county
– Average millage rates by county
– Property tax levies by county
• Computed variables: All variables are available in the raw data
40https://www.tax.virginia.gov/local-tax-rates and https://www.tax.virginia.gov/annual-reports
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• Years: Data is available from 2000-2018.




• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and West Virginia State Auditor’s Office.
• Data available:
– Mill rates by property class and municipality level
• Computed variables: In order to compute the average total rate imposed at the
county level, we take the average of the total rates imposed at the municipality level
for all residential property.
• Years: Data is available from 2003-2015.
• Property Classification: West Virginia has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.50 Wisconsin
• Source of data: State of Wisconsin Department of Revenue’s website41 and direct
contact via email
• Data available:
– Total levy by county
– Total equalized assessed value by county
– Average total tax rate by county
– Total tax credit by county
• Computed variables: We obtain the total levy by subtracting the credit from the levy.
• Years: The data is available from 1989-2018. Data for 1989-1990 attributed to 1989.
• Property Classification: Wisconsin has a statewide classification of real property.





• Source of data: Wyoming Department of Revenue’s website42
• Data available
– Property tax levies by jurisdiction / function (county levies, municipal levies,
special district levies, education levies) at the county level
– County level mill rate
• Computed variables: Using the county level mill rate and the total of taxes levied at
the county level, we estimate the net assessed value.
• Years: We have data from 1996-2016.
• Property Classification: Wyoming has a statewide classification of real property.
42https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/wy-dor/dor-annual-reports
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B.5 Property Tax Reforms and Tax Limits
We present results for different definitions of rate and levy limits. The majority of our
results is obtained using a definition of rate and levy limits that encompasses any limit
imposed. Following this definition, a locality is marked as having a rate limit if it has any
type of rate limit (for example a limit on individual property, a limit on some of the taxing
jurisdictions, a limit specified with a formula). Similarly, a locality is marked as having a
levy limit if any type of levy limit is present. We obtain data for the definitions above from
Paquin (2015)43. Paquin(2015) documents the limits enacted and repealed through 2013.
We record for every year in our sample the active limits and use the limits as of 2007 in
our analysis. It is worth mentioning that, during the period between 2007 and 2013, very
few changes to limits are enacted.
In addition, we also present results for rate limits at the jurisdiction level, aggregate
levy limits, and levy limits on individual properties. We complement the data from Paquin
(2015) with data from the Lincoln Institute of Public Policy44. The Lincoln review presents
the main features of states’ limits as well as the relevant history. We record a locality as
having rate limits at the jurisdiction level when most taxing jurisdictions within the county
are subject to a rate limit. In rare cases (e.g. South Dakota), rate limits exist but are
deemed not constraining (Lincoln Institute), and thus we record them as not present. We
classify a rate limit on an individual property as a limit which constrains the rate to which
a specific property is subject. We record a locality as having an aggregate levy limit when
taxing jurisdictions within the county are subject to limits on how much the levy can grow.
We also record whether there is a levy limit on individual properties, which however is far
less common.
Overall, jurisdiction-rate limits set in terms of maximum rates applicable and aggregate
levy limits set in terms of maximum growth rate for levies are the most common. Some
states however employ different formulas to set limits, which in some cases may depend
on other factors (e.g. inflation), or may combine several limits through a set process.
One particular process is the “truth-in-taxation” requirement, which usually requires that
higher assessed values do not automatically result in a tax increase, subjecting the increase
to specific obligations such as advertising changes and notifying taxpayers. Tennessee and
43Paquin, B.P., 2015. Chronicle of the 161-year history of state-imposed property tax limitations. Cam-
bridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
44State-by-State Property Tax at a Glance. https://www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data-
toolkits/significant-features-property-tax/state-state-property-tax-glance. Significant Features of the
Property Tax. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and George Washington Institute of Public Policy. (Property
Tax at a Glance; accessed: 10/31/2017 4:41:21 PM)
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Utah for example both have this type of requirement, which we categorize as an aggregate
levy limit.
While our preferred categorization system using “any rate limit” and “any levy limit” or
“aggregate levy limit” is relatively straightforward to interpret and implement, it does not
allow us to differentiate between localities with stricter and looser limits.
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APPENDIX C



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.3: Pre-trends analysis yearly sample
(1) (2)
Fin. Admin. Expenditures Direct Gen. Expenditures
Treatment × 2007 83.74b 3062.72c
(37.86) (843.15)
Treatment × 2008 74.61 2997.62c
(47.54) (851.64)
Treatment × 2009 64.39a 2253.83c
(35.91) (717.83)
Treatment × 2010 74.91b 1511.50b
(33.07) (728.64)
Treatment × 2011 29.80 1809.92c
(28.64) (692.75)
Treatment × 2012 28.88 1544.64b
(33.97) (638.97)
Treatment × 2013 -11.51 1001.60a
(24.93) (554.88)
Treatment × 2015 -39.10a -130.62
(22.67) (327.84)
Treatment × 2016 -15.36 -587.06
(34.07) (494.82)




Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the entity level in parentheses. This table presents estimates from equa-
tion (2) in the text. Treated units are local governments with federal funds expenditures between $500000
and $750000 in 2012, control units are local governments with federal funds expenditures between $750000
and $1000000
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Table C.4: Audit findings
Probability of audit in 2017 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Material Weakness FS -0.08c
(0.01)
Material Weakness MP -0.05c
(0.01)
Adverse or Qual. Report FS -0.06c
(0.01)
Adverse or Qual. Report MP -0.02a
(0.01)
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observations 19,057 19,057 19,057 19,057
Standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01














































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.1: Distribution of non-federal entities
(a) Distribution of non-federal entities in 2013 (b) Distribution of non-federal entities in 2014
(c) Distribution of non-federal entities in 2015 (d) Distribution of non-federal entities in 2016
(e) Distribution of non-federal entities in 2017 (f) Distribution of non-federal entities in 2018
These figures plot the frequency distribution of non-federal entities (including local governments and non-
profits). The threshold for audit was raised in FY2015 from $500000 to $750000.
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Figure C.2: Distribution of local governments
(a) Distribution of local governments in 2013 (b) Distribution of local governments in 2014
(c) Distribution of local governments in 2015 (d) Distribution of local governments in 2016
(e) Distribution of local governments in 2017 (f) Distribution of local governments in 2018
These figures plot the frequency distribution of local governments. The threshold for audit was raised in
FY2015 from $500000 to $750000.
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Figure C.3: Analysis of trends - full sample
(a) Average direct expenditures (b) Average financial costs
Data Source: Census of Local Governments, years 2002, 2007 and 2012.
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Figure C.4: Analysis of trends - yearly sample
(a) Average direct expenditures (b) Average financial costs
Data Source: Census of Local Governments
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